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Fhotographic 

Sciences 

Carporation 


23  WiST  MAIN  STRUT 

WIBSTIR,N.Y.  14SM 

(716)  •72-4903 


CIHM/ICMH 


Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  IMicroraproductions  /  institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiquas 


Tachnical  and  Bibliographic  Notaa/Notaa  tachniquaa  at  bibliographiquas 


T 


Tha  Inttituta  haa  attamptad  to  obtain  tha  baat 
original  copy  availabia  for  filming.  Faaturaa  of  thia 
copy  which  may  ba  bibliographically  uniqua, 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  imagaa  in  tha 
raproduction,  or  which  may  aignif  icantiy  changa 
tha  uaual  mathod  of  filming,  mn  chackad  balow. 


□   Colourad  covara/ 
Couvartura  da  coulaur 


I     I   Covara  damagad/ 


□ 


D 
D 

n 


Couvartura  andommagte 


□   Covara  raatorad  and/or  laminatad/ 
Couvartura  raatauria  at/ou  palliculAa 

I — I   Covar  titia  miaaing/ 


La  titra  da  couvartura  manqua 


Colourad  mapa/ 

Cartaa  gtographiquaa  an  coulaur 


□   Colourad  inic  (i.a.  othar  than  blua  or  black)/ 
Encra  da  coulaur  (i.a.  autra  qua  blaua  ou  noira) 


D 


Colourad  plataa  and/or  illuatrationa/ 
Planchaa  at/ou  illuatrationa  •n  coulaur 


Bound  with  othar  matarial/ 
Rail*  avac  d'autras  documanta 


Tight  binding  may  cauaa  ahadowa  or  diatortion 
along  intarior  margin/ 

Lareliura  tarria  paut  cauaar  da  I'ombra  ou  da  la 
diatortion  la  long  da  la  marga  intAriaura 

Blank  laavaa  addad  during  raatoratlon  may 
appaar  within  tha  taxt.  Whanavar  poaaibia.  thaaa 
hava  baan  omittad  from  filming/ 
II  aa  paut  qua  cartainaa  pagaa  blanchaa  ajoutiaa 
lora  d'una  raatauration  apparaiaaant  dana  la  taxta. 
maia.  loraqua  cala  ttalt  poaaibia.  caa  pagaa  n'ont 
paa  «t«  filmiaa. 

Additional  commanta:/ 
Commantairaa  supplAmantairaa: 


L'Inatitut  a  microfilm*  la  maillaur  axamplaira 
qu'il  lui  a  AtA  poaaibia  da  aa  procurar.  Las  ditaiis 
da  cat  axamplaira  qui  aont  paut-Atra  uniquas  du 
point  da  vua  bibliographiqua.  qui  pauvant  modifier 
una  imaga  raproduita.  ou  qui  pauvant  axigar  una 
modification  dana  la  mAthoda  normaia  da  fiimaga 
aont  indiquAa  ci-daaaoua. 


I     I   Colourad  pagaa/ 


D 


Pagaa  da  coulaur 

Pagaa  damagad/ 
Pagaa  andommagAas 

Pagaa  raatorad  and/oi 

Pagaa  rastaurAas  at/ou  pailiculAas 

Pagaa  discoloured,  stained  or  foxei 
Pagaa  dAcolorAes,  tachetAes  ou  piquAes 

Pagaa  detached/ 
Pages  dAtachAes 

Showthrough/ 
Tranaparance 

Quality  of  prir 

QualitA  inAgala  da  I'imprassion 

Includes  supplementary  matarli 
Comprend  du  matAriel  supplAmentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Adition  disponible 


r~n  Pagaa  damaged/ 

I      I  Pagaa  restored  and/or  laminated/ 

r~T|  Pagaa  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 

I      I  Pagaa  detached/ 

r^j  Showthrough/ 

r~n  Quality  of  print  varies/ 

I      I  Includes  supplementary  material/ 

pn  Only  edition  available/ 


T 

P 
o 
f 


C 

b 
t 

a 
o 
f 

a 
o 


T 
al 
T 

M 
d 

ai 
bi 
rii 
n 
n\ 


Pagaa  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Lea  pages  totaiement  ou  partiellement 
obscurcies  par  un  feuiliet  d'errata,  une  pelure, 
etc..  ont  AtA  filmAes  A  nouveau  de  fapon  A 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  poasible. 


Thia  item  ia  filmed  at  tha  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  filmA  au  taux  de  rAduction  indiquA  ci-dessous. 


10X 

14X 

18X 

22X 

26X 

30X 

J 

12X 


16X 


aox 


24X 


28X 


32X 


Tht  copy  filmed  hw  hat  lM«n  raproduesd  thanks 
to  th«  ganarotity  of: 


L'axamplaira  filmA  fut  raproduit  grica  i  la 
gAnAroait*  da: 


Library 

Trant  Univtnity,  PMtrborough 


Library 

Trant  Univtnity,  PMarborough 


Tha  imagas  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  baat  quality 
poasibia  eonsidaring  tha  condition  and  iaglbiilty 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  Icaaplng  with  ^ 
filming  contraet  apaeif ioatlona. 


Original  eopiaa  in  printad  papar  eovara  ara  fHmad 
beginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  last  paga  with  a  printad  or  ilhiatratad  impraa- 
sion,  or  tha  back  eovar  whan  appropriate.  All 
othar  original  eopiaa  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
firat  page  with  a  printed  or  IHiiatrated  imprea- 
alon.  and  anding  on  the  laat  pege  with  a  printed 
or  illuatratad  impreeaion. 


Las  imagea  suivsntes  ont  it*  raproduitas  avac  la 
plus  grsnd  soin,  eompta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattettt  da  i'axempiaira  film*,  at  m 
conformit*  avac  lea  conditions  du  contrst  da 
filmage. 

Lea  eKempleires  originsux  dont  la  couvartura  •n 
papier  eat  imprim*e  aont  film*a  an  commandant 
par  le  premier  plat  at  an  tarminent  soit  par  la 
derni*re  paga  qui  comporta  una  ampreinte 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'iHuatration.  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  aalon  le  ces.  Tous  les  autras  axemplairas 
orlglnaux  aont  film*a  en  commenfant  par  la 
praml*re  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impreaaion  ou  d'illustration  at  an  tarminent  par 
la  darni*re  pege  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 


The  kwt  recorded  frame  on  eech  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  — ^  (meening  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  ▼  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  appliea. 


Un  das  symboias  suivants  apparaltra  sur  la 
darni*re  imege  de  cheque  microfiche,  salon  te 
cas:  la  symbols  -^  signifia  "A  SUIVRE",  la 
symbols  V  signifis  "FIN". 


Mapa,  plates,  cherts,  etc.,  mey  be  filmed  et 
different  reduction  ratioa.  Those  too  lerge  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  ara  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hend  comer,  left  to 
right  end  top  to  bottom,  aa  many  frames  es 
required.  This  following  diegrems  illustrste  the 
method: 


Les  cartas,  planches,  tebieaux,  etc..  pauvant  *trs 
film*s  *  das  taux  de  r*duction  diff*rants. 
Lorsqus  la  document  est  trop  grand  pour  *tra 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clich*,  ii  est  film*  *  partir 
da  i'angle  sup*rieur  gauche,  de  gauche  *  droita, 
at  de  haut  en  Ims,  en  prenant  la  nombra 
d'imagas  n*csssaire.  Les  disgrammas  suivants 
illustrsnt  la  m*thoda. 


1  2  3 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

GE 


SGH 


GERMAN  PHIIOSOPHICAL  CLASSICS 


VOB 


ENGLISH  READERS  AND  STUDENTS. 


BDmS  BT 


GEORGE  S.  MORRIS. 


SCHELLING'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


X 


'I 


vx 


i 


IN  PEEPARATION 


FOR  THK  SAME  SERIES: 


KANT'S  ETHICS.    Pfesidknt  Porter. 

KANT*S  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT.     Prof.  Robert  Adansok. 

HEGEL'S  LOGIC.    Dr.  Wm.  T.  Harris. 

HEGEL'S  ^ESTHETICS.    Prof.  J.  S.  Kidket. 

HEGEL'S  PHILOSOPHY  OP  HISTORY  AND  OF  THE  STATE. 

HEGEL'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

FICHTE'S  SCIENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

LEIBNITZ'S   NEW   ESSAYS   CONCERNING   HUMAN   UNDER- 
STANDING. 

ALREADY   PUBLISHED: 

KANT'S  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.    Prof.  Geo.  8.  Morris. 


SCHELLING'S 


TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION 


By  JOHN  WATSON,  LL.D.,  F.R.S.C, 

PROFESSOR  or  MENTAL  AND  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT,  QUBBN** 
CNIVERSITY,   KINOSTON,  CANADA.' 


CHICAGO: 
S.  C.  GRIGGS  AND  COMPANY. 

1882. 


"S^&^BA.V/^ 


v/ 


COPTRIOHT,  188S, 

bt  s.  c.  orioos  and  company. 


i;-.iH'}r»«:»*^{».^.?' 


%^ 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF   KANT. 

Three  phases  of  Schelling's  speculations?  (1) 
agnostic,  (2)  pantheistic,  (3)  theistic      .      .       1 

Schelling,  the  link  connecting  Hegel  with  Kant 
through  Fichte 3 

Relations    of   the   Transcendental  Idealism   to 
Fichte's  Wissenschaftslehre  and  Hegel's  Phcp- 
nomenologie  des  Geistes 3 

The  Critical  problem 4 

Conditions  of  experience 6 

Are  there  supersensible  realities?  If  so,  they 
are  not  objects  o^  "experience  ''^'  because  they 
cannot  be  "  scbematized." 8 

Reason  compels  u.^  to  seek  for  a  totality  of  con- 
ditions  12 

Rational  Psychology,  Cosmology  and  Theology 
uncritically. -identify  Ideas  of  reason  with 
supersepj^i>heiroalities   . 13 

Relation  B(  'fheoretical  to  Practical  Reason; 
possibility  of  reconciling  free  and  natural 

causation      .     .     .     .     v , 17 

▼ 

000510 


yi  OONTSNTS. 

Practical  Reason  proves  the  freedom  and  immor* 
tality  of  man,  and  the  existence  of  Qod  22 

The  world  must  be  conceived  by  us  as  a  teleo- 
logical  system 25 

CHAPTER  ir. 

THE   EARLIER   PHILOSOPHT   OF   FICHTK. 

Free  activity  for  Kant  the  essence  of  Reason     .  28 

Imperfect  development  of  Kant*s  doctrine     .  30 
Fichte's  simplification  of  it  by  the  denial  of  any 

reality  out  of  relation  to  human  intelligence  33 
Contrast  of  Dogmatism  and  Idealism     ...  35 
Dogmatism  leads  to  Determinism  and  Material- 
ism, and  fails  to  explain  conscious  experience  37 
Idealism  starts  from  Intelligence  as  pure  self- 
activity    40 

Fundamental  thesis,  antithesis  and  synthesis     .  42 
Diremption  of  philosophy  into  Theoretical  and' 

Practical 46 

Relation  of  Fichte's  three  funduiijental  proposi- 
tions to  the  philosophy  of  Kant     ....  47 

And  to  the  Logic  of  Hegel     .     ...      .     .  50 

The  Psychology  of  Fichte     .     .     .     *      ,     .  60 
Stages  of  knowledge:  sensation,  perception,  im- 
agination, understanding,  judgment,  reason  53 
Practical  Reason  as  the  ultimate  exp'       ^ion  of 
reality      ...      ...     .     '.      .     .  59 

Porsnnality  and  Morality      .     .     .     .      .      .  61 

Critical  estimate  of  Fichte*s  earlier  philosophy  64 


CONTKNTS. 


Vii 


CHAPTER  III. 


8CHELLIK0  8   EARLIER   TREATISES. 


70 


71 


78 


Schelling's  first  work,  The  Possihility  of  a 
Form  of  Philosophy  in  General^  deduces  the 
categories  of  quality  and  modality  from 
Fichte*s  fundamental  propositions 

In  The  I  as  Principle  of  Philoaophy,  the  ab- 
solute and  the  finite  Ego  are  strongly  opposed, 
subject  and  object  coordinated,  and  the  world 
viewed  as  manifesting  unconscious  reason     . 

The  Philosophical  Letters  on  Dogmatism  and 
Criticism  regards  the  existence  of  an  "ob- 
jective" God  as  an  un verifiable  hypothesis, 
and  conceives  the  absolute  as  the  unrealisable 
goal  of  man^s  strivings 

Essays  in  explanation  of  Idealism:  (1)  Space 
and  Time  modes  of  the  self-activity  of  intelli- 
gence; (2)  The  Kantians  err  by  confusing  the 
logical  opposition  of  Subject  and  Object  with 
their  actual  separation;  (3)  The  essence  of 
Spirit  is  infinite  self-limitation    .... 

Schelling's  Philosophy  of  Nature  connected 
with  Kant's  Anfangsgriinde  der  Natur- 
wissenschaft  and  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft  . 

In  the  Ideas  for  a  Philosophy  of  Nature  the 
various  phenomena  of  the  material  world  are 
deduced  from  the  nature  of  Perception  and 
Sensation 92 

The  treatise  On   the  World  Soul  reduces  all 


84 


90 


▼lii 


COHTBNTS. 


the  phenomena  of  nature  to  a  single  force 
manifesting  itself  in  two  opposite  directions    94 
In    the    First    Outline   of   the   Philosophy  of 
Nature  Schelling    maintains   nature   to  be 
Ml  eternal  process  of  self  •limitation     ...     96 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   PROBLEM   OF   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 

Schelling*s  gradual  separation  from  Fichte     .     98 

Philosophy    of    Nature    and    Transcendental 

Idealism    two    coordinate    disciplines,    the 

former  dealing  with  the  totality  of  objects 

and  the  latter  with  the  totality  of  conscious 

acts 100 

Criticism  of  philosophical  dogmatism     .     .     .  101 
Intellectual  Perception  as  the  organ  of  phi- 
losophy          .     .  102 

Method  of  Transcendental  Idealism      .      .      .  104 

A  single  first  principle  necessary     ....  105 

\/  That  principle  pure  self-consciousness    .     .     .  106 

And  is  self-evident 107 

Distinction  and  relation  of  consciousness  and 

self-consciousness      . 110 

Problem    of  Theoretical  Philosophy:   How  do 
subject  and  object  seem  to  be  independent  of 

each  other? 112 

The  three  "epochs'*  or  stages  of  knowledge     .  114 


CONTENTS. 


ix 


CHAPTER  V. 


^y 


THEORETICAL   PHIL080PIIT. 

First  stage  of  knowledge:  from  sensation  to 
perception 115 

Sensation  an  immediate  feeling  of  necessity      .  115 

Not  the  product  of  something  out  of  relation 
to  intelligence 117 

But  of  the  first  self-limitation  of  intelligence     .  118 

As  such  it  excludes  all  reflection     .     .     .     .119 

Failure  of  dogmatism  to  account  for  it     .     .  120 

Perception  the  explicit  opposition  of  subject 
and  object,  or  the  consciousness  of  a  real 
world  of  matter 121 

Dogmatic  materialism  does  not  account  for  the 
consciousness  of  reality 122 

Perception  the  act  in  which  the  ideal  self  con- 
templates the  real  self  as  limited     .     .     .  122 

The  objective  world  seems  to  be  independent  of 
intelligence  because  the  relation  of  the  ideal 
to  the  real  self  is  not  made  explicit    .      .     .   124 

The  perception  of  its  own  contrary  activities  by 
intelligence  yields  as  product  the  forces  of 
matter,  the  synthesis  of  which  is  gravity     .   124 

Second  stage  of  knowledge:  from  perception  to 
reflection 125 

The  distinction  of  internal  and  external  per- 
ception    125 

The  feeling  of  self  given  in  the  perception  of 
time 12G 


CONTENTS. 


Consciousness  of  an  external  object  given  in  the 
perception  of  space 128 

Inner  and  outer  world  correlative     ....   128 

The  object  as  an  extensive  quantity  is  substance, 
as  intensive  quantity  it  is  accident      .      .     .129 

Substance  presupposes  causality  and  both  reci- 
procity      129 

All  substances  are  in  reciprocal  causation     .  132 

The  knowledge  of  such  substances  a  process  in 
which  the  idea  of  the  world  as  a  unity  is  con- 
tinuously specified  for  the  individual  intelli- 
gence     .*.......  .     .   133 

Distinction  of  absolute  and  finite  intelligence   .   136 

F*erception  of  the  world  as  organized  and  of  the 
various  phases  of  organization     ....  138 

Third  stage  of  knowledge  :  from  reflection  to 
will      . 139 

Schelling's  development  of  the  Kantian  doc- 
trine of  the  categories,  schemata  and  prin- 
ciples of  judgment 139 

The  apparent  opposition  of  intelligence  and 
nature 140 

Tne  opposition  explained  from  the  nature  of 
abstraction      . 141 

Conception  as  the  product  of  abstraction      .      .   142 

Judgment  the  union  of  conception  and  per- 
ceived object  by  means  of  the  schema  .     .     .   143 

Transcendental  abstraction,  the  categories  and 
the  transcendental  schema  ......   143 

True  relation  of  conception  and  perception  ex- 
plained from  the  nature  of  reflection     .     .   144 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


The  distinction  of  a  prion  and  a  posteriori 
purely  relative 147 

Distinction  or  non-distinction  of  inner  and 
outer  sense  accounts  for  the  character  of  the 
mathematical  and  dynamical  categories  re- 
spectively    .      .      ..     .      .     •.     •     .     •      •   147 

Reduction  of  Kant^s  categories  to  those  of 
relation 140 

Transition  to  practical  philosophy     .     .     .     .150 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PRACTICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

The   ultimate  explanation   of   intelligence    as 

knowing  found  in  intelligence  as  will     .     .152 
Contrast  of  the  original  act  of  self-consciousness 

and  the  act  of  self-determination     .     .     .   153 
Why   is   will    apparently   limited    to    specific 

objects? 155 

Will  the  condition  of  individuality     .      .      .   157 
How  do  I  obtain  a  knowledge  of  other  intelli- 
gences besides  myself,  and  seem  to  be  acted 

upon  by  them? .     .  157 

The  knowledge  of  nature  as  independent  of  the 
individual  consciousness  also  explainv^'d  from 
the  nature  of  will      .      .      .     .      .      .     .   161 

Relation  of  will  to  perceived  objects     .      .     .   162 

The  idea  and  the  ideal 163 

Impulse  the  feeling  of  opposition  between  the 
ideal  and  the  external  world 165 


Xll 


CONTENTS. 


The  realization  of  will  in  the  objective  world  a 
change   in  the    perceptions  of   the   willing 

agent 165 ' 

Action  must  therefore  conform  to  the  laws  of 
nature,  i.e.,  to  the  laws  of   intelligence  as 

perceptive 171 

Opposition  of  will  and  impulse  ....  172 
Freedom  as  identification  with  the  moral  law  .  173 
Happiness  the  coincidence  of  natural  impulse 

and  moral  law 174 

Justice  the  law  of  free  beings 175 

History  the  union  of  will  and  law  as  realized 

in  perpetual  progress 177 

The  goal  of  human  history  the  complete  reve- 
lation of  God 179 


CHAPTER  VII. 


TELEOLOGT    AND    ART. 


Teleology  the  final  solution  of  the  problem  of 
philosophy:   Schelling's  debt  to  Kant     .      .   181 

Organisms  are  under  mechanical  law,  and  yet 
must  be  explained  by  the  idea  of  final  cause: 
imperfection  of  hylicism  and  conscious  teleo- 
logy       183 

Difference  between  Kant  and  Schelling  on  the 
question  of  immanent  teleology     ....   186 

Art  as  the  actual  unity  of  the  conscious  and 
unconscious 187 


coNTEirre. 


Xlll 


Contrast  of  the  products  of  art  and  the  organ- 
ized products  of  nature 188 

Art  as  the  organ  of  philosophy 189 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE   SYSTEM   OF   IDENTITY. 

Main  value  of  the  Transcendental  Idealism  its 
application  of  the  idea  of  process  or  develop- 
ment 191 

Its  general  imperfection  a  want  of  systematic 
completeness      .     . 193 

1.  Schelling  errs  in  coordinating  Nature  and 
Intelligence,  instead  of  subordinating  the 
former  to  the  latter,  but  his  view  is  a  step  in 
advance  of  Fichte^s  subjective  idealism     .     .  196 

2.  He  wrongly  conceives  of  Intelligence  as  in 
itself  a  negative  infinite,  but  he  also  rightly 
regards  it  as  an  infinite  process     ....  201 

3.  Metaphysic  and  Psychology  not  clearly  dis- 
tinguished, but  the  phases  of  subjective  spirit 
well  characterized 203 

4.  Mistake  of  subordinating  Theoretical  to  Prac- 
tical Intelligence 205 

5.  Art  not  a  true  synthesis  of  the  conscious  and        ' 
the  unconscious 206' 

Schelling's  System  of  Identity  the  logical  result         . 

of  his  previous  speculations 208 

Reason  as  the  Absolute  Identity  of  Intelligence 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


and  Nature,  their  difference  being  purely 

quantitative      .      •     . 209 

Fichte's  criticism  of  the  System  of  Identity  rela* 
tively  valid,  but  fails  to  do  justice  to  the 
truth  it  contains 214 


CHAPTER  IX. 

SCHELLINO'S   LATER   PHILOSOPHY. 

Mysticism  of  Schelling's  later  speculation    .     .  218 

Philosophy  and  Religion  the  link  between 
the  System  of  Identity  and  the  "Positive" 
Philosophy      ...      ....      .     .219 

Summary  of  the  Enquiries  into  the  Nature  of 
Human  Freedom 220 

Not  the  Pantheism  of  Spinoza  but  his  Realism  is 
destructive  of  Individuality  and  Freedom     .  220 

Relation  of  Schelling  to  BOhmen     ....  222 

Possibility  of  evil  not  inconsistent  with  the  per- 
sonality of  God 223 

Existence  of  evil  due  to  the  necessary  self- revela- 
tion of  God 226 

Freedom  a  choice  of  good  and  evil  in  a  timeless 
act 227 

God  not  the  author  of  evil,  but  evil  a  stage  in 
the  realization  of  good 228 

The  Philosophy  of  Mythology  and  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Revelation  exhibit  the  self-revelation 
of  God  in  the  successive  stages  of  the  religious 
consciousness 229 


eONTBNTS. 


XV 


Religion  as  the  Positive  Philosophy     .     .     .  230 
Criticism  of  the  later  philosophy  of  Scbelling  232 


CHAPTER  X. 


CONCLUDING    REMARKS. 


Contrast  of  the  first  and  last  stages  of  Schel- 
ling's  speculations 237 

Comparison  of  the  first  stage  with  English  Em- 
piricism and  with  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason 238 

Imperfection  of  the  second  phase  of  Schelling's 
speculations      .      .      .     .     .     .     .     .     .  244 

That  imperfection  arose  from  following  the 
letter  of  Kant's  "Dialectic" 247 

Unsatisfactoriness  of  the  last  phase  of  Schel- 
ling's  speculations,  and  its  sources      .     .      .  249 

Hegel  the  true  follower  of  Kant     ....  250 


SCHELLING'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  KANT.      . 

TnVERYBODY  is  familiar  with  the  saying  of 
-*-^  Hegel,  that  Schelling  "carried  on  his  philo- 
sophical education  before  the  public,  and  signalized 
each  fresh  stage  of  his  advance  by  a  new  treatise." 
The  essential  truth  of  this  criticism  it  would  be 
vain  to  deny,  but  perhaps  it  suggests  to  the  ordi- 
nary reader  a  lack  of  coherence  and  continuity,  with 
which  Schelling  is  not  justly  chargeable.  Perpetual 
change,  both  in  the  substance  and  the  form  of  his 
philosophy,  there  is,  but  it  is  the  change  of  one  who 
cannot  stand  still  because  he  is  the  continual  recipi- 
ent of  fresh  light,  which  he  cannot  avoid  communi- 
cating to  others.  The  phases  of  Schelling's  philo- 
sophical faith  may  be  regarded  as  three  :  first,  the 
period  of  "  storm  and  stress,"  in  which,  in  harmony 
with  Fichte's  earlier  philosophy,  he  refused  to  admit 
the  reality  of  any  Supreme  Being  other  than  the 
moral  order  of  the  world,  as  revealed  to  the  indi- 
vidual in  the  idea  of  a  moral  perfection  to  which 


BCHBLLINO'S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


man  can  only  approximate,  and  in  the  struggle  to- 
ward which  his  true  life  consists  ;  secondly,  the 
stage  at  which  man  and  nature  are  regarded  as  two 
coordinate  manifestations  of  a  single  activity,  that 
is  revealed  in  each  with  equal  fulness  and  perfec- 
tion; and,  lastly,  the  crowning  stage,  in  which  an 
attempt  is  made  to  prove  the  personality  of  God, 
while  preserving  the  freedom  and  the  moral  respon- 
sibility of  man  maintained  in  the  earlier  stages. 
The  mere  mention  of  these  three  phases  will  sug- 
gest what  is  the  truth,  that  there  is  no  break  in  the 
continuity  of  Schelling's  philosophy.  In  his  first 
period  Schelling  does  indeed  deny  the  reality  of 
what  he  calls  an  "  objective  God,"  by  which  he 
meant  what  Mr.  Matthew  Arnold  has  called  a 
"magnified  and  non- natural  man  in  the  next 
street";  but  he  may  be  said  to  catch  a  glimpse  of 
the  glory  of  God  in  the  ideal  of  infinite  moral  per- 
fection, and  at  any  rate  he  has  grasped  with  perfect 
clearness  the  principle  of  human  freedom,  however 
blind  he  may  be  to  its  ultimate  implications.  In 
the  second  stage,  without  letting  go  the  freedom  and 
responsibility  of  man,  he  has  discovered  that  Nature 
is  the  expression  of  a  rational  process,  in  some  sense 
the  obverse  of  the  process  of  human  knowledge  and 
action,  and  hence  that  man  and  Nature  are  alike 
manifestations  of  something  not  themselves.     In 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   KANT. 


8 


the  third  stage,  Schelling  seeks  to  gather  up  all  the 
elements  of  trutli  already  discovered,  and  to  fuse 
them  in  the  perfect  unity  of  a  personal  God.  The 
philosophy  of  Schelling  is  thus  itself  an  example  of  a 
lawr  upon  which  he  insists,  that  man  moves  on  toward 
a  goal  which  he  only  sees  in  a  dim  and  imperfect 
way.  It  must,  however,  be  added  that  Schelling 
saw  much  more  clearly  the  problems  which  demand 
solution,  than  how  to  solve  them.  His  philosophy  is 
in  large  measure  a  failure  ;  but  then  it  is  one  of 
those  failures  that  are  more  significant  than  the 
petty  successes  of  others.  It  would  be  hazardous  to 
say  that  Hegel,  with  Kant  and  Aristotle,  not  to 
speak  of  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz,  to  stimulate  his  own 
marvellous  insight,  could  not  have  dispen^'^d  with 
the  assistance  of  Fichte  and  Schelling ;  but  this  at 
least  may  be  admitted,  that  without  them  he  would 
have  found  his  task  a  much  harder  one.  The  inter- 
est in  the  philosophy  of  Schelling  is  thus  twofold  : 
firstly,  as  a  record  of  the  intellectual  development 
of  a  singularly  gifted  mind,  and,  secondly,  as  form- 
ing the  transition  from  Kant  to  Hegel  through 
Fichte. 

The  Transcendental  Idealism  is  one  of  Schel- 
ling's  many  attempts  to  present  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy of  Kant  in  a  form  less  inadequate  than 
that  in  which   it  was  given  to  the  world  by  its 


schelling'h  transcbxdbntal  idbambm. 


founder.  With  the  Wiaaemchaftmlehi'f.  of  Fichte 
it  is  connected  in  the  way  of  direct  affiliation,  as  it  is 
itself  in  turn  the  philosophical  progenitor  of  Hegel's 
Phwnomenologie  des  Geistea ;  or  rather,  as  Schel- 
ling  read  Kant  with  the  eyes  of  Fichte  as  well  as 
with  his  own,  so  Hegel  studied  Kant  to  all  the 
more  advantage  that  he  had  profited  by  the  disci* 
pline  imparted  to  him  by  Fichte  and  Schelling. 

The  great  problems  of  man's  beliefs,  conduct,  and 
destiny,  which  have  exercised  so  great  a  fascination 
over  men^s  minds  in  all  ages,  receive  from  Kant  that 
peculiar  illumination  which  it  is  the  glory  of  philo- 
sophical genius  to  cast  upon  them.  What  can  we 
know  ?  What  ought  we  to  do  ?  What  may  we 
hope  ?  To  these  old  questions  Kant's  thoughts  were 
irresistibly  drawn,  and  the  answers  which  he  gave 
to  them,  imperfect  as  in  some  ways  they  were,  have 
already  changed,  and  are  destined  still  further  to 
change,  the  whole  system  of  beliefs  which  have 
slowly  grown  up  through  the  ages.  This  revolu- 
tion has  taken  place  because  Kant,  in  virtue  of  his 
speculative  endowment  and  his  ethical  enthusiasm, 
could  not  be  content  with  the  answers  which  had 
come  down  from  the  past.  Every  belief,  however 
venerable,  must  show  to  him  its  right  to  exist,  or 
be  calmly  and  firmly  set  aside.  Whether  there  is 
any  God  but  Nature,  whether   man's  actions  are 


purely  meclianical  or  are  free,  whether  this  life  is 
the  be-all  and  end-all,  —  these  questions  above  all 
^  must  be  submitted  to  the  severest  tests  of  reason, 
\  and  must  be  answered  without  regard  to  men's 
individual  hopes  or  fears.  At  the  same  time,  no 
6ne  ever  had  less  of  the  purely  sceptical  temper 
than  Kant,  the  temper  which  is  content  to  marshal 
the  arguments  for  and  against  the  beliefs  of  men, 
without  seeking  for  new  principles  to  be  put  in 
pla^e  of  the  old.  Kant  never  swerved  from  the 
conation  that  Reason  must  be  able  to  solve  the 
problems  which  it  has  itself  raised  ;  and  it  makes 
one  impatient  to  find  his  large,  calm  vision  con- 
founded with  the  intellectual  indolence  or  vanity 
which  regards  no  solution  as  the  only  one  possible. 
Philosophical  criticism  meant  for  Kant,  as  for  his 
idealist  followers,  a  demolition  of  the  idols  of  the 
age,  but  not  less  the  erection  in  their  stead  of  new 
forms  of  truth  and  beauty.  Like  all  the  masters  in 
philosophy,  Kant's  speculations  were  prompted  and 
guided  by  the  necessity  laid  upon  him  to  seek  for 
an  explanation  of  the  foundations  of  morality  and 
religion.  But  he  sobn  found  that,  to  arrive  at  any 
satisfactory  conclusion,  it  was  first  necessary  to  de- 
termine how  far  knowledge  was  possible.  The  free- 
dom of  the  human  will,  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  the  existence  of  God,  were  beliefs  tenaciously 


?  ^  N|v7lr4^ 


RCIlELLINa'8  TRAN8CENDRNTAL  IDBALinM. 


held  or  flippantly  denied;  but  neither  the  dogmatist 
nor  the  sceptic  seemed  to  him  to  have  any  rational 
and  inexpugnable  ground  for  the  belief  that  was  in 
him,  but  rather  held  it  as  an  unreasoned  conviction. 
Was  there,  then,  any  rational  principle  by  which  those 
questions  might  be  at  once  and  forever  resolved? 
This  at  least  seemed  to  Kant  self-evident,  that  if  our 
edifice  of  belief  is  to  rest  on  a  rock,  and  to  be  too 
strongly  built  to  be  carried  away  when  the  floods 
come  and  the  winds  blow  and  beat  upon  it,  we  must, 
before  asserting  the  reality  of  anything  supersensi- 
ble,  begin  by  asking  what  it  is  that  constitutes  the 
strength  and  stability  of  that  knowledge  of  common 
objects  and  common  fasts  which  no  one  can  seriously 
call  in  question.  Of  the  truths  of  every-day  life, 
the  mathematical  and  physical  sciences  and  history, 
— the  facts  of  experience,  in  a  word, — no  one  has  yet 
been  sceptical,  however  sceptical  he  may  have  been 
of  a  supersensible  world  beyond  experience.  Let 
us,  then,  find  out  the  secret  of  their  reality,  and  we 
shall  probably  be  able  to  decide  whether,  and  how 
far,  the  world  beyond  the  senses  is  worthy  of  our 
credence.  What,  then,  is  experience?  and  how  do 
we  come  to  get  knowledge  by  means  of  it  ? 

It  has  almost  universally  been  taken  for  granted 
that  whatever  is  known  by  experience  exists  full- 
formed  and  complete  before  it  is  experienced,  and 


TIIK   rillLOSOPIlY   OP  KANT. 


that  knowledge  consists  in  the  passive  apprehension 
of  this  ^ireKxistent  world  of  objects.  But  closer 
consideration  .^hows  this  supposition  to  be  self-con* 
tradictory,  and  incompatible  with  the  facts  supposed 
to  be  thus  passively  mirrored  in  the  mind.  A  fact 
is  something  very  different  from  the  immediate 
apprehension  at  a  given  moment  of  a  particular 
object  or  event;  it  is  something  that  exists  not 
merely  when  we  apprehend  it,  but  before  and  after 
that  apprehension, —  something  therefore  which  is 
not  particular,  but  universal.  "  Water  rusts  iron": 
here  is  a  proposition  which  asserts  the  invariable, 
real  or  necessary  connection  of  two  phenomena,  not 
simply  their  connection  so  long  as  they  are  present 
to  the  senses.  In  every  fact  something  universal  is 
implied,  or  every  fact  is  an  instance  of  a  law.  Ad- 
mitting,  therefore,  that  the  particular  phenomenon 
is  nothing  for  us  apart  from  sense,  but  is  given  to 
us  by  sense,  we  must  still  hold  that  the  latv  is  not  so 
given.  But  how  can  law  be  imposed  upon  nature 
by  our  minds?  Only  upon  the  supposition  that 
hature  is  not,  as  we  at  first  suppose,  something  exist- 
ing apart  from  all  relation  to  conscious  beings,  but 
something  that  exists  only  for  such  beings.  Of 
course  we  do  not  create  nature,  but  we  constitute  it 
as  it  is  for  us.  What  nature  apart  from  us  may  be, 
we  cannot   possibly  tell.     The  nature  which  we 


8      schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

know  is  made  by  the  action  of  our  thought  upon  the 

J^J!12^JjLl  material  supplied  by  the  senses.    And  since  the  facts 

which  we  know  are  not  isolated  or  random  affections, 

but  form  a  cosmos,  we  must  regard  experience  as 

made  for  us  by  the  subordination  of  all  the  particu- 

iLl^  ***i^  lars  of  sense  to  univejsal  laws  belonging  to  the  very 

***^2^     *   ^lature  of  our  intelligence  as  self-conscious. 

*'V^'**r    '^      Thus  the  universal  judgments  which  form  the 

warp  of  experience  are  capable  of  being  explained 

l^'j^^i^t'^1^  accordance  with  the  conditions  under  which  only 

our  intellectual  life  can    be  carried   on.       There 

belong  to  our  intellect  certain  functions  of  thought, 

or  categories,  which  take  hold  of  whatever  units  of 

sense  may  be  presented  to  them  and  form  the  world 

of  experience  familiar  to  us  all.     In  every  single  bit 

of  experience  thought  is  implied  as  reducing  the 

thronging  crowd  (GewUhl)  of  impressions  to  order 

by  bringing  them  under  the  supreme  unity  of  a 

single  self. 

The  inquiry  into  the  constitution  of  nature  has 
led  to  the  quite  unexpected  result  that  the  univer- 
sal notions  or  categories  —  unity,  substance,  cause, 
etc. — which  form  the  very  soul,  so  to  speak,  of  na- 
ture, exist  for  us  only  because  we  are  sdf-con- 
scious.  Thus,  if  we  abstract  in  thought  from  those 
categories,  nature  becomes  unthinkable,  or  drops 
back  into  the  chaos  of  mere  impressions  from  which 


I 


THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF   KANT. 


the  activity  of  thought  had  rescued  it.  The  next 
and  more  important  question  is,  whether  the  prob- 
lem as  to  the  existence  of  supersensible  realities 
has  become  any  easier  for  us  now  that  we  have 
discovered  the  conditions  of  sensible  experience. 
This  is  a  much  harder  problem  than  the  other. 
That  we  have  a  knowledge  of  a  world  in  space  and 
time  no  one  can  doubt,  even  prior  to  an  exhibition 
by  philosophy  of  the  elements  implied  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  it  as  real  ;  but  that  over  and  above  this 
world  there  are  existences  which  are  not  in  time 
or  space  seems  at  first  sight  problematical  enough. 
For  how  can  we  know  anything  of  realities  that 
ex  hypothesi  are  not  in  space  and  time,  and  so  give 
us  nothing  definite  to  which  we  can  apply  those 
universal  conceptions,  by  the  employment  of  which 
detached  impressions  of  sense  emerge  as  universal 
laws?  Can  we,  for  example,  say  that  in  its  true 
essence  the  soul  is  something  not  directly  known, 
but  only  inferred  from  the  successive  modifica- 
tions or  manifestations  of  it?  How  can  we,  in 
accordance  with  the  conditions  of  knowledge,  be 
certain  that  there  is  a  God,  who,  if  he  exists,  must 
be  independent  of  the  forms  of  space  and  time? 
How,  in  short,  can  there  be  any  knowledge  at 
all  of  the  supersensible,  which  by  its  very  nature 
must  be  out  of   space  and  time,  and  so  incapable 


10     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


of  being  known,  so  far,  at  least,  as  we  have  yet 
seen?  Assuming  for  a  moment  that  there  actu- 
ally is  a  supersensible  world,  what  can  we  know 
of  it?  Is  it  definable  as  a  magnitude?  Evidently 
not,  for  the  term  "  magnitude  "  has  absolutely  no 
meaning  for  us  unless  we  realize  in  thought  the 
actual  process  by  which  an  object  is  known  as  an 
extensive  quantity, —  unless,  in  other  words,  we 
represent  it  as  generated  in  time  by  the  suc- 
cessive addition  of  unit  to  unit.  We  speak  of 
a  color,  a  sound,  or  a  taste,  as  having  a  certain 
degree  of  intensity;  can  we  affirm  the  like  of  the 
supersensible?  Impossible,  for  that  which  has 
degree  must  be  represented  as  filling  a  given 
moment  of  time  with  an  intensity  somewhere  be- 
tween zero  and  infinity.  But  at  least  the  super- 
sensible may  be  defined  as  a  substance  or  a  cause  ? 
Is  not  the  soul  a  substance,  and  God  a  cause?  At 
first,  no  doubt,  they  seem  to  be  so,  but  an  inquiry 
into  the  conditions  of  knowledge  has  shown  us  that 
a  substance  or  cause  not  in  time  is  quite  incapable 
of  being  known.  A  substance,  as  we  know  it,  is 
something  that  does  not  pass  away  with  the  mo- 
ments of  time  as  they  come  one  by  one,  but  persists 
through  time;  whereas  the  supersensible  is  that 
which,  if  known  at  all,  must  be  known  as  not  in 
time.     A  cause,  again,  so  far  as  our  experience  goes. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OP  KANT. 


11 


is  something  which,  as  the  condition  of  a  certain 
change  of  state  which  follows  it,  must  be  in  time 
and  therefore  be  itself  a  change  of  state;  the  super- 
sensible would  therefore  cease  to  be  supersensible 
were  it  in  time,  while  on  the  other  hand  as  out  of 
time  it  cannot  be  known  as  a  cause. 

From  all  this  it  seems  plain  enough  that  what- 
ever cannot  be  "  schematized " —  represented,  that 
is,  as  conforming  to  the  process  by  which  the  defi- 
nite or  concrete  becomes  a  possible  object  in  time  — 
cannot  be  knotvn  in  the  sense  in  which  we  speak 
of  knowing  anything  by  experience.  Shall  we, 
then,  at  once  conclude  that  the  whole  of  knowable 
existence  is  exhausted  in  the  world  of  sense,  and 
that  the  existence  of  any  supersensible  reality  is 
utterly  incapable  of  being  established?  By  no 
means;  all  that  we  are  entitled  to  say  is,  that  super- 
sensible realities,  if  there  are  such,  are  not  capable 
of  being  "  schematized,"  do  not  admit  of  the  appli- 
cation to  them  of  the  categories,  and  can  never 
become  objects  of  actual  sensible  experience.  Our 
inquiry  into  the  conditions  of  knowledge  has,  so 
far  as  the  supersensible  is  concerned,  yielded  only 
a  negative  result.  But  this  result  must  not  be 
regarded  as  worthless;  it  at  least  enables  us  to  see 
that  to  the  supersensible  world,  if  such  a  world 
exists  at  all,  the  schematized  categories  have  no 


12       SCHELLINO's    TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 

application.  We  cannot  say,  for  example,  that  the 
soul,  supposing  it  to  be  something  diflferent  from 
its  manifestations,  is  a  cause  in  the  sense  in  which 
we  say  that  a  sensible  phenomenon  is  the  cause  or 
condition  of  a  change  in  nature ;  for  to  do  so  would 
be  to  represent  the  soul  as  one  of  a  series  of  sensi- 
ble phenomena,  and  therefore  to  deny  its  super- 
sensible nature.  Nor  can  we  speak  of  God  as  either 
a  substance  or  a  cause,  since  in  that  case  he  would 
be  conditioned  or  dependent  on  something  else,  and 
would  therefore  cease  to  be  God.  It  is  not  meant 
by  this  that  there  are  supersensible  realities  —  that 
yet  remains  to  be  determined,- — but  only  that,  if 
there  are  such,  they  must  not  be  brought  under  the 
categories  or  be  regarded  as  objects  limited  in  space 
and  time.  Our  next  question  must  therefore  be, 
whether  there  is  anything  to  lead  to  the  conclusion 
that  there  are  supersensible  realities,  and  if  so, 
what  relation  these  bear  to  the  sensible  realities 
indubitably  known  to  us. 

Intelligence  in  its  application  to  the  sensible  world 
is  concerned  only  with  the  relations  of  particulars  to 
one  another.  Given  a  certain  change,  for  example, 
and  the  understanding  directs  us  to  seek  for  its 
cause  or  condition  in  some  precedent  state  of  nature. 
But,  besides  this  knowledge  of  the  relations  of  par- 
ticular objects  or  events  to  one  another,  we  find  our- 


THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF   KANT. 


18 


selves  impelled  by  Reason  to  seek,  not  merely  for  a 
definite  condition  for  a  given  phenomenon,  but  to 
seek  for  all  the  conditions  of  it. 

The  understanding  is  satisfied  when  it  has  found 
the  special  condition;  Reason  is  not  satisfied,  but 
seeks  for  that  which,  as  the  complete  totality  of  con- 
ditions, is  not  itself  conditioned  at  all.  And  as  an 
unconditioned  totality  is  evidently  incapable  of  be- 
ing made  an  object  of  sensible  experience,  it  is  so. 
far  merely  an  idea,  useful  in  prompting  the  under- 
standing to  seek  always  for  a  prior  condition  of 
every  phenomenon,  but  incapable,  from  the  nature 
of  the  case,  of  ever  becoming  an  object  of  experience. 
It  supplies  a  rule  for  the  understanding,  but  it  does 
not,  so  far  as  we  can  yet  see,  add  anything  to  our 
knowledge;  it  is  regulative,  not  constitutive.  We 
must  therefore  be  exceedingly  careful  not  to  identify 
an  idea  of  Reason  with  the  knowledge  of  an  actual 
"object"  corresponding  to  it.  That  identification, 
however,  has  unwittingly  been  made  by  all  those 
who  have  maintained  that  we  actually  have  a  know- 
ledge of  supersensible  realities,  in  the  same  way  in 
which  we  have  a  knowledge  of  sensible  or  phenome- 
nal things.  Hence  the  supposed  sciences  of  Rational 
Psychology,  the  science  of  the  soul  in  itself,  Rational 
Cosmology,  the  science  of  the  world  as  a  whole,  and 
Rational  Theology,  the  science  of  God  in  his  inner 


14     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


nature.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  the 
houl  as  a  supersensible  reality  cannot  be  an  object 
of  experience,  since  it  cannot  be  determined  by  any 
category  without  being  represented  as  in  time,  and 
so  as  sensible  or  phenomenal.  Those,  therefore,  who 
assert,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  soul  is  a  supersensi- 
ble reality,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  is  a  sub- 
stance, simple,  self-identical,  and  relative  to  possible 
objects  in  space  and  time,  really  make  the  soul  at 
once  sensible  and  supersensible,  and  thus  fall  into  a 
manifest  paralogism.  If  the  soul  is  a  substance,  it 
is  simply  a  part  of  the  sensible  world,  and  therefore 
not  unconditioned,  but  conditioned:  if  it  is  uncondi- 
tioned, it  is  not  a  substance.  Similarly,  the  world, 
as  a  complete  whole,  is  confused  by  the  Rational 
Cosraologist  with  the  conditioned  or  limited  phe- 
nomena which  alone  are  actually  known  in  expe- 
rience; that  is  to  say,  a  pure  idea  of  Reason  is  identi- 
fied with  a  supposed  object  of  experience.  It  is  no 
wonder,  therefore,  that  the  Rational  Cosmologist  finds 
himself  maintaining  mutually  contradictory  propo- 
sitions. Take,  for  example,  the  quantitative  deter- 
mination of  the  woi'ld  of  experience.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  is  said  that  the  world  had  an  absolute  begin-  v 
ning  in  time  and  is  limited  in  s;>acf;,  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  maintained  that  it  never  began 
io  be  and  has  no  limit  in  space.     Either  of  these 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   KANT. 


15 


propositions  may  be  proved  with  equal  cogency  if 
we  assume  that  the  partial  determination  of  the 
world  by  the  understanding  is  the  same  thing  as  the 
complete  determination  of  it,  as  it  exists  in  the  idea 
of  Reason.  But  the  moment  we  see  that  the  idea  of 
Reason  is  not  capable  of  being  presented  as  an  actual 
object  of  experience,  we  discover  that  both  proposi- 
tions are  false.  We  cannot  say  that  the  world  began 
to  exist  at  some  point  of  time  or  has  existed  from 
all  eternity,  because  we  can  represent  objects  as 
quantitative  only  by  "schematizing"  them,  i.e.  by 
representing  them  as  in  time,  which  itself  is  capable 
of  being  represented  only  as  a  never-ending  series. 
To  know  the  world  as  complete  in  time  is  impossible; 
and  equally  impossible  is  it  to  know  the  world  as 
necessarily  incomplete  in  time;  the  only  knowledge 
we  have  is  of  a  series  of  conditions,  which  is  never 
complete,  but  which,  under  the  guiding  idea  of. 
Reason,  we  perpetually  seek  to  complete.  Turning 
now  to  the  dynamical  relations  of  things,  we  find 
the  Rational  Cosmologist  again  falling  into  self- 
contradiction.  Thus  it  is  held,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  all  things  are  connected  by  the  law  of  natural 
causation,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  there  must 
be  a  sort  of  cause  that  is  not  necessitated,  but  free. 
Now  the  truth  is  that,  while  each  of  these  proposi- 
tions is  as  susceptible  of  proof  as  the  other,  neither 


IG       SCHELLINO'S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


is  true  so  long  as  we  suppose  both  to  apply  to  the 
world  as  it  is  in  itself,  while  both  may  be  true  on  the 
supposition  that  the  one  applies  to  the  phenomenal 
and  the  other  to  the  noumenal  world.  To  this  point 
we  shall  immediately  return.  In  the  meantime  we 
may  look  at  Kant's  criticism  of  Rational  Theology. 
What  course  that  criticism  will  take  may  be 
readily  anticipated.  The  three  arguments  for  the 
existence  of  a  Supreme  Being,  who  is  the  source 
of  all  reality,  are  held  to  be  reducible,  ultimately, 
to  one  —  the  ontological,  which  reasons  from  the 
conception  to  the  actual  existence  of  a  Supreme 
Being.  This  argument  really  contains  a  fallacy 
similar  to  that  implied  in  identifying  the  self,  as 
known  in  sensible  consciousness,  with  a  supposed 
supersensible  self.  However  necessary  the  idea  of 
a  Supreme  Being  may  be  as  an  ideal  of  Reason, 
giving  satisfaction  to  the  demand  for  perfect  unity 
in  knowledge,  we  cannot  take  this  ideal  as  a  proof 
of  the  reality  of  a  Being  corresponding  to  it.  That 
such  a  Being  exists  is  not  impossible,  but  it  is 
impossible  that  he  can  ever  be  known,  since  that 
would  imply  that  he  had  become  an  object  of  con- 
tingent experience,  and  thus  had  ceased  to  be  un- 
conditioned or  supersensible.  Practical  reason  may, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Kant  asserts  emphatically 
that  it  does,  establish  the  reality  of  a  Supreme 


THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF   Ka 


17 


Being,  as  well  as  the  freedom  of  the  human  will 
and  the  immortality  of  the  soul :  but  in  no  possible 
way  can  it  be  shown  that  any  of  the  ideas  of  Reason 
have  within  the  realm  of  actual  knowledge  other 
than  a  regulative  use.  We  must,  then,  go  on  to  ask 
what  is  the  relation  of  Theoretical  and  Practical 
Reason. 

This  question  cannot  be  better  answered  than  by 
a  careful  statement  of  the  solution  of  the  problem 
as  to  the  relation  of  natural  and  free  causation,  to 
which  we  promised  to  return.  It  has  already  ap- 
peared that  the  seeming  contradiction  of  natural 
and  free  causation  can  only  be  solved  by  drawing  a 
distinction  between  the  sensible  and  the  supersensi- 
ble world,  and  refusing  to  attempt  to  determine  the 
latter  in  the  same  way  in  which  we  determine  the 
former.  In  his  further  discussion  of  this  vexed 
question,  Kant's  aim  is  to  show  that  the  physical 
law  of  causality  may  perhaps  be  reconciled  with 
the  existence  of  a  free  causality,  and  that,  looked  at 
from  the  proper  point  of  view,  neither  is  contra- 
dictory of  the  other.  No  solution  of  the  problem 
can  for  a  moment  be  entertained  which  tries  to 
weaken  the  universal  validity  of  the  law  of  cause 
and  effect  in  nature.  Any  such  attempt  is  fore- 
doomed to  failure,  since  a  denial  of  natural  causa- 
tion carries  with  it  logically  the  downfall  of  experi- 
8 


18       HCII£LLlNO*8  TRAN8CRNDKNTAL   IDKALIHM. 


ence  as  a  connected  whole,  including  the  facts  and 
laws  of  the  special  sciences.  Every  change  of  state 
whatever  must  have  a  cause  or  condition  without 
which  it  could  not  be.  And  this  is  just  as  true  of 
human  actions  as  of  the  mechanical  movements  of 
material  bodies.  If  we  could  trace  baclc  the  actions 
of  men  to  their  source,  we  should  be  able  to  see  that 
they  invariably  follow  the  law  of  natural  causation. 
An  unmotived  act  is  a  mere  absurdity.  Any  viola- 
tion of  that  law,  either  in  the  real  in  of  matter  or  of 
mind,  would  be  destructive  of  the  whole  of  experi- 
ence. On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  manifest  dis- 
tinction in  the  manner  of  causation  between  the 
actions  of  man  and  the  unconscious  or  mechanical 
sequences,  according  to  Anch  the  changes  of  ma- 
terial bodies  or  the  acts  of  the  lower  animals  take 
place.  The  former  are  purely  mechanical,  the  latter 
are  not.  A  billiard-ball  when  struck  must  move; 
an  animal  follows  its  immediate  instincts:  man, 
however,  does  not  invariably  follow  the  promptings 
of  his  immediate  desires,  but  may  subordinate  them 
to  some  end  set  up  by  his  reason.  Hence  we  have 
the  conviction  that  we  are  under  a  law  of  freedom. 
The  question  is  whether  this  conviction  can  be 
philosophically  justified.  The  ordinary  method  of 
solution,  which  consists  in  denying  that  the  law  of 
natural  causation  applies  to  human  acts — the  so- 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF   KANT. 


called  "liberty  of  indifference,"  or  liberty  to  act 
apart  from  or  contrary  to  motives — is  no  solution 
at  all.     Is  any  other  solution  possible  ? 

Reason,  as  we  have  seen,  sets  up  the  idea  of  an 
unconditioned  causality, —  a  causality  that  does  not 
form  a  mere  link  in  the  chain  of  natural  causa- 
tion, but  is  quite  independent  of  it.  If  there  is  a 
causality  of  this  kind,  which  can  be  shown  to  be 
not  incompatible  with  the  prevalence  of  natural 
law,  the  way  will  be  left  open  for  a  positive  solution 
of  the  problem  of  human  freedom, — a  solution  which 
can  only  be  given  when  we  come  to  consider  reason 
as  practical, —  that  is,  as  setting  up  a  purely  intelli- 
gible world  of  moral  laws.  At  present  we  cannot 
do  more  than  show  that  free  and  natural  causality 
may  possibly  coexist. 

When  we  ask  whether  the  world  has  had  a  begin- 
ning in  time  or  has  existed  from  all  eternity,  we 
forget  that  a  third  supposition  is  possible,  namely, 
that  the  sensible  world  is  merely  what  it  seems  to 
us  to  be,  and  does  not  exist  except  in  relation  to 
our  faculty  of  perception.  Hence  we  do  not,  in 
solving  the  difficulty,  need  to  suppose  any  super- 
sensible or  intelligible  world,  but  have  only  to  draw 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  world-in-itself  is  a 
mere  idea,  set  up  by  reason,  of  a  complete  series 
of  conditions,— an  idea  which,  from  the  nature  of 


20       8CIIELLING*8   TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


the  ease,  can  never  be  realized,  since  every  indefi- 
nitely extensible  quantitative  series  is  by  its  nature 
incapable  of  being  completely  summed  up,  and  yet 
compels  us  to  seek  for  its  complete  summation.  But 
when  we  seek  for  the  unconditioned  in  the  case  of 
causality,  it  is  quite  possible  to  conceive  —  nay,  rea- 
son compels  us  to  suppose  —  that  there  may  be  a 
kind  of  causality  which  is  not  conditioned,  but  un- 
conditioned.  In  our  ordinary  notion  of  freedom,  as 
action  according  to  an  end  prescribed  by  reason, 
this  supposition  of  a  causality  which  does  not  itself 
form  a  link  in  the  chain  of  causes  and  effects  in 
nature,  is  tacitly  assumed.  While,  therefore,  every 
cause  actually  known  by  us  as  an  object  of  experi- 
ence  is  itself  an  effect  presupposing  a  prior  cause, 
it  is  not  impossible  that  there  may  be  another  sort 
of  causality  which  is  not  an  object  of  sensible  ex- 
perience, and  therefore  is  not  itself  an  effect.  Such 
a  cause,  it  is  true,  as  supersensible,  can  never  be- 
come an  actual  object  of  "  experience,"  for  in  that 
case  it  would  cease  to  be  supersensible;  but  it  may 
nevertheless  be  indisputably  proved  to  be  real.  A 
causality  of  this  kind  would  be  unconditioned,  and 
would  not  enter  into  the  series  of  causes  and  eflFects 
known  to  us  as  in  time.  It  might  initiate  a  series 
of  conditions  presenting  themselves  in  the  world  of 
sense,  and  yet  might  not  itself  be  initiated.    Sup- 


THE    rillLOMOFIlY    OP    KANT. 


n 


posing,  then,  that  there  are  two  distinct  kinds  of 
causality  —  a  causality  which,  us  the  condition  of 
a  change  of  state  in  the  sensible  world,  is  itself  con- 
ditioned,  and  a  causality  that  is  the  supreme  condi- 
tion of  a  certain  series  of  states  in  the  world  of 
sense,  but  is  not  itself  a  member  of  that  series  — 
how  may  these  be  shown  to  be  not  destructive  of 
one  another?  To  this  question,  Kant,  as  I  under- 
stand him,  would  answer  in  |his  way.  My  acts, 
looked  at  simply  as  objects  of  experience,  belong 
to  the  phenomenal  world,  and  so  far  come  under 
the  law  that  every  phenomenal  event  must  have 
a  phenomenal  cause.  But  reason,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  practical,  takes  me  out  of  this  merely  phenome- 
nal world,  and  sets  before  me  certain  ends  which 
it  pronounces  to  be  binding  upon  all  rational  be- 
ings. Thus  there  rises  up  before  me  a  world  dis- 
tinct from  that  which  presents  itself  to  me,  in  so 
far  as  I  simply  contemplate  events  as  in  time.  Sup- 
pose now  that  I  act  in  accordance  with  the  ends 
prescribed  by  reason,  will  my  acts  then  cease  to  be 
conformable  to  the  law  of  natural  causation?  By 
no  means.  The  man  who  obeys  the  law  to  do  jus- 
tice to  all'  men  does  not  therefore  act  in  violation 
of  the  law  cf  aatural  causation,  that  every  event 
must  have  its  condition  in  the  phenomenal  world. 
The  difference  between  him  and  the  immoral  man 


22       SCIIKLLING^S   TUAN8CKNDENTAL   IDKALISM. 


who  steals  liis  neighbor's  i>roperty  is  not.  that  the 
acts  of  the  one  come  under  tiie  law  of  causality  and 
the  acts  of  the  other  do  not,  but  that   from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  moral  law  the  one  acts  freely 
and  the  other  does  not.     Freedom  means  conform- 
ity to  the  pure  idea  of  Duty,  not  action  contrary 
to  motives.     When  I  act  in  accordance  with  that 
idea,  I  initiate   a   series  of  acts  from   an  idea  of 
Reason;  but  these  acts,  looked  at  simply  as  follow- 
ing in  time  on  volition,  are  an  instance  of  the  law 
of  natural   causality,   that   every   event   as  condi- 
tioned is  relative  to  another  event  as  its  condition. 
Kant,  in   other  words,  in   distinguishing   between 
free  and  natural  causation,  virtually  says  that  the 
category  of  causality,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  holds 
of  sensible  phenomena,  is  inadequate  to  express  the 
character  of  the  actions  of  man  as  originating  from 
a  regard  for  moral  law.     That  his  mode  of  pre- 
sentation is  open  to  objection  should  not  blind  us 
to  the  essential  truth  for  which  he  is  contending, 
that  from  the  point  of  view  of  man  as  a   moral 
being,  freedom  is  not  only  possible,  but  is  not  in- 
compatible with  the  law  of  natural  causation. 

In  what  has  just  been  said  we  have  to  some  ex- 
tent anticipated  the  result  of  Kant's  criticism  of 
the  Practical  Reason,  to  which  attention  must  now 
be  directed.     In  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  it  has 


TIIK    PIIILOBOI'IIY    OP   KANT. 


23 


been  maintained  that  no  knowledge  of  supersensible 
realities  can  be  obtained,  sinco  such  knowledge 
always  implies  a  process  of  determining  objects  in 
time,  whilst  the  supersensible  is  necessarily  free 
from  the  limits  of  time.  We  have  now  to  see  how 
Kant  would  show  from  the  nature  of  the  practical 
reason  that  man  is  free  and  the  heir  of  immor- 
tality, and  that  God  exists.  The  central  idea  from 
which  he  starts  is  that  of  Freedom,  which  has 
already  been  shown  to  be  at  least  possible.  That 
we  have  the  consciousness  of  a  moral  law  is  a  fact 
which  admits  of  no  dispute;  it  is  given  to  us  in 
the  contrast  of  what  is  and  what  ought  to  he.  Were 
there  no  conception  of  the  moral  law  we  should 
never  become  conscious  of  freedom;  while  on  the 
other  hand,  were  there  no  freedom  there  could  be 
no  realization  of  the  moral  law.  The  pure  idea 
of  Duty  and  the  idea  of  Freedom  necessarily  imply 
each  other.  That  this  pure  idea  is  originated  en- 
tirely by  reason  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  it 
cannot  be  derived  from  any  observation  of  the 
facts  of  experience,  not  even  from  an  observation 
of  the  sequence  of  our  own  acts  on  motives.  Ex- 
perience can  tell  us  what  actually  takes  place,  but 
it  cannot  set  before  us  an  intelligible  world  in 
which  men  might  act  quite  differently  from  the 
way  in  which  they  do  act.    Thus  we  get  the  notion 


24      SCH£LLING*S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 

of  a  world  in  which  all  men  should  act  purely 
according  to  ends  prescribed  by  reason.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  iiien  do  not  so  act.  The  natural 
desires  prompt  them  to  foL'aw  inclination  rather 
than  reason,  and  thus  a  conflict  arises  between 
the  law  of  Reason  and  the  law  of  Desire.  Hence 
it  is  that  the  moral  law  presents  itself  as  obliga- 
tory—  as  a  command  to  act  according  to  reason, 
not  according  to  desire;  and  that  any  swerving 
from  the  law  of  duty  destroys  the  morality  of  an 
act.  To  do  one's  duty  is  therefore  to  act  from 
reason  :  to  follow  inclination  is  to  cease  to  be 
moral.  But  while  to  be  moral  our  acts  must  take 
place  in  complete  independence  of  all  natural  de- 
sire, it  does  not  follow  that  to  act  freely  is  to  act 
without  regard  for  law.  True  freedom  is  that 
which  consists  in  willing  the  moral  law.  When  I 
act  from  the  idea  of  duty  I  am  free,  and  freedom 
of  will  is  therefore  identical  with  willing  the  idea 
of  duty.  The  answer,  then,  to  the  question  "  What 
ought  I  to  do?"  is  this:  "Do  that  which  will  make 
thee  worthy  of  happiness."  This  is  a  very  different 
thing  from  saying  "  Do  that  which  will  bring  thee 
happiness."  Action  regulated  by  the  latter  maxim 
is  not  moral,  but  rests  upon  self-love;  for  to  seek 
for  happiness  is  to  act  simply  from  a  desire  for  the 
satisfaction  of  our  natural  inclinations,  and  all  ac- 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OP   KANT. 


25 


tion  so  determined  is  incompatible  with  freedom. 
But,  supposing  action  to  be  regulated  purely  by  the 
idea  of  duty  or  a  regard  for  moral  law,  will  hap- 
piness as  a  matter  of  fact  follow?  It  need  hardly 
be  said  that  it  does  not  follow  in  this  world.  If, 
indeed,  all  men  at  all  times  acted  in  accordance 
with  the  idea  of  duty,  we  might  say  that  happiness 
would  be  the  lot  of  all,  for  free  or  moral  action 
naturally  tends  to  produce  happiness.  But  a  world 
in  which  all  men  on  all  occasions  act  morally  is  a 
mere  idea,  which  can  never  be  realized  so  long  as 
man  has  a  twofold  nature,  prompting  him,  on  the 
one  hand,  to  follow  desire  and,  on  the  other,  setting 
before  him  a  pure  moral  law.  We  can  only  hope 
for  the  realization  of  such  an  idea,  if  a  supreme 
reason  is  held  to  exist.  A  state  of  things,  in  which 
happiness  is  exactly  proportionate  to  moral  worth, 
is  only  conceivable  in  a  world  ruled  over  by  a  wise 
and  good  Author.  Such  a  world,  ruled  over  by  such 
a  Being,  reason  compels  us  to  postulate,  although  it 
is  not  susceptible  to  the  senses,  nor  can  ever  become 
an  object  of  our  experience. 

Thus,  as  it  seems  to  Kant,  we  can  see  that  the 
moral  law  must  be  obeyed,  whether  happiness  may 
in  this  world  follow  in  its  train  or  no,  while  vet 
the  divorce  between  desire  and  reason,  virtue  and 
happiness,   inevitably   leads   to  the  certainty  of  a 


26     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


Supreme  Being  and  of  a  future  life.  And  having 
established  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being,  we 
can  now  determine  with  certainty  that  which  to 
reason  in  its  speculative  aspect  was  at  best  prob- 
lematical. The  world  of  nature  as  ruled  c  er  by 
a  single  Supreme  Being  must  be  viewed  as  in  some 
sense  a  manifestation  of  Infinite  Intelligence,  and 
hence  as  adapted  to  the  realization  of  our  moral 
nature.  Accordingly  the  study  of  nature  tends  to 
assume  the  form  of  a  teleological  S3'stem  in  which 
all  things  are  adapted  to  one  supreme  end.  True, 
we  cannot  say  that  we  comprehend  the  nature  of 
God  absolutely  as  he  is,  or  that  we  are  abstractly 
right  in  conceiving  of  nature  as  a  system  adapted 
to  ends,  but  we  are  entitled  to  make  the  nature 
of  God  intelligible  to  ourselves  by  analogies  drawn 
from  the  world  of  experience,  and  practically  to 
view  all  things  as  forming  a  system  presided  over 
by  an  all-wise,  all-perfect  and  all-powerful  Being. 
The  world  of  sense  thus  becomes  for  us  a  "  sensu- 
ous symbol "  of  that  higher  world  which  is  half- 
revealed  and  half-concealed  from  us.  Knowing 
only  in  part,  we  can  but  laboriously  spell  out,  from 
indications  in  the  world  of  sense,  what  seem  to  be 
the  designs  of  the  Infinite  Mind,  but  we  have  the 
satisfaction  of  knowing  that  all  things  work  to- 
gether for  good  to  those  who  obey  the  moral  law, 


\ 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OP  KANT. 


27 


and  to  those  who,  in  the  interrogation  of  nature, 
are  willing  to  spend  themselves  and  to  be  spent. 
The  former  have  a  certificate  of  Reason  that  worthi- 
ness to  be  happy  will  ultimately  bring  happiness; 
the  latter,  freed  from  the  danger  of  an  "  indolent " 
or  "  perverted "  reason,  know  that  in  the  careful 
examination  of  experience  they  are  following  the 
only  path  which  can  lead  to  the  better  comprehen- 
sion of  Nature,  Mind,  and  God. 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  EARLIER  PHILOSOPHY  OP  FICHTE. 

"CpVEN  from  the  hurried  summary  of  the  Criti- 
-^-"^  cal  Philosoph}'^  given  in  the  preceding  chap- 
ter, it  must  be  evident  to  the  reader  that  Kant 
regards  Will,  or  Practical  Reason,  as  constituting 
in  a  peculiar  sense  the  essence  of  man.  Were  it 
possible  for  us  to  be  purely  contemplative  beings, 
we  should  have  no  proper  reason  for  regarding 
ourselves  as  free  beings,  or  as  destined  to  a  higher 
life  beyond  the  grave;  nor  should  we  have  any 
proper  reason  for  holding  that  the  world  mani- 
fests, however  dimly  and  imperfectly,  the  unseen 
guidance  of  a  Supreme  Being.  It  is  the  revela- 
tion of  moral  law,  as  introducing  us  to  an  ideal 
world  that  ought  to  be,  and  ought  to  fashion  the 
sensible  world  after  its  pattern,  that  enables  us  to 
learn  what  our  true  nature  is  and  demands.  Even 
in  his  account  of  the  conditions  of  knowledge, 
however,  Kant  shows  that  his  system,  half  uncon- 
sciously to  himself,  rests  upon  the  conviction  that 
the  inner  nature  of  intelligence  is  free  activity  real- 
izing itself  through  universal  laws.  Nature  is  not 
so  much  made  for  us  as  made  by  us.     Intelligence, 

28 


THE   EARLIER   PHILOSOPHY   OF   FIGHTS. 


29 


it 


as  the  source  of  those  universal  conceptions  which 
unite  the  material  of  sense  in  a  connected  system, 
is  contrasted  with  sense  as  receptive,  and  is  ex- 
pressly qualified  as  "spontaneous"  and  "active"; 
and  the  process  by  which  the  manifold  of  sense  is 
determined  in  definite  ways  is  a  spontaneous  ac- 
tivity of  mind.  That  spontaneous  activity  is  of 
the  very  essence  of  intelligence  is  implied  in  the 
"  synthetical  unity  of  self-consciousness,"  —  that 
unity  wh'  h  is  the  supreme  condition  of  all  knowl- 
edge that  we  can  have.  Free  activity  being  thus, 
in  Kant's  view,  regarded  as  the  characteristic  fea- 
ture of  man  as  rational,  it  was  only  natural  that 
Fichte,  in  seeking  for  a  supreme  principle  from 
which  a  system  of  philosophy  at  once  reasoned 
and  true  might  be  built  up,  should  be  led  to  start 
from  the  conception  of  man  as  self-conscious,  active 
and  free;  and  equally  natural  that  his  philosophy 
should  explicitly  formulate  that  subordination  of 
theory  to  practice,  of  knowledge  to  morality,  which 
had  been  in  no  obscure  way  indicated  by  Kant. 
Further  reflection  on  the  principle  thus  grasped, 
viewed  in  its  relation  to  the  Critical  Philosophy 
as  presented  by  its  author,  led  to  a  simplification 
and  restatement  of  it  that  at  first  sight  makes  it 
seem  rather  a  new  theory  than  a  recast  of  the 
old.    The  aim  of  Kant  was  to  prepare  the  way  for 


30     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

a  philosophy  that  should  hold  nothing  on  suffer- 
ance. That  which  could  be  proved  to  be  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  necessary  conditions  of  human 
knowledge  and  morality  was  alone  to  be  admitted 
into  the  new  and  completely  reasoned  system.  The 
principle  was  thoroughly  sound,  but  even  after 
all  proper  allowance  has  been  made  for  numerous 
infelicities  of  statement,  it  cannot  be  said  to  have 
been  thoroughly  and  consistently  carried  out  to 
its  issues.  Even  to  state,  and  much  more  to  trace 
to  their  source,  all  the  instances  in  which  Kant  is 
untrue  to  that  principle,  is  here  impossible,  but  a 
few  words  may  be  said  on  the  point  by  way  of 
preparation  for  the  understanding  of  the  changes 
introduced  by  Fichte. 

Although,  as  has  been  said,  Kant  regards  human 
intelligence  as  essentially  active  and  spontaneous, 
he  is  not  less  certain  that,  so  far  as  knowledge  is 
concerned,  it  is  active  only  in  relation  to  the  ma- 
terial of  sense  which  is  "  given  "  to  it.  If  it  is  asked, 
"  given "  by  tvhat  ?  the  answer  of  Kant  is  not  by 
any  means  so  clear  as  could  be  wished.  Kant  cer- 
tainly does  not  say  that  sensations  are  effects  of  a 
pre6xistent  and  independent  "  thing  -  in  -  itself,"  as 
those  who  study  his  philosophy  only  in  part  are  apt 
to  suppose;  all  that  he  says  is,  that  our  minds  do 
not  originate  the  particular  element  of  knowledge, 


THE    EARLIER    PHILOSOPHY    OF   FICHTE. 


31 


but  receive  it  from  some  other  source.  The  state- 
ment is  manifestly  true,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  individual  man,  and  is  little  more  than  an  ex- 
pression of  the  conviction — a  conviction  which  Kant 
never  dreams  of  questioning — that  the  objects  which 
come  before  us,  one  by  one,  as  parts  of  a  real  world, 
are  not  made  6//  us,  but  revealed  to  us.  At  the 
same  time,  it  must  be  admitted  that  here  we  have 
the  irpioTov  i/'sbdo'-  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  For 
Kant,  even  when  he  has  defined  the  "  thing-in-itself," 
as  he  afterward  does,  as  a  supersensible  world, 
manifesting  the  presence  of  a  Supreme  Reason,  re- 
gards both  as  hidden  from  us  in  their  universal 
nature,  by  the  necessary  limitations  of  our  minds, 
and  as  but  dimly  suggested  by  the  world  we  know  ; 
a  view  which,  if  taken  literally,  leads  to  the  grave 
of  all  sound  philosophy  in  the  unknown  and  the 
unknowable.  A  similar  mixture  of  truth  and  false- 
hood is  implied  in  the  view  that  space  and  time  are 
forms  of  human  perception,  or  at  least  of  the  percep- 
tions of  all  intelliorent  beings  who  have  a  sensuous 
nature.  In  one  aspect  of  it,  the  subjectivity  of  these 
"forms"  draws  attention  to  a  truth  which  is  simply 
an  application  of  the  principle  of  all  true  philoso- 
phy, the  truth  that  space  no  less  than  time,  and 
therefore  all  knowable  objects  in  either  or  both, 
cannot  be  said  to  exist  apart  from  their  relation  to 


32    schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


consciousness.  In  asserting  that  space  and  time 
belong  to  us  as  perceptive  beings,  Kant  also  meant 
to  emphasize  the  truth,  that  the  constitution  of  our 
minds,  to  be  completely  explained,  must  be  brought 
into  relation  with  the  supersensible  source  of  finite 
intelligence.  Still  further,  his  theory  implies  that 
the  determination  of  objects,  simply  as  in  space  and 
time,  gives  an  imperfect  and  partial  knowledge  of 
things,  and  leaves,  as  problems  to  be  solved,  the 
true  nature  of  the  mind,  the  world  and  God.  But 
while  these  points  of  view,  taking  hold  ps  they  do  of 
an  aspect  of  truth  of  supremo  importance,  are  all 
more  or  less  implied  in  Kant,  the  view  which  is 
actually  formulated  by  him,  that  space  and  time 
are  mere  modes  of  our  perception,  and  hence  that 
objects  of  perception  are  but  phenomena,  is  not  only 
unsatisfactory,  but  is  inconsistent  with  the  demand 
for  a  theory  which  shall  fully  explain  how  knowl- 
edge is  possible.  Not  to  prolong  this  criticism  un- 
necessarily, it  may  be  said,  summarily,  that  in  the 
limitation  of  the  categories  and  schemata  to  human 
intelligence,  and  above  all  in  the  denial  that  in  the 
principle  of  self-consciousness  we  reach  a  real  knowl- 
edge of  intelligence  as  it  is  in  itself,  Kant  betrays 
a  confusion  of  thought  between  two  very  different 
propositions:  (1)  that  the  finite  intelligence,  as  such, 
requires  ultimately  to  be  explained  by  relation  to 


THE   EARLIER   IMIlLOSOrilY    OP   FICllTE. 


33 


infinite  intelligence,  and  (2)  that  human  intelligence 
is  by  its  very  nature  incapable  of  knowing  things 
as  they  must  present  themselves  to  an  intelligence 
free  from  all  limitations.  The  first  of  these  propo- 
sitions I  regard  as  true,  the  second  as  false.  For, 
while  our  intelligence  necessarily  implies  relation  to 
an  infinite  intelligence,  it  does  not  follow  that  the 
latter  is  in  its  essence  different  from  ours,  nor  does 
it  follow  that  the  world  which  we  know  is  not,  when 
properly  understood,  the  only  world  that  there  is  to 
be  known.  An  imperfection  of  a  similar  kind  besets 
Kant's  account  of  the  Practical  Reason.  Between 
Reason  and  Desire,  the  "  kingdom  of  nature  "  and 
the  "kingdom  of  grace,"  he  places  an  impassable 
gulf,  and  even  his  proofs  of  God  and  immortality 
suffer  from  the  imperfect  logic  of  his  theory.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  ideas  of  freedom,  immortality 
and  God  are  treated  in  a  supremely  suggestive  way, 
and  the  direction  in  which  the  only  possible  solu- 
tions must  be  found  is  clearly  marked  out.  It  is 
unnecessary,  however,  at  present,  to  speak  of  these 
points  more  at  length,  since  Fichte  here  closely 
foiiows  Kant,  with  the  important  and  significant 
exception  of  the  moral  belief  in  a  Supreme  Reason 
existing  apart  from  the  ideal  of  such  a  reason  in  us. 
From  what  has   been  said  it  will  be  possible   to 

make  plain,  in  a  few  words,  the  way  in  which  Fichte 
8 


84      SCHELLINO'S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


sought  to  develop  Criticism  into  a  system  of  philoso- 
phy. Starting  from  the  conception  of  Reason,  or 
the  Ego  as  essentially  active,  he  endeavors  to  show 
how  knowledge  and  conduct  may  be  explained,  with- 
out,  in  any  case,  taking  refuge  in  a  conception 
incapable  of  verification.  Hence  he  denies  sum- 
marily that  there  are  realities,  supersensible  or 
other,  which  can  possibly  exist  or  be  known  out  of 
relation  to  reason.  That  the  manifold  or  sensible 
is  "given,"  he  admits  only  in  this  sense,  that  when 
we  look  at  knowledge  as  it  exists  for  ordinary  con- 
sciousness, without  bringing  it  in  relation  to  the 
practical  originativeness  of  reason  as  manifested  in 
will,  the  only  test  of  reality  which  we  have  is  the 
feeling  of  necessity,  a  compulsion  to  think  -certain 
objects  as  real.  Space  and  time,  and  the  categories, 
again,  are  certainly  modes  in  which  the  known  world 
is  determined  by  us,  but  they  are  also  modes  in 
which  that  world  actually  exists.  The  known  world, 
however,  can  only  be  properly  explained  when  it  is 
brought  into  relation  with  reason  as  practical;  then 
only  is  the  mere  feeling  of  compulsion,  which  is  the 
empirical  criterion  of  reality,  seen  to  arise  from  the 
consciousness  of  self  as  willing.  Only  in  willing  do  I 
become  conscious  of  myself  as  active,  that  is.  in  my 
essential  nature;  and  as  the  consciousness  of  self  is 
the  necessary  condition  of  the  consciousness  of  not- 


TUB   £AKL1£R   rUlLUSOrUY    OF   FlCllTE. 


35 


self,  it  is  in  will  that  I  at  once  become  aware  of 
myself  and  of  a  not-self  or  real  world  contrasted 
with  and  yet  relative  to  it.  Reason  is,  therefore, 
the  true  "  thing-in-itself,"  and  hence  Fichte,  at  least 
in  the  first  stage  of  his  philosophizing,  with  which 
only  we  have  here  to  deal,  does  not  admit  that  there 
is  any  supersensible  reality  but  rer,son,  as  mani- 
fested in  and  to  us,  nor  any  God  but  the  ideal  of 
moral  perfection,  in  the  continual  approximation  to 
which  the  moral  life  of  man  consists.  Whether, 
in  discarding  the  supersensible  as  formulated  by 
Kant,  Fichte  has  not  swept  away  the  nobler  part 
of  his  system,  we  shall  afterward  consider.  Mean- 
time it  will  be  advisable  to  give  a  statement  of  his 
philosophy,  following  rather  more  closely  his  own 
mode  of  statement,  and  entering  somewhat  more 
into  detail. 

The  moment  we  turn  our  thoughts  to  the  con- 
tents of  consciousness  we  find,  says  Fichte,  that  they 
divide  up  into  two  classes, —  those  which  are  accom- 
panied by  a  feeling  of  freedom,  and  those  which  are 
ac-ompanied  by  a  feeling  of  necessity.  To  explain 
that  class  of  ideas  which  is  accompanied  by  the  feel- 
ing of  necessity, —  to  account,  in  other  words,  for 
experience,  outer  and  inner, —  is  the  problem  of 
Philosophy.  Now,  to  put  forward  any  explanation 
of  experience,  it  must  be  possible  to  rise  above  ex- 


36     scuelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


perience  so  far  as  to  make  it,  as  a  whole,  an  object  of 
reflection,  and  this  implies  the  faculty  of  abstracting 
from  experience.     Only  two  methods  of  explaining 
experience    are    logically   possible, —  that    of    dog- 
matism and  that  of  idealism.     According  to  ideal- 
ism, the  explanation  must  be  sought  in  intelligence 
in  itself,  as    abstracted   from    all   its   relations  to 
experience;    according  to  dogmatism,  the  explana- 
tion must  be  sought  in  the  thing-in-itself,  as  ab- 
stracted from  the  fact  that  it  occurs  in  experience 
or  is  in  consciousness.     Now,  there  is  a  marked  con- 
trast between   the   object   of   idealism   and  the  ob- 
ject of  dogmatism.     Intelligence  is  neither  a  pure 
fiction  nor  an  actual  object  or  thing  in  experience; 
not   the    former,   because   even    a   pure   fiction   is 
freely  produced  by  intelligence,  and  so  presupposes 
intelligence;  not  the  latter,  because,  while  no  ob- 
ject exists  except  for  intelligence,  the  latter  is  not 
itself  an  object  of  experience  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of   that   term.      The  thing-in-itself,    on  the  other 
hand,  is  a  pure  fiction,  for,  as  beyond  intelligence, 
it  cannot   be   known   at  all.     Thus   the   object   of 
idealism   and   the  object   of  realism   are   alike  be- 
yond experience  ;  but  they  differ  in  this,  that  in- 
telligence is   presupposed  in   all  experience,  while 
the  thing-in-itself   is  at  best  a  fiction    set    up  by 
intelligence  to  account  for  experience.    This  does 


THE   EARLIER   PHILOSOPHY   OP   PICHTE. 


37 


not   show  that   there   is    no  thing-in-itself,  but   it 
raises  a  suspicion  against  it. 

■  Neither  of  these  systems  can  refute  the  other. 
Idealism  cannot  refute  dogmatism.  The  idealist 
starts  from  the  belief  in  free  self-activity,  but  the 
dogmatist,  in  holding  that  all  experience  is  to  be 
explained  by  the  action  of  an  independent  reality 
on  consciousness,  reduces  that  belief  to  an  illusion, 
due,  as  Spinoza  said,  to  a  knowledge  of  our  actions 
without  a  knowledge  of  their  causes.  Every  dog- 
matist is  necessarily  a  determinist  and  material- 
ist; the  former  because  he  makes  free  activity  an 
illusion,  and  the  latter  because  he  explains  intel- 
ligence as  a  mode  of  a  thing-in-itself.  Nor  can 
dogmatism  refute  idealism.  The  basis,  and  the 
only  basis,  of  dogmatism  is  the  supposed  necessity 
of  explaining  experience  by  a  thing-in-itself.  But 
if  it  can  be  shown  that  experience  may  be  ex- 
plained by  idealism,  the  whole  structure  built  up 
by  dogmatism  falls  to  the  ground. 

The  insufficiency  of  dogmatism  to  explain  actual 
experience  may  be  easily  shown.  Intelligence  is 
that  which  sees  itself,  or  is  at  once  object  and 
subject;  it, exists  for  itself  and  only  for  itself.  If 
I  think  any  object  whatever,  I  must  relate  the 
object  to  myself.  If  the  object  is  a  mere  inven- 
tion, I  produce  it  for  myself;  if  the  object  is  real 


38    sciielling's  transcendental  idealism. 


and  independent  of  my  invention,  I  contemplate 
it  as  it  arises  for  me;  but  in  either  case  the  object 
as  experienced  exists  only  for  me  as  intelligence, 
not  for  itself.  A  thing  has  no  existence  except 
for  some  intelligence.  Hence,  while  intelligence  is 
in  its  very  nature  dual,  or  at  once  ideal  and  real, 
the  thing  is  only  single  or  real;  the  former  exists 
for  itself,  while  the  latter  does  not. 

On  the  one  side,  then,  we  have  intelligence  with 
its  objects  as  referred  to  itself,  and  on  the  other  side 
the  thing-in-itself  of  the  dogmatist,  and  there  is  no 
bridge  from  the  one  to  the  other.  How  does  the 
dogmatist  seek  to  connect  them  ?  By  the  principle 
of  causality.  Intelligence  with  its  objects  he  ex- 
plains as  a  product  or  effect  of  something  which  is 
out  of  relation  to  intelligence.  But  this  is  no  expla- 
nation at  all.  Suppose  a  thing  to  act  as  cause  on 
something  else,  and  you  have  not  advanced  a  single 
step  in  the  explanation  of  intelligence.  If  the 
object  acted  upon  is  conceived  as  endowed  with 
mechanical  force,  it  will  transmit  the  impression  to 
another  object,  this  to  a  third,  and  so  along  the  chain 
of  objects;  but  none  of  these  objects  comes  thereby 
to  be  or  exist  for  itself  or  to  be  conscious:  it  is 
acted  upon,  but  it  does  not  know  itself  as  acted 
upon.  Nay,  endow  your  object  with  the  highest 
property  an  object  can  be  supposed  to  have, —  the 


THE   EARLIER  PHILOSOPUY   OF   PICIITE. 


39 


-^ 


property  of  sensibility, —  and  it  will  not  be  excited  to 
self-consciousness;  it  may  react  against  an  external 
stimulus,  but  it  will  not  know  itself  as  reacting. 
Thus  conscious  experience  is  not  explained  by  the 
thing-in-itself,  but  simply  ignored.  All  that  we 
have  is  the  mutual  action  of  things  on  one  another 
and  the  product  of  this  action.  A  change  in  things 
is  supposed  to  take  place,  but  this  change  is  nothing 
for  experience,  since  experience  implies  conscious- 
ness. The  dogmatist  may  say  that  the  soul  is  one 
of  the  things-in-themselves,  and  in  this  way  he  may, 
no  doubt,  apply  the  category  of  cause  and  effect  to 
it;  but  in  so  doing  he  has  not  explained  experience, 
but  simply  put  the  soul  among  the  fictions  set  up 
to  explain  it.  Or,  if  it  is  said  that  the  effect  of 
the  thing-in-itself  —  by  whatever  name  it  is  called, 
matter  or  soul  or  God  —  is  such  as  to  produce  con- 
sciousness, we  have  simply  combined  the  idea  of 
causality  with  intelligence  without  explaining  any- 
thing, for  the  two  ideas  are  perfectly  distinct. 
Dogmatism  thus  fails  to  explain  what  it  sets  out  to 
explain.  Hence  it  is  no  philosophy  at  all,  but  an 
unthinkable  absurdity.  The  moment  we  perceive 
the  distinction  between  intelligence  and  mechanism, 
the  whole  attempt  to  explain  the  former  by  the  lat- 
ter is  seen  to  be  in  the  literal  sense  preposterous. 
Only  those  who  ignore  intelligence  can  suppose  that 


40     schellixg's  transcendental  idealism. 


they  have  explained  it  by  the  hypothesis  of  things- 
in-themselves. 

Idealism  explains  the  consciousness  of  objects 
from  the  activity  of  intelligence.  Intelligence  is 
purely  active  or  self-determined,  since  it  is  that  on 
which  all  else  is  to  depend.  It  is  not  correct  to 
say  that  it  is  a  mode  of  being,  for  being  implies  the 
mutual  action  of  things  on  one  another,  whilst  on 
intelligence  nothing  can  act,  because  nothing  exists 
in  knowledge  but  for  it.  It  is  not  even  something 
that  acts,  for  that  would  imply  that  it  exists  prior  to 
its  activity.  Now  experience  in  its  various  mani- 
festations—  the  experience,  for  example,  of  a  mate- 
rial world  i^  space  and  time  —  is  to  be  explained 
by  the  pure  self-activity  of  intelligence,  and  hence 
intelligence  must  obey  the  laws  originated  by  itself. 
This  is  the  reason  why  the  experience  of  objects  is 
accompanied  by  the  feeling  of  necessity.  Intelli- 
gence can  only  act  according  to  its  own  laws,  and 
recognizing  itself  as  determined  by  those  laws,  it 
feels  itself  restricted  or  limited  in  its  nature.  This 
conception  of  intelligence  as  acting  according  to  the 
laws  of  its  own  nature  is  Transcendental  or  Criti- 
cal Idealism,  as  distinguished  from  a  Transcendent 
Idealism,  which  supposes  intelligence  to  act  in  a 
lawless  or  capricious  way.  In  acting,  intelligence 
manifests  its  laws,  and  these  laws  are  all  connected 


THE   EARLIER   PHILOSOPHY    OP  PICHTE. 


41 


together  in  a  single  system.  How,  then,  are  these 
laws  discovered?  Let  any  one  think  some  object — 
say  a  triangle  —  and  he  will  find  by  reflection  that 
two  things  are  implied:  (1)  The  act  of  thinking, 
which  is  free  or  depends  upon  the  will  of  the 
person  thinking;  and  (2)  the  necessary  manner  in 
which  that  act  can  be  realized.  The  latter  is 
the  law  according  to  which  thought  acts,  and  which 
is  revealed  only  by  thinking  freely.  Thus  the 
thinking  is  free,  and  yet  it  takes  place  according 
to  a  necessary  law  of  thought.  In  this  way  a 
fundamental  law  of  all  thinking  is  discovered.  But 
it  can  be  shown  by  an  examination  of  that  law 
'  that  a  second  act  is  implied  in  it,  then  that  this 
act  implies  a  third,  and  so  on  until  all  the  acts 
on  which  the  first  depends  are  completed.  If 
the  presupposition  of  Idealism  is  sound,  and  the 
deduction  has  been  correctly  made,  the  results  must 
harmonize  with  the  laws  of  all  experience.  Thus 
Idealism  proceeds  from  a  fact  of  consciousness  — 
which,  however,  is  obtainable  only  by  a  free  act  of 
thinking  —  to  the  totality  of  laws  of  experience.  It 
is  not  identical  with  experience,  but  it  is  when  com- 
pleted a  perfect  picture  of  experience  as  a  whole. 
Experience  involves  the  cooperation  of  all  the  laws 
discovered  by  philosophy,  not  of  any  one  of  them  in 
separation  from  the  rest.     The  separate  laws  exist 


42     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


only  for  the  philosopher:  they  are  merely  ideal  dis- 
tinctions, which  he  finds  according  to  the  method 
indicated.  Those  distinctions  are,  however,  real 
laws,  since  they  are  discovered  by  contemplation  of 
the  manner  in  which  intelligence  necessarily  acts. 

The  fundamental  principle,  then,  of  the  philoso- 
phy of  Fichte  is  that  of  the  self  as  an  activity 
which  returns  upon  itself.  Let  us  now  see  how 
it  may  be  formally  established.  It  will  be  admit- 
ted by  every  one  that  there  are  in  consciousness 
various  objects.  It  is  not  asserted  that  such  con- 
sciousness testifies  to  anything  absolutely  true,  but 
only  that  there  actually  is  a  consciousness  of  objects. 
Let  us  suppose  that  we  have  in  our  empirical  con- 
sciousness the  perception  or  apprehension  of  the 
sensible  object  which  we  call  a  billiard-ball.  Now, 
in  philosophy  we  are  not  concerned,  at  least  in 
the  first  instance,  with  the  sensible  properties  by 
which  one  object  is  marked  off  and  distinguished 
from  other  objects,  but  only  with  the  relations  of 
objects,  whatever  they  may  be,  to  consciousness. 
Expressed  generally,  therefore,  our  question  is  this: 
What  is  the  relation  of  any  o])ject  whatever  to 
consciousness  ?  We  abstract  from  the  various 
sensible  properties  of  the  billiard-ball,  extension, 
roundness,  solidity,  etc.,  and  in  so  doing  we  elimi- 
nate all  that  marks  off  the  billiard-ball  from  other 


THE   EARLIER  PHILOSOPHY   OP  PICHTE. 


43 


objects  of  consciousness,  and  have  as  residue  merely 
the  consciousness  of  something,  or  of  an  object  in 
general.  For  simplicity,  let  us  term  this  something 
or  object  A.  Now  A  is  in  consciousness.  We  do 
no*  s?»'  hat  there  is  any  real  object  —  any  object 
tu^i  ex;  apart  from  cons^.  jusness, —  but  only  that 
A  is  in  consciousness.  We  affirm  that  if  A  is  in 
consciousness,  then  it  is  in  consciousness.  The  con- 
tent of  this  proposition  is  purely  hypothetical,  since 
we  have  not  decided  that  there  is  any  real  A  at 
all,  but  the  form  of  the  proposition  is  not  hypo- 
thetical, but  absolutely  certain.  "  If  A  is,  then  it 
is  A,"  is  a  proposition  immediately  certain,  and 
therefore  not  in  need  of  proof  of  any  kind.  The 
question  is  as  to  the  ground  of  this  law.  We  have 
posited  that  A  actually  is  in  consciousness,  but  not 
that  it  has  any  reality  apart  from  consciousness. 
But  to  be  in  consciousness  the  A  must  be  referred 
to  the  self.  I  posit  the  A  in  my  consciousness,  and 
in  so  doing  I  posit  myself.  We  may  see  this  very 
clearly  by  considering  that  if  the  first  A  were  in 
consciousness,  and  the  second  A  not  in  conscious- 
ness, we  should  manifestly  be  unable  to  make  the 
affirmation  A  =  A.  The  self  must  therefore  be 
identical  with  itself.  Hence  we  may  substitute  for 
A=A  the  proposition  Ego = Ego,  or  Ego  as  object 
is  identical  with   Ego  as  subject.     In   order  that 


44     SCHBLLINO'S  TRANSCEKDBXTAL   IDEALISM. 


the  proposition  A=A  may  be  formed,  both  subject 
and  object  must  be  present  in  consciousness;  and 
however  frequently  this  proposition  may  be  made, 
the  same  condition  will  be  demanded.  Now  as  the 
identity  of  the  self  is  the  basis  of  the  proposition 
A= A,  we  get,  by  abstracting  from  the  self  and  look- 
ing merely  to  the  form  of  affirmation,  the  logical 
law  of  identity.  Moreover,  since  all  knowable  ob- 
jects are  only  for  the  Ego,  the  reference  of  an 
object,  whatever  it  may  be,  to  the  Ego  is  the  con- 
dition of  there  being  any  real  object  in  knowledge; 
hence  that  which  is  referred  to  the  Ego  is  alone 
real,  or  the  reference  of  an  object  to  the  Ego  is 
the  category  of  reality. 

Again,  in  empirical  consciousness  we  find  a  dis- 
tinction drawn  between  one  object  and  another; 
we  afiirm,  for  example,  that  a  cannon-ball  is  not 
a  billiard-ball.  Expressed  abstractly,  this  yields  the 
proposition  not- A  is  not=:A.  The  relation  of  sub- 
ject and  predicate  in  this  proposition  brings  to  light 
a  second  and  quite  distinct  act  from  that  implied 
in  the  proposition  A=A.  And  as  nothing  is  except 
for  the  Ego,  the  act  is  an  act  of  the  Ego.  The  act 
is  one  of  opposition  as  the  first  act  is  one  of  posi- 
tion. But  while  the  act  is  distinct  and  independent, 
the  content  or  matter  is  dependent  on  the  content 
or  matter  of  the  first  proposition.     Unless  we  posit 


THE   EARLIER    PHILOSOPHY    OF    FICHTE.         45 


A,  there  can  be  no  not-A.  Now,  as  in  the  first 
act  the  Ego  posited  the  Ego,  in  this  act  it  must 
oppose  to  the  Ego  the  non-Ego.  Abstracting  from 
the  content  and  looking  merely  at  the  form  of 
the  act  of  opposition,  we  get  the  logical  formula 
not-A  is  not=A,  which  we  may  call  the  logical 
law  of  opposition  or  contradiction;  and  this  act 
when  applied  to  any  real  object  yields  the  category 
of  negation. 

The  two  propositions  just  set  forth,  taken  per  «e, 
are,  apparently,  contradictory  of  one  another.  If 
the  non-Ego  is  posited,  there  can  be  no  Ego  posited; 
if  the  Ego  is  posited,  there  can  be  no  non-Ego  pos- 
ited. Yet  both  are  posited  in  the  Ego,  and  there- 
fore must  be  somehow  reconcilable  with  each  other, 
unless  the  identity  of  self- consciousness  is  to  be 
destroyed.  Evidently,  therefore,  there  must  be  a 
third  act  of  consciousness  in  which  the  opposites  are 
reconciled.  This  third  act  can  only  consist  in 
uniting  the  two  opposites  without  destroying  either, 
and  this  is  equivalent  to  the  limitation  of  each  by 
the  other.  The  immediate,  empirical  Ego  and  non- 
Ego,  or  subject  and  object  of  consciousness,  mutually 
limit  one  another  or  exist  only  in  relation  to  one 
another,  the  combining  activity  being  in  the  absolute 
Ego  which  posits  both.  This  act  may  therefore  be 
expressed  in  the  formula:  The  absolute  Ego  opposes 


46     SCIIBLLINg's   TBANSCENDKNTAL   IDKALIHM. 

in  the  Ego  a  limited  Ego  to  a  limited  non-Ego. 
Further,  by  abstracting  from  the  content  and  looking 
at  the  mere  form  of  uniting  oppofnites,  we  get  the 
logical  law  of  the  ff round.  A  \h  in  part  =  not- A: 
A  is  in  part  not  =  not-A.  In  so  far  as  A  and  not-A 
are  equal,  we  have  (/round  of  relation.'  in  ho  far  as 
A  and  not-A  are  not  equal,  we  have  f/round  of  dis- 
tinction. Moreover,  in  relation  to  real  objectH  the 
act  of  synthesis  yields  the  category  of  limitation  or 
determination. 

The  synthesis  contained  in  the  third  fundamental 
principle  is  the  starting-point  of  both  the  theoretical 
and  the  practical  philosophy  of  Fichte.  That  syn- 
thesis is  expressed  in  the  proposition:  "In  and 
through  the  absolute  Ego,  both  the  Ego  and  non-Ego 
are  posited  as  each  limitable  through  the  other;  or, 
in  positing  the  Ego  the  reality  of  the  non-Ego  is 
negated,  and  in  positing  the  non-Ego  the  reality  of 
the  Ego  is  negated,  while  yet  the  reality  of  each 
exists  only  for  the  Ego."  Now,  this  synthesis  may 
be  broken  up  into  two  propositions:  (1)  The  Ego 
posits  the  non-Ego  as  limited  through  the  Ego; 
(2)  The  Ego  posits  the  Ego  as  limited  through  the 
non-Ego.  The  former  of  these  propositions  is  the 
basis  of  Practical  Philosophy,  the  latter  the  basis  of 
Theoretical  Philosophy.  Now,  the  proposition  that 
the  relative  Ego  and  non-Ego  mutually  limit  or 


THE    BARLIBB   PHILOSOPHY    OP   PICHTE. 


47 


t 


determine  each  other,  while  yet  both  are  only  for  the 
absolute  Ego,  leaves  it  undecided  what  is  the  exact 
sense  in  which  the  mutual  determination  is  to  be 
understood,  and  also  how  the  contradiction  is  to  be 
reconciled.  We  have,  therefore,  to  take  each  of  the 
modes  of  determination  and  examine  it  separately 
before  we  can  come  to  any  decision  as  to  the  ulti- 
mate synthesis  by  which  the  two  contradictions  are 
reconciled  with  one  another.  How  can  it  be  the 
case  that  the  Ego  determines  the  non-Ego,  while  yet 
the  non-Ego  determines  the  Ego?  This  problem 
can  only  be  solved  by  asking  in  what  sense  each 
proposition  is  true  consistently  with  the  relation  of 
both  Ego  and  non-Ego  to  the  absolute  Ego. 

If  the  three  propositions  which  have  just  been 
"deduced,"  or  shown  to  be  implied  in  the  very 
nature  of  intelligence,  should  seem  somewhat  ob- 
scure to  the  reader,  their  significance  may  be  easily 
apprehended  by  bringing  them  into  relation  with 
the  better  known  philosophy  of  Kant.  The  very 
titles  of  Kant's  first  two  Critiques  imply  that  in 
both  it  is  Reason  as  a  single  indivisible  unity  which 
is  under  consideration,  and  that  it  is  the  same  Rea- 
son variously  determined  which  manifests  itself 
now  as  knowing  and  again  as  practically  active. 
Substitute  Reason  for  the  self-positing  Ego  of  Fichte, 
and  it  is  plain  that  the  absolute  thesis  is  simply  a 


48      SCIIELLINO'S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 

formal  statement  of  the  nature  of  Reason  as  a 
self-conscious  activity,  which  cannot  be  resolved 
into  anything  but  itself,  and  which  is  neither  theo- 
retical alone,  nor  practical  alone,  but  the  poten- 
tiality of  both.  Now,  it  requires  little  reflection  to 
see  that  Reason,  or  the  pure  Ego, — which,  if  viewed 
in  its  mere  abstraction  or  potentiality,  can  only 
be  defined  negatively  as  independent  of  all  else, 
positively  as  absolute  self-affirmation  or  self-reali- 
zation,—  must  differentiate  itself  before  it  can  be 
Reason  as  it  actually  exists  for  us;  it  must,  in  other 
words,  be  distinguished  according  to  its  mode  of 
manifestation,  as  theoretical  or  practical,  and  in 
either  case  there  must  be  an  opposition  of  subject 
and  object,  self  and  not -self.  These  terms  are 
necessarily  correlative:  there  can  be  for  us  no  sub- 
ject which  does  not  know  an  object  or  realize  an 
object  or  end,  and  no  object  that  is  not  known  or 
realized.  This  condition  at  once  of  knowledge  and 
of  action  is  also  implied  in  the  philosophy  of  Kant, 
as  we  have  seen,  although  he  is  not  always  quite 
true  to  himself.  As,  then,  Fichte's  first  proposition 
asserts  that  Reason  or  Self-consciousness  can  never 
be  shown  to  depend  upon  anything  foreign  to  it  — 
any  unthinkable  thing  -  in  -  itself,  —  so  his  second 
proposition  maintains  that  the  necessary  condition 
of  all  reality  is  the  distinction  within  consciousness 


TH£    KARLIER   PHILOSOPHY    OF    FICHTE. 


49 


\ 


of  subject  and  object.  And  this  proposition,  it 
will  be  observed,  holds  both  of  knowing  and  of  act* 
ing.  The  third  proposition  or  fundamental  syn* 
thesis,  simply  makes  explicit  what  is  implied  in  the 
first  two  propositions  taken  in  combination  with  one 
another.  Subject  and  object  must  be  opposed  one 
to  the  other,  since  otherw'so  there  couM  be  no 
real  consciousness,  and  the  opposition  i.iay  be  either 
theoretical  or  practical.  But  the  opposition,  as 
within  consciousness,  is  not  a  real  separati  )M,  but 
merely  a  formal  or  logical  distinction.  Reason 
manifests  itself  in  the  contrast  of  Sv;ir  ?ind  not-selt. 
otherwise  it  would  not  be  reason,  but  yet  it  em- 
braces the  distinctions  which  express  its  nature. 
Moreover,  the  opposition  of  self  and  not-self  takes 
two  diiferent  directions,  according  a .  the  self  seems 
to  be  dependent  on  the  not-self  or  the  reverse:  as 
theoretical,  the  object  seems  to  be  "given"  to  the 
self;  as  practical,  the  self  puts  itself  into  the  object. 
The  further  course  of  ,  hilosophy  will  therefore 
have  two  branches;  the  theoretical,  in  which  the 
various  ways  in  which  reason  makes  objects  intel- 
ligible to  itself  are  exhibited,  and  the  practical,  in 
which  is  shown  the  manner  in  which  it  realizes 
its  inner  nature  in  a  world  produced  by  itself. 

It  will  not  be  necessary  to  follow  Fichte  in  his 
"  deduction  "  of  the  categories  of  reciprocity,  cau- 


50    schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

sality  and  substantiality.  The  principle  of  the  de- 
duction is  in  essence  identical  with  Kant's  "deduc- 
tion of  the  categories."  All  that  need  be  borne  in 
mind  is  that  Fichte  exhibits  the  categories  not  as 
forms  belonging  to  the  "  constitution  "  of  the  human 
mind,  but  rather  as  movements  in  the  living  pro- 
cess by  which  Eeason  manifests  itself  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  objective  world.  In  his  distinction  of 
the  threefold  movement  of  intelligence,  as  well  as 
in  his  attempt  to  connect  the  categories  with  one 
another  in  an  organic  system,  he  supplies  the  norm 
which,  under  the  hands  of  Hegel,  developed  into  an 
elaborate  system  of  all  the  categories  or  modes  of 
activity  by  which  intelligence  thinks  the  real  world. 
It  will  be  advisable,  in  order  that  the  reader  may 
see  for  himself  how  far  Schelling  in  his  Transcen- 
dental Idealism  is  original,  to  give  a  short  sumniary 
of  what  in  Fichte's  system  may  be  called  Psychology. 
The  main  difference  between  Fichte  and  Kant  in 
their  theory  of  knowledge  arises  from  the  fact  that 
the  former  refuses  to  make  the  problem  easier  to 
himself  by  ?,ssuming  that  there  is  a  "  manifold  of 
sense/  somehow  made  real  by  its  relation  to  the 
thing-in-itself.  Hence  Fichte  is  compelled  to  ex- 
plain the  seeming  independence  of  the  world  of  sen- 
sible objects  entirely  from  the  nature  of  intelligence 
itself.    The  explanation  is  found  so  far  in  the  nature 


THE    EARLIER   PHILOSOPHY    OF   FICHTE. 


51 


of  the  "  productive  imagination,"  a  faculty  described 
as  a  law  of  our  minds  by  which  the  particulars 
appearing  in  our  consciousness  are,  so  to  speak, 
thrown  out  of  the  knowing  subject.  The  reason 
why  the  object  seems  to  be  inaependent  and  out 
of  relation  to  consciousness  is,  that  the  process  is 
one  that  takes  place  apart  from  any  reflective  con- 
sciousness of  it.  As  in  the  first  instance  the  object 
or  non-Ego  is  contemplated  in  itself —  this  being 
the  characteristic  feature  of  mere  knowledge,  as 
distinguished  from  practical  activity  —  it  is  not  ex- 
plicitly related  to  the  self,  and  hence  it  presents 
itself  as  if  it  were  an  independent  reality.  Philo- 
sophical reflection  is  therefore  required  to  bring  out 
the  tacit  relation  of  the  object  to  the  subject,  and 
to  show  that  the  supposed  independence  and  causal 
activity  of  the  object  is  but  a  natural  illusion.  By 
the  reality  of  an  object,  then,  we  must  understand 
simply  the  limit  which  intelligence  as  knowing  sets 
to  itself  by  the  very  law  of  its  being.  A  limit, 
however,  which  is  made  by  intelligence,  intelligence 
must  be  capable  of  removing,  and  as  a  matter  of 
fact  the  process  of  knowing  is  the  perpetual  tran- 
scendence of  a  self-created  limit.  The  imagina- 
tion is  thus  a  continuous  process  of  setting  down 
and  removing  a  limit  ;  in  the  very  act,  in  truth,  of 
opposing  something  as  foreign  to  itself  it  removes 


52      SCHELLINO'S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


I 


the  opposition.  Hence  the  various  phases  which 
constitute  the  ideal  evolution  of  knowledge,  and 
which  we  must  follow  out  until  we  have  completely 
exhausted  them;  when,  as  we  may  expect,  we  shall 
be  compelled  to  seek  for  the  final  explanation  of 
reality,  not  in  contemplation  of  the  object,  but  in 
the  self- activity  of  the  subject. 

The  result  of  Fichte's  metaphysical  investigations 
has  been  to  show  that  there  can  be  no  knowable 
reality  out  of  all  relation  to  intellig'^nce,  and  that 
the  law  which  governs  the  development  of  human 
knowledge  is,  that  that  which  intelligence  at  first 
thinks  in  an  unconscious  or  unreflective  way,  it 
is  compelled  by  the  very  law  of  its  nature  subse- 
quently to  think  in  a  reflective  or  conscious  way. 
The  elevation  of  unconscious  into  conscious  knowl- 
edge  constitutes  the  dialectic  movement  of  thought 
by  which  the  several  stages  of  knowledge  are 
reached.  Now,  when  we  fix  our  attention  upon 
the  process  of  knowledge  itself, —  when,  in  other 
words,  we  deal  with  the  peculiar  problem  of  psy- 
chology,—  we  find  that  there  are  various  stages 
through  which  knowledge  passes:  sensation,  per- 
ception, etc.  In  treating  of  these  Fichte  combines 
a  description  of  these  phases  as  they  present  them- 
selves to  the  individual  with  a  deduction  of  them ; 
that  is,  he  endeavors  to  show,  not  only  that  as   a 


h 


THE    EARLIER    PHILOSOPHY    OP   PICHTE. 


53 


matter  of  fact  knowledge  has  these  stages,  but  why, 
in  accordance  with  the  necessary  law  of  its  devel- 
opment, it  must  have  these  stages  and  no  others. 
The  deduction  of  the  categories  he  supplements 
by  a  deduction  of  the  subjective  phases  of  knowl- 
edge. . 

The  first  and  lowest  phase  of  knowledge  is  sen- 
sation. To  the  individual  who  is  still  at  the  stage 
of  sensation  nothing  is  present  but  an  immediate 
feeling;  in  other  w^ords,  he  seems  to  be  absolutely 
passive  or  to  be  devoid  of  all  reflection.  A  sensa- 
tion—  which,  as  we  know,  must  be  the  product  of 
the  Ego  itself,  since  nothing  can  exist  for  intelli- 
gence except  that  which  is  in  relation  to  it,  and 
nothing  can  be  in  relation  to  it  which  it  does  not 
actively  relate  —  seems  to  be  passively  taken  up 
from  without.  A  sensation,  therefore,  appears  to 
be  a  purely  passive  state.  The  Ego  simply  finds 
it  in  itself;  it  does  not  apparently  produce  it.  Sen- 
sation may  thus  be  defined  as  a  tinding-within-self 
(Empfndung)  of  a  given  state.  But  when,  with 
the  light  which  we  have  obtained  from  our  meta- 
physical study  of  knowledge,  we  go  on  to  ask 
whether  the  Ego  is  in  reality,  as  it  seems  to  be, 
absolutely  passive,  we  at  once  see  that  it  is  not. 
If  it  were  quite  passive  there  would  be  no  feeling 
at  all.     A  mere  impression  coming   from   without 


54    schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


is  not  to  be  identified  with  a  sensation  actually 
experienced.  To  be  experienced  it  must  be  appro- 
priated by  the  Ego,  and  this  appropriation  is  an  act, 
not  a  state.  We  must,  therefore,  regard  sensation 
as  a  complex  product,  which  on  the  one  side  is 
passive,  and  on  the  other  side  is  active.  Two  fac- 
tors, passivity  and  activity,  combine,  and  their  com- 
mon product  can  only  be  something  which  is  nei- 
ther mere  activity  nor  mere  passivity,  but  both  in 
one.  And  if  these  two  factors  unite  in  a  common 
product,  they  must  mutually  limit  without  destroy- 
ing one  another.  Sensation  is  thus  a  limitation  of 
the  Ego.  In  itself,  or  taken  in  abstraction  from 
all  its  products  or  objects,  the  Ego  is  pure,  un- 
limited activity.  But  an  absolutely  pure  Ego  is 
an  unthinkable  abstraction,  because  the  Ego  can 
only  exist  at  all  if  it  has  some  consciousness  of 
itself.  In  order,  therefore,  that  it  may  have  any 
knowledge  whatever,  intelligence  must  in  some 
way  reflect,  check,  or  render  definite  its  unlimited 
activity.  When  the  unlimited  activity  is  thus  re- 
flected —  when,  in  other  words,  it  is  turned  back 
toward  the  self — there  is  an  interruption  of  the 
unlimited  activity,  which  therefore  becomes  limited. 
The  Ego  is  thus  an  activity  turning  back  upon  it- 
self. Accordingly  it  becomes  aware  of  itself,  finds 
itself,  feels  itself.    So  far  we  have  explained  why 


THE    EABLIER   PHILOSOPHY    OP   PICHTE.         55 


\ 


intelligence  is  conscious  of  itself,  but  we  have  not 
explained  how  it  happens  that  it  does  not  recog- 
nize the  limitation  as  produced  by  itself.  To  the 
individual,  as  we  have  seen,  sensation  appears  to 
be  a  limitation  of  the  Ego  by  something  external 
to  it.  How  are  we  to  explain  this  illusion?  The 
answer  is  perfectly  simple  :  the  Ego  reflects  its 
own  activity,  but  it  does  not,  and  indeed  cannot, 
at  the  same  time  reflect  on  this  reflection;  in  other 
words  it  cannot  become  conscious  of  itself  as  at 
once  determined  and  productive.  Reflection,  in  its 
first  form,  is  thus  an  unconscious  activity.  And 
as  intelligence  is  unconscious  of  itself  as  produc- 
tive, what  is  produced  necessarily  seems  to  be  given 
to  it  from  some  other  source.  Accordingly  the 
Ego  simply  finds  itself  limited,  without  recogniz- 
ing that  what  it  finds  is  really  produced  by  itself, 
and  this  is  sensation.  Thus  all  the  character- 
istics of  sensation  are  explained.  (1)  The  I  seems 
to  be  passive,  because  it  does  not  reflect  on  its  own 
reflective  activity;  (2)  self  and  its  object  are  im- 
mediately identical,  or,  rather,  seem  to  be  identi- 
cal, because  of  the  same  absence  of  conscious  re- 
flection, and  (3)  the  union  of  passivity  and  activity 
is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  I  reacts  on  its 
own    activity,  which    is    therefore   to   that  extent 


ni 


56      SCHELLING^S   TRANSCBNDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


passive.    Hence  every  sensation  is  accompanied  by 
a  feeling  of  constraint  or  compulsion. 

The  second  stage  of  knowledge  is  perception.  In 
perception,  the  Ego  has  before  it  an  object  or  non- 
Ego  in  which  it  is,  as  it  were,  sunk  and  lost.  At 
the  same  time,  intelligence  is  no  longer  immediately 
identical  with  its  object,  as  in  sensation,  but  to  it 
there  is  opposed  a  non-Ego  or  object  by  which  it 
seems  to  be  limited.  Thus  there  is  not  onlv  sensa- 
tion,  but  perception;  not  only  a  feeling  of  constraint, 
but  the  perception  of  a  non-Ego  which  produces 
that  feeling;  not  only  a  something  limited,  but  a 
something  which  limits.  In  perception,  these  two 
elements  are  united  together,  so  that  there  is  no 
perception  without  a  feeling  of  constraint,  and  no 
feeling  of  constraint  without  perception.  This  is  a 
description  of  perception  from  the  phenomenal  point 
of  view,  and  we  have  now  to  ask  how  the  second 
stage  of  knowledge  is  to  be  philosophically  explained. 
Each  new  step  in  the  evolution  of  knowledge,  as 
has  been  said,  must  arise  from  a  new  act  of  reflec- 
tion, and  must  give  rise  to  a  new  product.  What 
the  Ego  is,  it  must  become  for  itself.  Now  we  have 
seen  that  in  sensation  intelligence  finds  itself  lim- 
ited. This  limitation  was,  however,  simply  a  feeling 
of  limitation,  not  a  definite  reflection  upon  limita- 
tion.    The  next  step,  therefore,  is  to  raise  this  fact 


\: 


THE    EARLIER   PHILOSOPHY   OF   FICHTE. 


57 


I 


of  limitation  into  explicit  consciousness,  and  this 
takes  place  when  the  Ego  reflects  on  its  limit,  and 
by  that  very  fact  goes  beyond  it.  Just  as  reflection 
of  the  pure  activity  of  the  self  gave  rise  to  its  limi- 
tation, so  reflection  on  its  limitation  is  necessarily 
a  transcendence  of  it.  And  beyond  the  limit  of  the 
Ego  there  can  be  nothing  but  that  which  limits  it, 
i.e.  a  non-Ego.  We  know,  from  our  metaphysical 
analysis  of  knowledge,  that  there  can  be  no  object  in 
knowledge  which  is  not  the  product  of  intelligence. 
How,  then,  does  it  come  that  the  non-Ego  seems  to 
be  completely  independent  of  the  Ego?  Exactly  for 
the  same  reason  that  sensation  seems  to  be  a  pure 
passivity.  In  perception,  intelligence  reflects  upon 
sensation,  but  for  that  very  reason  it  cannot,  at  the 
same  time,  reflect  on  its  reflection.  Hence  the  non- 
Ego,  which  is  really  a  product  of  the  activity  of  the 
Ego,  appears  to  be  independent  of  it.  As  it  does 
not  see  itself  act,  intelligence  is  not  conscious  of  its 
own  activity  in  perception,  and  hence  the  object 
seems  to  be  independent  of  it.  At  the  stage  of  per- 
ception, that  which  is  perceived  appears,  and  can 
only  appear,  as  a  product  of  the  non-Ego.  Starting 
from  what. is  given  in  perception,  intelligence  goes 
on  to  raise  it  into  a  higher  form,  and  this  it,  of 
course,  eflFects  by  a  new  act  of  reflection.  This  act 
of  reflection  is  free  or  spontaneous:   the  Ego  can 


68    scHEL  ling's  transcendental  idealism. 


only  reflect  on  what  is  given  to  it  in  perception,  but 
the  act  of  reflection  is  its  own  spontaneous  activity. 
This  act  of  imagination  is,  on  the  one  hand,  free, 
and  on  the  other  hand  determined:  free,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  a  product  of  the  spontaneous  activity  of  the 
Ego,  and  determined,  since  the  Ego  must  conform  to 
the  attributes  of  the  object  as  given  in  perception. 
The  marks  or  attributes  of  the  resulting  mental 
image  are  thus  referred  to  the  real  object,  which 
appears  as  the  substance  of  which  those  are  attri- 
butes; and  the  existence  of  the  image  is  ref^arded  as 
due  to  the  activity  of  the  object,  or  as  an  efi'ect  of 
which  the  latter  is  the  cause.  It  thus  becomes  evi- 
dent that  the  imagination  is  the  true  condition  of 
the  categories.  From  the  same  source  spring  the 
pure  perceptions  of  space  and  time,  which  are  poten- 
tial infinities  issuing  fro»*~  the  imaginative  activity 
of  intelligence. 

So  far  we  have  explained  only  the  universal  con- 
ditions of  the  representation  of  objects.  The  prod- 
uct of  imagination  has,  however,  to  be  fixed  or 
related,  and  this  is  due  to  the  Understanding.  The 
understanding,  again,  is  itself  subject  to  a  new 
act  of  reflection,  which  implies  a  capacity  for  reflec- 
tion upon  an  object  or  abstraction  from  it.  This 
new  act  of  reflection  is  Judgment,  which  itself  rests 
upon  Reason,  the  activity  by  which  complete  abstrac- 


THE    £ARLI£B   PHILOSOPHY    OF   FHJHTE. 


59 


tion  is  made  from  the  whole  world  of  objects  and 
attention  concentrated  entirely  on  intelligence  it- 
self. Thus  we  reach  jmre  Self-consciousness^  the 
point  from  which  our  inquiry  originally  started. 
The  circle  of  knowledge  has  thus  been  completed, 
and  it  only  remains  to  determine  the  relations  of 
knowledge  and  action. 

It  has  been  shown  that,  apart  from  the  relation 
of  self  and  not-self,  subject  and  object,  no  knowl- 
edge whatever  is  possible.  But  in  this  relation 
there  is  an  unresolved  remainder  to  which  attention 
must  now  be  directed.  Starting  from  knowledge, 
as  it  is  found  in  our  actual  experience,  we  have 
found  that  to  take  away  either  the  subject  or  the 
object  is  to  make  knowledge  an  impossibility.  A 
self  that  has  nothing  before  it  is  merely  the  poten- 
tiality of  knowledge,  whilst  an  object  existing  apart 
from  self  is  for  knowledge  nothing  at  ail.  But  in 
the  apprehension  of  an  object  as  distinct  from  the 
self,  while  yet  in  relation  to  it,  there  is  a  convic- 
tion or  feeling  that  the  object  is  necessary,  or,  in 
other  words,  that  it  is  something  not  made  by  us. 
As  Fichte  properly  maintains,  the  presence  of  this 
feeling  of  necessity  is  the  criterion  by  which,  in  our 
ordinary  knowledge,  we  satisfy  ourselves  that  what 
is  before  us  is  a  real  object,  and  not  simply  a  fiction 
of  our  own  minds.    The  connection  of  this  feeling 


60     sciielling's  transcendkntai,  idkauhm. 


of  necessity  with  the  Kantian  tliing-in-itself  is  obvi- 
ous.    Kant,  starting  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
individual  man  who  gradually  acquires  knowledge, 
was  led  to  hold  that  objects  in  Hpace  and  time  im- 
ply, besides  the  formal  ( onstitution  of  our  knowing 
faculty,  a  certain  sensuous  element  that  in  "  given  " 
to  us,  not  produced  by  ns,  and  that,  apart  from 
this  "given"  element,  there  is  no  knowledge  of  an 
actual  object.     Taking  one  step  farther,  he  asserted 
that  the  thing-in-itself  is  not  known  in  our  ordinary 
or  sensible  experience,  but  that  its  nature  remains 
a  problem  for  subsequent  consideration.     Similarly, 
Fichte,  hardly  changing  in  the  least  degree  Kant's 
view  as  properly  understood,  maintains   that  our 
ordinary  experience   of  a  real  world  is  accompa- 
nied by  the  feeling  that  what  is  before  us  is  not 
made  by  us,  but  is  independent  of  us,     This  convic- 
tion must,  however,  be  justified.     It  is  not  enough 
simply  to  accept  the  object  as  something  necessary 
or  real;  we  must  further  show,  from  the  nature  of 
the  self,  or  Reason,  how  it  comes  about  that  we 
apparently  refer  reality  to  an  independent  world, 
while  yet  there  can  be  no  world  but  that  which  is  in 
relation  to  us  as  conscious  beings. 

Now  it  is  evident  that  the  explanation  of  the  feel- 
ing of  necessity,  which  is  for  us  as  knowing  intelli- 
gences the  test  of  the  reality  of  the  world,  must  be 


THE    EARLIER    PHILOSOPHY    OF    FICHTE. 


61 


found  in  the  nature  of  self-consciousness.  To  seek 
for  the  explanation  of  it  in  any  transcendental 
reality,  such  as  Kant  seemed  to  find  in  the  noume- 
nal  or  supersensible  world,  is  inconsistent  with  the 
first  principle  of  IdtMlisin.  That  which  is  to 
explain  reality  must  be  in  direct  and  indissoluble 
connection  with  the  self.  Now  we  found  that  the 
self  which  is  to  unite  knowledge  and  action  is  the 
self  as  an  activity  returning  upon  itself,  or  estab- 
lishing its  reality  by  the  fact  of  its  own  activity. 
This  pure  activity,  unlike  the  limited  activity  of  the 
knowing  self,  is  absolutely  unlimited  or  infinite  in 
its  activity:  it  is  its  nature  to  be  incapable  of  inter- 
ference from  anything  alien  to  itself.  Kant,  as  we 
have  seen,  finds  in  reason  as  practical  the  essence  of 
human  freedom,  and  by  means  of  the  ideal  set  up 
by  reason  as  the  ultimate  goal  of  all  things,  he  is 
led  to  regard  the  world  of  ordinary  experience  as 
manifesting  palpable  traces  of  a  Divine  Mind, 
Fichte  grasps  the  Practical  Reason  as  an  absolute 
and  universal  self,  revealing  itself  to  us  as  an  Ideal 
which  we  must  make  the  goal  of  all  our  efforts. 
The  self  as  it  actually  exists  at  any  moment  is  thus 
contrasted  with  the  idea  of  an  infinitely  perfect  self 
with  which  we  are  to  seek  for  identification.  This 
ideal  self  is  not,  however,  to  be  regarded  with  Kant 
as  identical  with  a  Supreme  Reason,  conceived  of  as 


^5* 


62      MCIIKLLINU^H   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 

beyond  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge,  and  therefore 
as  unknowable.  The  absolute  self  is,  in  short, 
simply  our  ordinary  self  conceived  of  as  an  ideal  to 
which  in  this  world,  and  in  virtue  of  our  freedom, 
we  must  continually  approximate.  To  each  Individ 
ual  as  a  self-conscious  activity  the  absolute  self  is 
necessarily  given,  not  as  an  object  known,  but  as  an 
ideal  to  be  realized.  Admitting,  then,  that  human 
reason  necessarily  contains  the  ideal  of  an  infinitely 
perfect  self,  what  is  the  relation  of  this  ideal  self 
to  the  self  as  standing  in  relation  to  known  objects? 
Can  we  connect  the  feeling  of  necessity,  which  is  the 
mark  of  reality  for  us  as  knowing,  with  the  neces- 
sary ideal  of  reason?  Fichte  has  no  doubt  what- 
ever that  knowledge  must  be  explained  from  the 
nature  of  the  self  as  freely  determining  itself  to 
activity.  Only  in  the  consciousness  of  myself  as 
active,  as  willing  the  moral  law,  have  I  a  belief  in 
the  reality  of  myself  as  a  person.  Now  morality, 
as  consisting  in  an  approximation  to  the  ideal  self, 
necessarily  implies  strife  or  effort.  The  law  of  my 
mind  wars  against  the  law  of  my  members;  the 
desires  have  to  be  overcome,  and  they  can  be  over- 
come only  by  a  fierce  struggle  against  the  imme- 
diate self  and  toward  the  ideal  self.  Thus  the 
world  appears  to  me  as  something  alien  to  my 
nature,  which  yet  it  is  my  nature  to  overcome. 


THE    EARLIER    I>fIIL0H01MI Y    OK    FICIITE. 


63 


This  foreign  element  is  necessary  to  the  moral 
life,  which  would  ceasu  were  there  no  opposition. 
The  reality  of  the  world  thus  means  for  me  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  something  resisting  all  my  efforts, 
or,  subjectively,  the  consciousness  of  an  infinite 
striving  toward  a  goal  that  perpetually  recedes 
from  me.  Thus  we  can  distinguish  what  may  meta- 
phorically be  called  a  centrifugal  and  a  centripetal 
direction  in  the  self,  the  former  impelling  us  onward 
and  the  latter  manifesting  itself  as  a  return  to  self. 
Were  either  of  these  absent,  there  would  be  no  con- 
ciousness  of  self,  and  therefore  no  world  of  objects. 
Our  finitude,  then,  consists  in  the  fact  that  while  our 
very  nature  is  to  realize  the  ideal  self,  we  yet  are  pre- 
vented from  doing  so  by  the  opposition  that  we  con- 
tinually encounter.  This  opposition  appears  in  our 
consciousness  as  a  feeling  of  necessity  or  compulsion 
—  that  feeling  which,  as  we  saw,  was  the  immediate 
criterion  of  reality  for  the  knowing  subject.  Thus 
the  circle  of  reality  is  completed.  The  feeling  of  a 
necessary  reality,  which  from  the  point  of  view  of 
knowledge  is  unintelligible,  receives  explanation 
from  the  consideration  of  man  as  a  finite  being 
striving  after  perfection  and  continually  driven 
back  into  himself  by  something  that  seems  foreign 
to  him,  but  which  is  in  reality  the  infinite  Reason 
constituting  his  essential  nature. 


64    schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


Before  passing  from  the  earlier  philosophy  of 
Fichte,  which  exercised  so  great  an  influence  on 
Schelling,  a  short  estimate  may  be  made  of  its 
value  as  a  solution  of  the  great  problems  raised  by 
Kant.  In  the  whole  of  his  inquiries,  Kant  assumes 
that  reason  is  absolutely  the  same  in  all  men, 
and  that  the  conclusions  of  reason  are  to  be  ac- 
cepted as  universally  valid.  But  just  because  he 
unquestioningly  starts  from  this  assumption  he 
never  clearly  distinguishes  between  reason  in  the 
individual  man  and  reason  as  the  essence  of  intel- 
ligence as  such;  or,  rather,  he  assumes  that  the 
limitations  hemming  in  the  individual  man  are  lim- 
itations which,  as  belonging  to  the  nature  of  reason 
as  such,  are  incapable  of  being  transcended.  Hence 
it  is  that,  perceiving,  as  we  all  do,  that  the  knowable 
world  is  constituted  independently  of  our  individ- 
ual consciousness  of  it,  he  fails  to  see  with  perfect 
clearness  that  there  can  be  no  world  at  all  which 
is  not  in  relation  to  int(  lligence.  Accordingly  it 
seems  self-evident  to  Kint  that,  besides  the  world 
revealed  to  human  intelligence,  there  is  a  super- 
sensible world  which  is  only  dimly  shadowed  forth, 
and  which,  while  known  to  exist,  can  never  be 
made  perfectly  intelligible  to  us.  And  because  the 
world  of  experience  is  only  phenomenal,  Kant  is 
led  to  the  conclusion  that  the   mind   in  its   true 


V 


THE   EARLIER   PHILOSOPHY   OF   FICHTB. 


65 


le 
le 
h 


nature  is  not  properly  known,  but  has  to  be  sensu- 
ously figured  by  us  in  our  imperfect  human  way. 
Finally,  while  God  as  the  Supreme  Good  is  unde- 
niably real.  He  is  not  strictly  speaking  known  to 
us,  but  is  made  intelligible  to  us  by  analogies 
drawn  from  the  world  of  sense. 

Now  if  we  are  strict  to  bring  home  to  Kant  the 
logical  consequences  of  this  separation  of  the  phe- 
nomenal from  the  nouraenal  world,  we  may  easily 
show,  as  has  been  shown  scores  of  times,  that  the 
noumenal  world  vanishes  in  smoke,  and  leaves  us 
only  with  the  so-called  phenomenal  or  sensible 
world.  It  is  illogical  to  say  that  the  world  in 
itself,  the  mind  in  itself,  and  God  in  himself,  are 
not  at  all  what  we  know  them  to  be,  because  of 
that  which  we  do  not  know  we  can  assert  nothing 
whatever.  At  the  same  time  it  must  be  said  that 
this  method  of  criticism  is  somewhat  superficial, 
and  entirely  overlooks  the  deeper  elements  of  the 
critical  theory.  For  while  the  world,  the  mind, 
and  God,  are  certainly  not  incapable  of  being 
known  as  they  are,  it  is  not  less  true  that  they 
are  not  adequately  characterized  by  the  ordinary 
categories  of  quantity,  substance  or  cause.  These 
categories,  as  Kant  rightly  says,  are  applicable  to 
parts   of   experience,   but   not   to   experience   as   a 

whole;  they  express  the  nature   of  matter  as  the 
6 


66     schelling's  teanscendental  idealism. 

movable  in  space  and  time,  but  not  the  nature  of 
mind ;  and  they  completely  fail  to  express  the 
nature  of  God.  Kant's  imperfection,  therefore,  is 
not  in  asserting  the  limited  nature  of  the  sensible 
world,  but  in  throwing  around  the  noumenal  world 
a  half-transparent  veil  of  mystery.  Granting  that 
the  world,  the  mind  and  God  are  not  adequately 
characterized  as  quantities,  substances  or  causes, 
at  least  they  are  more  adequately  characterized 
by  these  categories  than  by  that  of  pure  Being, 
which  might  almost  as  well  be  pure  Nothing.  Tlie 
development  of  Kant's  thought,  therefore,  demands 
a  positive  determination  of  the  nature  of  those 
supersensible  objects  which  he  had  defined  only  by 
negative  predicates,  or  at  best  by  analogies  bor- 
rowed from  that  very  sensible  world  which  he 
rightly  held  to  be  limited,  partial  and  dependent. 

Fichte's  chief  merit  is  that  with  unhesitating 
clearness  and  decision  he  removes  the  veil  which 
Kant  had  drawn  across  the  mysterious  thing-in- 
itself.  The  absoluteness  of  reason  and  the  identity 
of  individual  and  universal  reason  being  assumed 
by  him  as  by  Kant,  the  problem  of  philosophy  as 
he  figured  it  was:  How  do  I,  in  virtue  of  my  rea- 
son, come  to  know  a  world  in  space  and  time,  and 
what  is  the  inner  nature  of  my  reason?  The  an- 
swer to  these  questions  Fichte  found  in  a  simpiifi- 


THE    EARLIER    PHIIa'SOPHY   OF   FICHTE. 


67 


cation  of  the  Kantian  theory.  The  mind  of  man 
is,  in  a  sense,  the  only  intelligible  reality,  and  that 
which  supplies  the  key  to  all  the  rest.  Determine 
exactly  the  nature  of  human  intelligence,  and  the 
necessary  conditions  of  all  reality  will  be  laid  bare. 
Hints  for  the  simplification  of  Kant's  view  were 
plentifully  supplied  by  Kant  himself;  and  indeed 
all  that  Fichte  needed  to  bring  him  to  his  peculiar 
point  of  view  was  to  connect  Kant's  aci^ount  of  the 
transcendental  unity  of  self-consciousness  with  the 
account  of  reason  in  its  practical  use,  and  to  reject 
any  mysterious  unknowable  thing-in-itself  as  a  pure 
fiction..  It  cannot,  however,  be  said  that  Fichte 
has  completely  solved  the  problems  raised  by  Kant. 
His  <^hief  merit  lies  in  tV.e  emphasis  he  bar;  placed 
on  the  necessary  relativity  of  existence  and  self- 
consciousness.  His  simpliii cation  of  Kant's  theory 
leaves  the  deeper  aspect  o^  it  very  much  as  he  iound 
it.  The  picture  whi*'*  ho  presents  to  us  of  exist- 
ence is  that  of  a  number  of  finite  intelligences,  each 
striving  1;0  realize  an  ideal  of  perfection  somehow 
given  to  it;  but  what  is  the  relation  of  these  intelli- 
gences to  the  world  as  a  whole,  or  how  thev  are 
related  to  an  infinite  intelligence,  he  does  not  tell 
us.  To  the  individual  there  is  somshow  given  a 
self  that  at  once  consists  in  a  perpetual  struggle 
toward  the  infinite,  and  is   itself  the  goal  of  the 


if  ■ 


68     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


struggle;  but  no  attempt  is  made  to  connect  this 
self  with  an  absolute  intelligence  comprehending  at 
once  finite  beings  and  the  finite  things  known  by 
them.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  Fichte's  "  deduction  " 
of  the  reality  of  the  world  is  more  than  a  restate- 
ment of  the  problem.  It  is  no  doubt  true  that, 
apart  from  the  free  activity  of  the  will,  there  could 
be  no  knowledge ;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  apart 
from  knowledge  there  could  be  no  free  activity. 
To  say  that  the  infinite  striving  after  an  unattain- 
able ideal  explaius  the  feeling  of  reality  is  merely 
to  say  that  freedom  finds  itself  impeded.  It  is  no 
proper  explanation  of  the  objective  world  to  say 
that  it  so  presents  itself  to  the  individual  intelli- 
gence; we  still  wish  to  know  what  objective  reality 
is,  apart  from  the  intelligence  of  any  particular  in- 
dividual,—  or,  rather,  what  the  finite  intelligence, 
tOi,ether  with  its  world,  is  in  relation  to  that  which 
is  somehow  higher  than  either;  and  that  question 
cannot  be  answered  without  a  theory  of  knowledge 
less  assumptive  in  its  nature  than  the  one  with 
which  Fichte  presents  us.  This  indeed  is  virtually 
implied  in  the  changes  which  Fichte  introduced  in 
the  later  presentation  of  his  system,  which  are  all 
in  the  direction  of  defining  the  absolute  Ego  more 
closely,  or,  in  other  words,  of  explaining  the  re- 
lations of   individual    and    universal   intelligence. 


THE   EABLIER   PHILOSOPHY    OP   FICHTE. 


69 


It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  subsequent  speculation, 
starting  from  the  unity  of  subject  and  object,  which 
Fichte,  following  out  the  theory  of  Kant,  was  led 
to  formulate  with  such  force  and  clearness,  must 
attempt  to  get  a  closer  and  deeper  view  of  the  rela- 
tions of  Man,  the  World,  and  the  Absolute. 


[  li 


i^i 


"ri 


CHAPTER  III. 

SCHELLING'S  EARLIER  TREATISES. 

jjORN  at  Leonberg,  in  Wllrtemberg,  in  1775, 
"^  thirteen  years  after  the  birth  of  Fichte, 
Schelling  entered  Tubingen  as  a  student  of  theol- 
ogy at  the  age  of  fifteen,  and  began  his  career  as  a 
philosophical  writer  in  his  twentieth  year.  His  first 
work  was  a  little  treatise  on  The  PossihiUtij  of  a 
Form  of  Philosophy  in  General,  in  which  he  follows 
pretty  closely  the  substance  of  Fichte's  Idea  of  Phi- 
losophy. This  essay  is  by  Schelling  himself  said  to 
have  originated  in  a  study  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  from  reflection  on  which  he  was  led  to  see  the 
necessity  of  a  single  principle  that  should  connect 
every  part  of  philosophy  in  an  organic  whole.  The 
need  for  such  a  principle  was  made  stiil  more  plain 
to  him  by  Schulzo's  ^Ene^tdemus  and  Maimon's  New 
Theory  of  Knowledge.  Re  also  came  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  lieiuijold's  El'^mentary  Philosophy  did  not 
supply  WfUit  was  wanteu,  inasmuch  as  the  principle 
on  which  it  tried  to  base  a  complete  system  v-as  not 
one  from  which  the  form  as  well  as  the  content  of 
philosophy  could  be  derived.  Fichte's  review  of 
uEnesideinus  and  tract  on  the  Idea  of  Philosophy 


.■M.,  -^^f* 


Sf'HELLiyo's    KARMER   TREATISES. 


71 


convinced  him  that  the  principle  of  which  he  had 
been  in  search  could  only  be  found  in  self-conscious- 
ness, as  that  which,  in  establishing  itself,  is  form  and 
content  in  one.  In  this  account  of  the  origin  of  his 
little  essay,  Schelling  displays  somewhat  too  eager  a 
desire  to  lay  claim  to  an  originality  of  which  the 
work  itself,  however  excellent  in  point  of  style, 
gives  no  special  evidence.  Its  only  claim  to  origi- 
nality lies  in  the  attempt  it  makes  to  deduce  from 
the  three  fundamental  principles  of  the  Fichtean 
philosophy  not  only  the  Kantian  categories  of  qual- 
ity, but  those  of  quantity  and  modality  as  well.  The 
main  significance  of  this  youthful  writing  for  Schel- 
liiig's  philosophical  development  is  the  indication  it 
gives  of  his  tendency  to  read  Kant  with  his  own 
eyes  as  well  as  with  those  of  Fichte, —  a  tendency 
which  is  still  more  plainly  displayed  in  a  somewhat 
longer  treatise,  The  I  as  Principle  of  PhUosophy^ 
published  in  the  following  year  (1795). 

By  tht  publication  of  this  little  work  Schelling 
at  once  established  his  position  as  a  philosophical 
writer,  who,  if  he  did  not  as  yet  give  evidence  of 
the  originality  of  Fichte,  at  least  had  as  firm  a 
grasp  of  the  principles  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre 
as  its  author,  who  was  also  familiar  with  the  phi- 
losophy of  Spinoza  and  of  Kant,  and  who  had  the 
capacity   of    expressing   his   ideas   with    wonderful 


il 


^iU^^'J^^^ljjI^jSi?^^ 


72     schellixg's  transcendental  idealism. 


ease  and  grace.  In  a  letter  to  Reinhold,  Fichte 
expressed  great  admiration  for  the  ability  shown 
by  Schelling  in  this  essay,  and  spoke  of  it  as  a 
commentary  on  the  Wissenschaftslehre,  which  had 
been  quite  intelligible  to  many  who  had  failed  to 
comprehend  his  own  exposition.  At  a  later  period, 
when  Schelling  had  struck  out  an  independent  path 
of  his  own,  Fichte  refused  to  admit  that  his  former 
disciple  had  ever  properly  compreli.  nded  the  sys- 
tem of  which  he  had  been  a  supposed  exponent. 
There  is  a  certain  justification  for  each  of  these 
estimates,  contradictory  as  they  are.  The  work  in 
question,  while  it  is  in  the  main  an  independent 
statement  of  the  philosophy  of  Fichte,  yet  exhibits 
unmistakable  traces  of  Schelling's  future  diver- 
gence from  Fichte, —  a  divergence,  however,  the 
germs  of  which  are  contained  in  Fichte  himself. 
The  aim  of  the  work,  as  its  title  indicates,  is  to 
show  that  the  Ego,  or  intelligence,  is  the  supreme 
or  unconditioned  element  in  human  knowledge. 
It  "  traces  back  the  results  of  the  critical  philoso- 
phy to  the  ultimate  principle  of  all  knowledge," 
refusing  to  be  bound  by  the  mere  letter  of  Kant's 
system.  No  doubt  in  Kant  the  true  principle  is 
implicit,  but  the  way  in  which  he  separates  the 
theoretical  and  the  practical  parts  of  his  philoso- 
phy prevented  him  from  seeing  that  the  basis  of 


SCHELLINa's   EARLIER   TREATISES. 


73 


s 
Is 
le 


\ 


the  whole  was  the  pure  or  absolute  Ego.  As  ulti- 
mate and  supreme,  this  principle  can  be  derived 
from  nothing  else;  it  is,  in  Spinoza's  phrase,  "the 
light  which  reveals  at  once  itself  and  darkness." 
It  is  vain  to  seek  for  the  supreme  principle  of  all 
knowledge  in  any  object  of  knowledge,  for  each 
object  as  but  a  single  link  in  the  chain  cannot 
possibly  bind  all  the  other  links  together.  Not 
even  God,  as  a  supposed  object  of  knowledge,  can  be 
for  us  the  ground  of  reality,  as  Descartes  supposed; 
for  we  cannot  establish  the  reality  of  God  until 
we  have  first  found  the  supreme  condition  of  any 
knowledge  whatever.  The  principle  we  seek  cannot 
be  found  even  in  the  subject  of  knowledge,  for  just 
as  an  object  exists  only  in  contrast  and  relation  to  a 
subject,  so  a  subject  exists  only  in  contrast  and  re- 
lation to  an  object;  nay,  the  subject  is  itself  knowa- 
ble  only  by  becoming  an  object  of  knowledge,  and 
is  therefore  conditioned.  The  supreme  principle, 
then,  is  neither  subject  nor  object,  but  that  which 
is  the  condition  of  both;  it  is  the  pure  or  absolute 
Ego,  which  can  never  be  an  object  of  knowledge, 
but  which  establishes  its  reality  in  and  through 
itself.  This  absolute  Ego,  while  it  is  not  an  object 
of  outer  sense,  cannot  be  thought,  but  only  per- 
ceived or  contemplated,  and  the  organ  by  which 
it  is  known  is  well  named  by  Fichte  Intellectual 


' 


74       SCUKLLINO's   TKANHC!KNI)KNTAf.    ir)k.\I.rSM. 


Perception.  The  Absolute  E^o,  v^hi'-'I'i  mu?<t  not  for 
a  moment  be  confounded  with  nelf-consciousness 
or  the  empirical  Ecfo,  is  absolutoly  IVee,  since  that 
must  be  fre«>  which  is  not  only  independent  of  all 
else  but  is  the  condition  of  all  posfsiblu  reality.  Of 
the  Ego  we  cannot  say  that  we  have  un  immediate 
knowledge  or  consciousness,  for  consciousness  im- 
plies the  opposition  of  subject  and  object,  or  more 
definitely  a  straggle  with  the  not-self  or  world 
of  nature  which  pev'petually  threatens  to  carry  the 
self  away  in  its  ever-flowing  stream  of  change. 
The  infinite  Ego  is  above  all  strife  and  change;  it 
is  an  absolute  unity  or  self-identity,  excluding  at 
once  numerical  multiplicity  and  numerical  unity. 
The  source  of  all  possible  reality,  it  is,  as  Spinoza 
said  of  his  absolute  Substance,  infinite,  indivisible 
and  unchangeable.  Still,  the  infinite  Ego,  which  is 
best  characterized  as  absolute  Power,  is  the  condi- 
tion of  the  finite  self  as  related  to  finite  objects, 
to  which  it  appears  as  the  command,  not  so  much 
to  be  identical  with  self  as  to  becomv  identical  with 
self.  In  the  absolute  Ego  there  iiiJ  complete  iden- 
tity of  possibility  and  actuality,  but  the  finite  Ego 
must  seek  to  make  actual,  by  slow  and  painful 
steps,  what  is  potentially  in  it,  and  hence  for  it 
the  absolute  Ego  is  an  ideal  to  be  realized.  The 
approximation  toward  this  ideal  is  possible  to  man 


, 


SniKLLINO's    KARLIKR   TKKATIKRr). 


76 


just  because  lie  is  identical  in  nature  with  the  ab- 
solute Ego,  and  herein  consists  his  practical  free- 
dom; but  as  the  world  of  nature  stands  in  oppo- 
sition to  him  as  a  finite  being,  absolute  freedom 
assumes  the  form  of  <i  . .  anscendence  of  the  natu- 
ral limitations  by  w  he  is  surrounded,  or  an 
obedience  to  a  moral  imposed  upon  him  as 
finite  by  his  infinite  reason.  Each  moral  advance 
carries  man  beyond  the  immediate  limits  of  his 
finite  nature,  and  in  this  partial  negation  of  the 
objective  world, —  the  world  which  stands  opposed 
to  him  as  something  foreign  to  his  ideal  self, —  his 
life  as  a  rational  being  consists.  In  the  perpetual 
approximation  to  complete  freedom  lies  the  recon- 
ciliation, in  idea,  of  morality  and  happiness;  and 
in  this  preestablished  harmony  of  nature  and  mo- 
rality lies  the  possibility  of  reconciling  the  mech- 
anism of  nature  with  the  finality  of  reason.  Na- 
ture is  not  something  absolutely  alien  to  reason, 
but  borrows  reality  from  it,  and  hence  in  follow- 
ing out  the  law  of  our  reason  we  do  not  find  our- 
selves in  absolute  disharmony  with  nature. 

The  main  features  in  this  outline  of  a  philo- 
sophical system'  are  Fichtean,  but  the  atmosphere 
which  pervades  it  is  sensibly  different,  although  it 
is  not  easy  to  make  the  difference  palpable  to  one 
who  has  not  read  the  treatise  itself  in   connection 


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23  WIST  MAIN  STREET 

WEBSTER,  N.Y.  MSM 

(716)t73-4S03 


^t,^»»(iumMtwa^M:. 


76     schblling's  transcendental  idealism* 


' 


with  the  Wisaenschaftslehre.  One  point  of  distinc- 
tion  manifestly  is,  that  Fichte^s  tacit  opposition  of 
the  absolute  and  the  finite  Ego  is  brought  by  Schel- 
ling  into  clear  and  bold  relief.  Predicates  are  ap- 
plied to  the  former  which  make  it  apparent  that 
all  finite  individuals  are  in  some  sense  but  modes 
of  an  intelligence  which  manifests  itself  in  them, 
but  is  somehow  distinct  from  them.  This  is  espe- 
cially apparent  in  the  deliberate  application  to  the 
absolute  Ego  of  predicates  applied  by  Spinoza  to 
the  absolute  substance  which  he  calls  God.  It  is 
true  that  Schelling  still  speaks  in  words  of  the 
absolute  Ego  as  nothing  apart  from  the  totality  of 
self-conscious  beings;  but  on  the  other  hand  his 
assertion  of  the  absolute  identity  of  subject  and 
object  is,  to  say  the  least,  as  much  in  accordance 
with  his  own  later  thought  as  with  the  philosophy 
of  Fichte.  It  is  but  another  manifestation  of  the 
same  tendency  to  go  beyond  the  subjective  idealism 
of  Fichte,  that  Schelling  insists  upon  the  coordi- 
nation of  subject  and  object.  While  denying  as 
strongly  as  Fichte  any  "  thing-in- itself "  lying  back 
of  knowable  objects,  he  yet  opposes  the  object  to 
the  subject  more  strongly  than  Fichte,  and  seeks 
in  the  absolute  Ego  for  the  unity  which  is  to  I'econ- 
cile  them.  The  reason  why  the  supreme  principle 
cannot  be  found  in  the  finite  self  is  mainly  that 


schelling's  earlieb  treatises. 


77 


the  latter  exists  only  as  conscious  of  an  object,  and 

• 

such  consciousness,  as  implying  distinction,  neces- 
sarily implies  limitation.  If  we  follow  out  this 
idea  we  shall  manifestly  be  led  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  true  absolute  is  to  be  sought  in  an  ab- 
stract identity,  which  excludes  all  definiteness  what- 
ever, and  which,  therefore,  will  be  almost  indis- 
tinguishable from  the  absolute  Substance  of  Spinoza 
or  the  Unknowable  of  recent  English  philosophy. 
It  is  of  course  true  that  Schelling  was  very  far 
from  intending  such  a  result,  and  that  his  theory 
contains  a  principle  utterly  discrepant  from  it;  but 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  here  we  have  already 
the  germ  of  the  theory  which  he  afterward  devel- 
oped, that  the  true  absolute  is  to  be  found  in  the 
complete  indifference  of  subject  and  object.  Lastly, 
it  may  be  remarked  that  in  this  treatise  Schelling 
already  shows  that  tendency  to  view  the  world  as 
moving  toward  an  end,  or  as  manifesting  unconscious 
reason,  which  had  been  suggested  to  him  by  a  study 
of  Kant's  Critique  of  Judgment,  and  which  he 
was  soon  to  apply,  not  merely  as  here,  to  man  as 
a  moral  being,  living  in  a  world  that  seemed  to  be 
alien  to  him,  but  to  the  determination  of  nature 
itself  as  rising  through  various  forms,  each  of  which 
is  the  prophecy  of  that  which  includes  and  tran- 
scends it. 


78     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

In  the  same  year  the  Philosophical  Letters  on 
Dogmatism  and  Criticism  were  published.  Nothing 
could  exceed  the  force  and  grace  of  this  little  work, 
which  may  be  regarded  as  the  consummate  flower 
of  Schelling's  period  of  storm  and  stress.  Dogma- 
tism and  criticism  are  here  considered  in  their 
bearings  on  the  independent  existence  of  an  "ob- 
jective" God.  The  work  was  meant  as  a  counter- 
blast against  the  official  followers  of  Kant,  who,  in 
Schelling*s  estimation,  were  seeking  to  convert  the 
Critical  Philosophy  into  a  dogmatism  of  a  worse 
kind  than  that  from  which  Kant  had  sought  to  free 
the  minds  of  men.  The  result  of  Kant's  specula- 
tions, it  was  held,  was  to  show  that  Theoretical 
Reason,  from  its  inherent  weakness,  is  unable  to 
conceive  of  God,  while  Practical  Reason  compels  us 
to  assume  his  existence  as  a  "  postulate  **  required 
to  establish  the  absoluteness  of  morality,  and  to 
furnish  a  motive  for  obedience  to  it.  This  attempt 
to  base  morality  on  a  pure  hypothesis  Schelling 
denounces  as  neither  Kantian  nor  rational.  God 
is  conceived  of  a'  being  entirely  external  to  the 
world,  and  as  formed  in  the  image  of  man.  He  is 
at  once  a  First  Cause  and  a  Moral  Governor.  How 
can  the  existence  of  such  a  being  be  proved  ? 
"  Theoretical  Reason,"  it  is  said,  "  is  by  its  neces- 
sary limitations   forever  prevented  from   framing 


bchelling's  earlier  treatises. 


79 


any  c6nception  of  God."  There  need  be  no  dispute 
about  words;  if  we  cannot  "conceive"  of  God  by 
theoretical  reason,  we  must  at  least  "believe,"  or 
"suppose"  him  to  exist;  how  then  is  this  belief  or 
supposition  to  be  justified?  It  is  all  very  well  to 
talk  of  "  practical  needs "  establishing  his  reality, 
but  if  "  needs "  are  to  determine  anything,  why 
should  not  theoretical  needs  be  as  potent  as  prac* 
tical?  If  the  existence  of  God  is  a  mere  assump- 
tion, it  is  not  likely  to  bear  much  strain.  If  it  is 
said  that  practical  needs  are  more  imperative  than 
theoretical,  the  answer  is  that  our  needs  cannot 
establish  the  reality  of  a  being  who  is  assumed  to 
be  unknowable.  The  so-called  "  practical  needs  " 
thus  turn  out  to  be  an  uncritical  belief, —  a  belief, 
moreover,  which  belongs  to  that  very  theoretical 
faculty  the  weakness  of  which  is  made  the  reason 
for  assuming  it.  Waiving  this  objection,  how  can 
it  be  shown  that  the  First  Cause  is  a  Moral  Gov- 
ernor? "The  fact  of  the  moral  law,"  it  is  said, 
"  proves  the  existence  of  an  Absolute  Being,  and 
human  freedom  would  be  destroyed  were  hhe  will 
of  that  being  not  conformed  to  the  moral  law." 
But  if  it  is  legitimate  to  reason  fonvard  in  this 
way  from  human  freedom  to  the  existence  of 
God,  why  should  not  others  reason  backward  from 
the  existence  of  God  to  the  denial  of  human  free- 


80      SCHELLIN6*S  TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


dom?  If  there  is  an  Absolute  Cause,  how  can  man 
possibly  be  free?  The  exponents  of  criticism  are 
pure  dogmatists.  "Can  there  be  a  more  pitiable 
spectacle,"  Schelling  indignantly  exclaims,  "than  a 
so-called  philosophy,  the  burden  of  which  is  that 
while  reason  is  too  weak  to  conceive  of  God,  a  man 
will  only  act  morally  if  he  assumes  the  existence 
of  a  Being  who  rewards  the  virtuous  and  punishes 
the  guilty !  '*  A  breath  is  enough  to  upset  such  a 
castle  of  cards.  The  real  weakness  of  reason  is  not 
that  it  cannot  know  an  objective  God,  but  in  sup- 
posing that  there  is  such  a  God  to  know.  The 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  is  not  to  be  charged  with 
the  stupidities  of  its  incompetent  interpreters,  but 
it  has  given  occasion  for  them,  from  the  fact  that 
it  is  a  criticism  merely  of  the  faculty  of  knowledge, 
and  therefore  begins  with  the  opposition  of  subject 
and  object.  The  question  with  which  it  starts  — 
How  do  we  come  to  form  synthetical  judgments?— 
may  be  thus  put:  How,  by  going  beyond  the  ab- 
solute, does  opposition  arise  ?  Although  synthesis 
is  possible  only  through  "Hn  original  unity  in  con- 
trast to  multiplicity,  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
could  not  ascend  to  that  unity,  since  it  started 
from  the  opposition  of  subject  and  object  as  a  fact. 
The  disadvantage  of  this  point  of  view  is  that 
knowledge  seems  to  be  something  not  belonging 


SCHELLINO'S   EARLIER   TREATISES. 


81 


to  the  very  nature  of  intelligence,  but  something 
peculiar  to  the  individual  subject.  The  most  that 
the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  has  been  able  to 
show  is,  that  dogmatism  is  theoretically  incapable 
of  proof.  Dogmatism  cannot  be  overthrown  so 
long  as  we  remain  at  the  point  of  view  of  knowl- 
edge. No  doubt  it  may  be  shown  that  the  subject 
can  only  get  a  knowledge  of  the  objective  world 
by  means  of  synthesis,  and  hence  that  objects  are 
necessarily  in  relation  to  the  subject.  But  this 
only  proves  that,  within  the  sphere  of  conditioned 
or  limited  existence  —  the  sphere  in  which  object 
and  subject  are  opposed  to  one  another  —  there  can 
be  no  object  out  of  relation  to  a  subject;  it  deter- 
mines nothing  as  to  the  unconditioned  or  absolute 
unity  which  combines  subject  and  object  in  one. 
All  synthesis  must  finally  end  in  a  thesis.  What 
is  this  thesis?  We  are  seeking  for  that  which  is 
beyond  the  difference  of  subject  and  object,  and 
this  something  must  be  either  (a)  an  absolute  sub- 
ject or  (b)  an  absolute  object.  But  just  because 
theoretical  reason  moves  only  within  the  realm  in 
which  subject  and  object  are  opposed,  it  can  give 
no  answer  to  this  problem.  Hence  completed  dog- 
matism, as  it  exists,  for  example,  in  Spinoza,  cannot 
be   refuted  by  criticism,  so  long  as  both  remain 

within  the  sphere  of   "knowledge."     The  battle 
6 


82       SCHELLING*8    TRANSOBNDBNTAL    IDEALISM. 


must  therefore  be  carried  into  the  sphere  of  ac- 
tion and  determined  there.  Criticism  as  well  as 
dogmatism  leads  to  "  SchwHrmerei,"  if  it  holds 
that  the  object  must  finally  be  swallowed  up  in 
the  subject;  in  other  words,  that  absolute  identity 
of  subject  and  object  is  the  goal  of  human  prog- 
ress. To  negate  the  object  and  to  negate  the  sub- 
ject are  at  bottom  the  same,  for  in  either  case 
personality  disappears.  The  only  difference  is  that 
criticism  starts  from  the  immediate  identity  of  the 
subject  and  goes  on  to  unite  subject  and  object; 
whereas  dogmatism  proceeds  in  the,  reverse  way. 
The  former  says  that  in  morality  the  subject  affirms 
itself,  and  holds  that  the  goal  is  the  synthesis  of 
morality  and  happiness  ;  the  latter  begins  with 
happiness,  or  the  harmony  of  the  subject  with 
the  objective  world,  and  in  this  way  seeks  to  find 
morality.  In  both  systems  morality  and  happiness 
are  distinct  principles  which  can  be  united  only 
synthetically,  that  is,  as  ground  and  consequence, 
so  long  only  as  the  individual  is  on  his  way  to 
the  goal.  Were  the  goal  reached,  the  distinction 
would  disappear  in  absolute  being  or  blessedness. 
So  freedom  and  necessity  must  be  united  in  the 
absolute;  a  will  which  is  subject  only  to  itself  is 
at  once  free  and  necessary;  free  because  it  obeys 
the  laws  of  its  own  being,  necessary  because  in 


SCHELLING*S   EABLIER  TREATISES. 


88 


ihe 
is 

ays 
in 


obeying  itself  it  is  under  the  yoke  of  law.  If, 
therefore,  criticism  is  to  separate  itself  definitely 
from  dogmatism,  it  must  deny  that  the  absolute 
unity  of  subject  and  object,  morality  and  happiness, 
freedom  and  necessity,  is  possible  for  man.  That 
unity  is  not  something  capable  of  being  realized, 
but  an  infinite  problem;  it  is  not  something  to  be 
knoiin,  but  something  to  he  done.  Hence  it  is  that 
conscious  life  is  an  infinite  striving  after  the  recon* 
ciliation  of  subject  and  object,  a  striving  to  attain 
to  unlimited  activity.  Were  the  goal  attained, 
moral  life  would  vanish.  The  command  of  criti- 
cism, therefore,  is:  "Strive  after  unconditioned 
freedom,  unlimited  activity;  seek  to  form  thyself 
into  the  divine."  The  choice  must  be  made  be- 
tween the  dogmatic  supposition  of  an  "objective" 
God,  and  the  critical  proof  of  huirao  personality. 
One  or  the  other  must  be  given  up.  The  more 
a  people  surrenders  itself  to  dreams  of  a  far-off 
supersensible  world,  the  less  is  its  moral  enthu- 
siasm in  this  world.  Not  the  weakness  of  reason, 
but  its  strength,  shuts  it  out  from  the  supersensi- 
ble; true  criticism  finds  the  secret  of  human  free- 
dom in  the  divine  idea  which  man  carries  in  his 
own  breast,  and  which  he  struggles  with  all  his 
might  to  realize  here  and  now. 
The  main  advance  beyond  Fichte,  made  in  the 


84      flCIIKLLINa'g  TRANSCBNOBVTAL  IDBAL81M. 


work  of  which  a  summary  has  just  been  given,  lies 
in  the  conception  of  dogmatism  as  incapable  of 
refutation  by  criticism,  except  within  the  sphere  of 
practical  reason, —  a  view  which  foreshadows  Schel- 
ling's  subsequent  coordination  of  the  philosophy  of 
spirit  and  the  philosophy  of  nature.  About  the 
same  time  as  the  last  treatise  appeared  the  New 
Deduction  of  Natural  Rights,  and  in  the  years  1796 
and  1797,  in  Fiehte  and  Niethammer*s  Journal  a 
series  of  four  articles  in  elucidation  of  the  Idealism 
of  the  Wissenscha/tslehre,  which  may  be  said  to 
complete  the  work  done  by  Schelling  during  his 
apprenticeship  in  philosophy  under  Pichte,  and  even 
to  give  unmistakable  evidences  of  the  coming  master 
of  his  craft. 

In  the  first  of  these  articles  Schelling  endeavors 
to  show  that  tlie  ordinary  interpretation  of  Kant 
completely  misrepresents  his  real  meaning.  From 
lierception,  says  Kant,  all  other  knowledge  borrows 
its  worth  and  reality.  When  he  speaks  of  "  things- 
in-themselves ''  he  does  not  mean  things  which,  as 
existing  opart  from  knowledge,  act  on  the  knowing 
subject  and  produce  affections  of  sense.  For  Kant 
there  are  no  objects  but  those  given  in  an  original 
synthesis  of  perception.  When  he  calls  space  and 
time  **  forms  "  of  perception,  he  does  not  mean  that 
they  are  empty  moulds  lying   ready-made   in   the 


K. 


HCIIKM.lN(rH    KARMKR   TRKATIHKK. 


95 


mind,  but  only  that  they  are  the  forniH  by  which 
the  syntlictic  activity  of  the  imagination  in  percep- 
tion  actively  relates  objects  in  the  most  general 
way.  These  iorms  of  activity  do  not  indeed  present 
objects  to  usr  but  they  are  the  conditions  under 
which  alone  we  can  present  objects  to  ourselves. 
And  neither  activity  exists  apart  from  the  other. 
Space  without  time  is  sphere  without  limit;  time 
without  space  is  limit  without  sphere.  As  mere 
limitation  time  is  negative,  space  as  sphere  or  ex- 
tension is  originally  positive  ;  and  hence  perception 
is  possible  only  through  the  cooperation  of  two 
opposed  activities.  The  faculty  which  combines  in 
itself  these  opposites  is  imagination.  The  reason 
why  real  objects  are  regarded  as  independent  of 
the  mind*s  activity  is,  that  upon  the  productive 
activity  of  the  mind  there  supervenes  a  peculiar 
activity  of  the  imagination  whidh  consists  in  repeat- 
ing the  original  activity  on  its  purely  formal  side. 
Thus  arises  the  outline  or  "schema"  of  an  object 
in  general  as  floating  in  space  and  time.  This 
schema  Kant  separates  from  the  conception  of  the 
understanding,  as  if  the  one  were  independent  of 
the  other;  but  while  in  speculation  they  may  be 
distinguished,  in  actual  knowledge  they  always  go 
together,  and  only  when  object  and  schema  are 
opposed  to  each  other  does  there  arise  the  conviction 


8G      HCU£LLlNU*tt  TRAN8CKNDKNTAL   IDKAUftM. 


of  a  real  object  as  outside  of  the  mind  and  inde- 
pendent  of  it.  The  world  of  nature  is  thus  con- 
stituted  by  the  series  of  acts  in  which  intelligence 
as  productive  and  reproductive  advances  toward 
complete  self-consciousness. 

No  error  can  be  destroyed  until  its  source  is 
clearly  pointed  out;  and  hence  Schelling  goes  on,  in 
the  second  article,  to  show  how  the  Kantians  have 
come  to  misrepresent  their  master  so  grossly.  In 
our  actual  knowledge  the  form  and  the  matter  of 
knowledge  are  indissolubly  united,  but  philosophy 
must  hypothetical ly  destroy  this  unity  in  order  to 
explain  it.  The  problem  is  to  account  for  the  abso- 
lute harmony  of  object  and  idea,  being  and  knowl- 
edge. Now  when  by  philosophical  analysis  we  have 
opposed  the  object  as  a  thing  outside  of  us  to  our 
knowledge  of  it,  no  immediate  union  of  the  two 
seems  possible,  and  hence  we  try  to  find  a  point  of 
connection  in  the  conception  of  cause  and  effect: 
the  object,  we  say,  is  the  cause  of  our  representa- 
tion of  it.  But  such  a  conception  cannot  possibly 
explain  the  unity  of  subject  and  object,  for  the 
object  as  beyond  knowledge  cannot  be  really  known. 
The  difficulty  can  only  be  solved  if  it  can  be  shown 
that  the  knowing  subject  does  not  apprehend  some- 
thing foreign  to  itself,  but  in  all  knowledge  knows 
only  itself.    Now  a  self-conscious  being  can  only 


8CI1KLLING*S    RARLIBR   TRRATISK8. 


87 


rs 


know  itself  as  active,  and  hence  conscious  life  is  a 
perpetual  process^  in  which  intelligence  manifests  its 
original  infinity.  On  the  other  hand,  intelligence  is 
an  object  for  itself  only  in  so  far  as,  acting  in  a 
definite  way,  it  limits  or  makes  itself  finite.  Rea- 
son is  thus  in  its  inmost  nature  a  unity  of  infinite 
and  finite.  Hence  the  fact  that  perception  implies 
two  opposite  activities.  As  limiting  itself,  a  self-con* 
scious  being  is  at  once  active  and  passive.  Now 
passivity  is  simply  negative  activity,  for  an  abso- 
lutely passive  being  would  be  a  mere  negation. 
The  object  of  perception  is  thus  not  an  object  inde- 
pendent of  intelligence,  but  intelligence  itself  as  at 
once  active  and  passive.  Intelligence,  however, 
cannot  in  the  same  act  perceive  itself  and  distin- 
guish itself  from  itself:  hence  in  perception  no  dis- 
tinction is  drawn  between  the  perception  and  the 
object  perceived.  But  in  virtue  of  his  freedom  a  self- 
conscious  being  is  able  to  abstract  from  himself  as 
perceived  —  an  abstraction  which  has  been  already 
described  as  the  faculty  of  concentrating  attention 
on  the  general  process  of  perception  ;  and  so  arises 
the  consciousness  of  an  object,  the  origin  of  which 
as  lying  beyond  consciousness  cannot  be  explained 
from  the  point  of  view  of  consciousness.  Further, 
since  the  consciousness  of  an  object  is  possible  only 
as  contrasted  with  free  activity  and  the  consciousness 


4»-'----i  -■ 


88    schelling's  tbanscendbntal  idealism. 


of  free  activity  only  as  contrasted  with  an  object,  to 
those  still  at  the  point  of  view  of  consciousness,  man 
seems  partly  necessitated  and  partly  free.  Hence 
we  can  understand  how  the  Kantians  have  come  to 
regard  the  "  form  "  of  knowledge  as  supplied  by  us, 
the  "  matter  "  as  coming  from  without. 

Our  knowledge,  if  it  is  to  be  real,  Schelling  goes  on 
to  say  in  the  third  article,  must  rest  upon  something 
which  is  not  obtained  by  means  of  conceptions  and 
inferences,  but  which  is  just  as  immediately  certain 
as  our  own  existence.    How  does  it  happen  that  that 
which  is  distinct  from  the  soul  should  yet  be  so 
closely  bound  up  with  our  inner  nature  that  it  can- 
not be  denied  without  denial  of  the  consciousness  of 
self?      All  the  mistaken  attempts  to  answer  this 
question  have  assumed  that  we  must  start  from  con- 
ception or  mediate  knowledge.     The  fact  of  immedi- 
ate knowledge  in  perception  is  not  denied,  but  it  is 
said  that  such  knowledge  is  due  to  the  operation  of 
external  objects  upon  us.     But  (1)  the  hypothesis,  at 
the  most,  explains,  not  perception,  but  sensation,  the 
reception  of  an  impression  from  an  object,  not  the 
immediate  knowledge  of  an  object;  and  hence  the 
perception  at  least  must  be  regarded  as  a  free  act. 
(2)  Since  a  cause  must  precede,  in  time,  its  effect, 
the  thing-in-itself  must  act  before  we  perceive  it, 
and  this  leads  to  the  absurd  supposition  of  a  double 


schelling's  earlier  treatises. 


89 


•le 


series  of  time.  (3)  In  perception,  object  and  idea 
are  identical,  whereas  the  supposed  thing-in-itself 
must  be  separate  from  perception, — a  view  which 
lies  at  the  base  of  all  scepticism,  as  might  be  shown 
historically.  The  opposite  view  is,  that  there  is  no 
object  independent  of  perception;  that  intelligence 
is  an  activity  which  goes  back  into  itself,  and  that 
to  go  back  into  itself  it  must  first  have  gone  out 
from  itself.  The  essence  of  spirit  is  to  perceive 
itself.  This  tendency  to  self-perception  is  infinite, 
and  in  the  infinite  reproduction  of  itself  consists  its 
permanence.  Spirit  necessarily  strives  to  contem- 
plate itself  in  its  opposite  activities,  and  this  it  can 
only  do  by  presenting  them  in  a  common  product, 
i.e.  by  making  them  permanent.  Hence,  at  the 
standpoint  of  consciousness  these  opposite  activities 
appear  as  at  rest,  or  as  forces  which  act  only  in  op- 
position to  an  internal  obstacle.  Matter  is  simply 
spirit  contemplated  in  the  equilibrium  of  its  activi- 
ties. That  common  product  is  necessarily  finite, 
and  spirit  becomes  aware  of  its  finitude  in  the  act 
of  production.  The  ground  of  this  limitation  can- 
not lie  in  its  present  act,  which  is  perfectly  free; 
and  hence  in  this  act  it  does  not  limit  itself,  but 
finds  or  feels  itself  limited.  The  product  of  its  free 
act,  spirit,  perceives  as  a  quantity  in  space,  the  limit 
of  this  production  as  a  quantity  in  time.     Hence 


90     schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

arises  the  distinction  of  outer  and  inner  sense,  the 
former  being  simply  the  latter  as  limited.  The  limit 
of  its  production  appears  to  spirit  as  contingent; 
the  sphere  of  production,  in  which  it  perceives  only 
its  own  mode  of  activity,  as  essential,  necessary  or 
substantial.  But  spirit  is  the  infinite  tendency  to 
become  an  object  to  itself,  to  present  the  infinite  in 
the  finite.  The  goal  of  all  acts  is  self-consciousness, 
and  the  history  of  those  acts  is  just  the  history  of 
self-consciousness.  Hence  the  task  Of  philosophy 
can  only  be  completed  when  we  have  reached  the 
goal  of  complete  self-consciousness.  Such  self-con- 
sciousness is  tvill,  in  which  theoretical  and  practical 
reason  meet  together.  By  freeing  ourselves  from 
our  representations  and  holding  them  away  from  us, 
we  are  able  to  explain  them,  and  so  to  connect  the 
theoretical  and  the  practical  self.  Thus  we  arrive  at 
the  Ego  as  the  principle  of  freedom,  beginning  with 
which  we  can  now  see  spirit  and  nature  arise 
together. 

It  does  not  lie  within  the  plan  of  this  work  to 
give  anything  like  an  extended  account  of  Schel- 
ling's  Philosophy  of  Nature,  but  some  idea  of  its 
principle  and  main  positions  is  necessary  as  a  prepa- 
ration for  the  proper  understanding  of  the  Tran- 
scendental Idealism.  We  have  already  seen  that 
Bchelling,  even  in  his  appropriation  and  assimila- 


KtJHKLLlNG's    EARLIER   TREATISES. 


91 


tion  of  the  thought  of  Fichte,  shows  a  decided 
tendency  to  go  back  to  Kant.  This  tendency  is 
manifested  still  more  clearly  in  that  part  of  his 
philosophy  which  is  now  under  consideration.  Not 
Fichte's  Wissenschaftslehre,  but  Kant's  Metaphy- 
sisc.he  Anfangsgrilnde  der  Nuturwissenschaft  and 
Kritik  der  Urtheilskmft  form  the  starting-point  of 
his  Philosophy  of  Nature.  In  the  former  work 
Kant  had  endeavored  to  show  that  matter  must  be 
resolved,  not  into  a  number  of  indivisible  material 
units,  as  variously  arranged  in  space,  but  into  two 
ultimate  forces  —  a  force  of  attraction  and  a  force 
of  repulsion  —  by  the  relation  of  which  to  each  other 
all  phenomena  of  matter,  as  that  which  occupies  or 
is  movable  in  space,  may  be  explained.  In  the 
latter  work  he  had  pointed  out  that  the  character- 
istics of  organic  beings  can  only  be  made  intelli- 
gible to  us  if  we  think  of  them  as  if  they  were 
produced  by  an  intelligence  similar  to  our  own. 
Schelling' endeavors  to  show  that  the  fundamental 
ideas  of  those  two  works  must  be  thought  out  to 
their  issue,  and  combined  in  a  true  philosophy  of 
nature.  And  just  as  Fichte  refused  to  admit  that 
there  is  any  noumenal  mind  distinct  from  that 
which  we  actually  know,  so  Schelling  denies  that 
the  application  of  means  to  ends  displayed  in  the 
whole  of  nature,  and  more  clearly  in  organic  beings, 


92       SCH£LL1NG*S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM.. 


can  be  accounted  for  by  the  "  transcendent "  prin- 
ciple of  an  intelligence  distinct  from  the  world,  and 
acting  externally  upon  it. 

In  1797  appeared  the  Ideas  for  a  Philosophy  of 
Nature,  in  which  Schelling  endeavors  to  connect 
the  main  principle  of  the  philosophy  of  Fichte  with 
a  philosophy  of  nature,  which  in  its  broad  outlines 
is  identical  with  that  contained  in  Kant.  In  a 
purely  analytical  way  Kant  had  shown  that  matter 
implies  the  presence  of  two  opposite  forces.  Schel- 
ling^s  aim  is  to  derive  those  forces  from  the  nature 
of  perception,  and  to  explain  the  various  phenomena 
of  nature  by  the  same  method.  The  way  in  which 
the  derivation  is  made  has  been  partly  explained 
above.  All  reality  or  objectivity  implies  the  presence 
in  consciousness  of  something,  the  primary  origin  of 
which  must  be  sought  in  an  unconscious  or  unre- 
flective  act  of  production.  Intelligence,  which  in 
its  own  nature  is  infinite,  limits  its  productivity 
and  presents  to  itself  that  which  has  the  appearance 
of  an  independent  object.  At  first  this  object  is 
simply  the  purely  abstract  "something  we-know-not- 
what,"  and  hence  it  calls  for  more  definite  character- 
ization. This  further  definition  of  reality  is  the 
task  of  the  philosophy  of  nature,  which  is  therefore 
related  to  transcendental  philosophy  as  a  sub- 
ordinate   or    applied    department  of    it,   like    the 


SCHELLINO'S    EARLIER   TREATISES. 


93 


ice 
is 

)t- 
r- 
le 
re 

ie 


philosophy  of  rights  and  the  philosophy  of  morals 
in  the  system  of  Fichte.  The  first  and  funda- 
mental determination  of  matter  is  given  in  the 
conception  of  force,  as  specifying  itself  in  attrac- 
tion and  repulsion,  which  correspond  respectively 
to  the  objective  and  subjective  activities  implied  in 
perception.  The  former  activity  as  coming  back 
to  the  self,  and  centering,  so  to  speak,  in  a  point,  is 
time;  the  latter  activity,  which  strives  continually 
outward  in  all  directions,  is  space.  Matter  is  there- 
fore definable  as  the  product  of  the  two  forces 
of  attraction  and  repulsion,  and  as  in  space  and 
time.  It  must  not  be  supposed  for  a  moment  that 
besides  these  forces  there  are  material  things 
outside  of  each  other:  forces  are  not  properties 
of  matter,  but  constitute  its  very  essence,  just  as 
the  infinite  and  finite  activities  are  not  attributes 
of  which  intelligence  is  the  substratum,  but  are 
identical  with  intelligence.  Matter,  however,  has 
certain  specific  forms,  which  must  be  shown  to  be 
compatible  with  the  outline  or  schema  of  it  which 
has  just  been  drawn.  The  various  states  of  cohe- 
sion—  solidity,  fluidity,  etc., —  are  readily  seen  to 
be  derivable  from  the  relation  of  these  two  forces, 
but  more  difficulty  is  experienced  when  we  come  to 
consider  the  qualitative  properties  of  matter.  In 
sensation  we  find  ourselves  qualitatively  determined. 


i 


94       SCIIELLING*S   TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


Referred  to  an  object,  the  determination  is  ooH' 
tingeni^  the  object  necessary.  This  necessary  object, 
as  product  of  the  two  forces,  is  purely  quantitative 
or  determined  only  as  in  space  and  time,  but  when 
qualified  by  the  addition  of  the  element  of  feeling, 
the  general  notion  of  the  object  becomes  individual 
or  determinate.  Quality  cannot  indeed  be  reduced 
to  quantity,  but  all  quality  rests  on  the  intensity 
of  the  fundamental  forces. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  follow  Schelling  in  hid 
attempt  to  reduce  the  varied  phenomena  of  physicM 
to  a  unity  in  duality ;  all  that  need  be  said  is  that, 
beginning  with  a  consideration  of  combustion,  ho 
considers  successively  light,  air,  electricity,  magnet* 
ism  and  heat.  More  important  is  his  consideration 
of  life,  which  is  closely  connected  with  Kant*s  con- 
ception of  organisms  as  marked  by  the  peculiarity 
that  in  them  there  is  a  unity  of  means  and  ends. 
Life  is  a  process  of  individuation,  and  implies  a  con- 
tinual restoration  of  the  equilibrium  which  the 
chemical  process  tends  to  destroy.  Thus,  in  the 
living  being  the  whole  conditions  the  parts,  and 
each  part  is  at  once  cause  and  eft'ect.  Accordingly 
we  are  compelled,  in  the  case  of  living  beings,  to 
suppose  an  immanent  adaptation  of  means  to  endii, 
instead  of  mere  mechanical  causality. 

In  the  Ideas.,  a  twofold  tendency  is  manifested: 


SCHELLING'S    EARLIER   TREATISES. 


95 


the  one  toward  unity,  the  other  toward  specification ; 
bat,  on  the  whole,  the  latter  prevails.  In  the  work 
entitled  On  the  World  Soul,  published  in  1798, 
the  former  tendency  comes  to  the  front,  and  Schel- 
ling  seeks  mainly  for  a  principle  which  shall  reduce 
the  whole  of  nature  to  unity.  This  principle  must 
not  be  sought  in  any  transcendental,  supernatural 
region,  whether  called  God  or  Fate,  but  in  nature 
itself.  A  principle  such  as  is  sought  Schelling 
seemed  to  find  in  the  conception  of  matter  as  a  unity 
of  opposite  forces,  and  hence  he  naturally  attempted 
to  reduce  all  the  varied  phenomena  of  nature  to  the 
single  principle  of  a  force  that  always  manifests  itself 
in  opposite  directions.  Accordingly  nature  must  no 
longer  be  divided  up  into  separate  groups  of  phe- 
nomena, with  a  special  kind  of  force  for  each, — 
mechanical,  chemical,  electrical,  vital, —  but  in  all 
must  be  seen  the  same  force  in  various  forms,  the 
same  unity  in  duality.  Even  the  division  of  organic 
and  inorganic  beings,  which  at  first  sight  seems  to 
be  an  absolute  one,  is  to  be  reconciled  with  the  ulti- 
mate unity  of  all  natural  phenomena,  and  must 
therefore  be  regarded  as  merely  relative.  Schelling, 
of  course,  did  not  mean  that,  from  the  historical 
point  of  view,  any  transition  from  inorganic  to 
organic  things  has  ever  taken  place.  It  should  be 
observed,  however,  that  those  who,  like  Mr.  Herbert 


S' 


.1, 


96      SCHELLINO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL   IDEALISM. 


Spencer,  find  a  principle  of  order  and  unity  in 
the  conception  of  force,  do  not,  any  more  than 
Schelling,  find  it  necessary,  in  establishing  the  so- 
called  "  persistence  of  force,"  to  prove  genetic  devel- 
opment: the  two  points  of  view  are  really  distinct, 
and  the  one  may  be  held  irrespective  of  the  other. 
In  thus  making  the  idea  of  force  the  supreme  prin- 
ciple of  nature,  Schelling  has  manifestly  stripped 
that  conception  of  its  purely  mechanical  connota- 
tion, and  thus  it  becomes  practically  identical  with 
the  idea  of  nature  as  an  eternal  process  or  mani- 
festation of  self-activity.  This  self-activity  takes 
two  directions,  one  forward  or  positive,  and  the  other 
backward  or  negative.  These  logically  distinguish- 
able activities  of  a  single  principle,  when  viewed  as 
one,  give  us  the  notion  of  a  single  principle  imma- 
nent in  nature,  which  is  the  source  of  its  organic 
unity.  The  somewhat  unfortunate  term  "  World 
Soul,"  borrowed  by  Schelling  from  Plato,  is,  there- 
fore, not  meant  to  signify  more  than  the  unity  of 
nature. 

In  the  First  Outline  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature^ 
published  in  1799,  Schelling  proceeds  to  develop, 
in  a  more  systematic  way,  the  principle  which 
he  had  set  forth  in  the  World  Soul,  and  which  he 
had  there  sought  to  prove  by  an  examination  of 
the  results  of  physical  science.      This  principle  he 


SCHELLINO^g    EARLIER   TREATISES. 


97 


ich 
he 
of 
he 


interprets,  in  accordance  with  the  supreme  prin- 
ciple of  the  science  of  knowledge,  as  pure  activ- 
ity. Nature  is  not  simply  a  product,  but  is  at  once 
that  which  produces  and  that  which  is  produced. 
And  just  as  the  Ego  is  at  once  infinite  and  finite, 
unlimited  and  limited,  so  nature  must  be  regarded 
as  limiting  its  own  infinite  productivity,  and  thus  as 
manifesting  itself  in  two  opposite  activities  which 
are  yet  in  essence  identical.  Hence,  each  definite  or 
specific  product  of  nature  is  the  result  of  the  co- 
operation of  those  two  forces  and  directions.  The 
duality  which  the  former  treatise  showed  to  be  the 
condition  of  all  natural  phenomena  is  now  derived 
from  the  idea  of  nature  as  productive.  Nature  is 
an  infinite  self-activity,  realizing  itself  in  the  fiulie, 
and  yet  unexhausted  in  that  realization.  The  vari- 
ous forms  inrwhich  it  manifests  itself  are  therefore 
only  apparent  products  or  completed  results;  in 
reality,  nature  is  an  eternal  process  that  is  evec  ful- 
filling itself,  and  yet  is  never  absolutely  fulfilled, — 
just  as,  in  the  sphere  of  self-consciousness,  practical 
reason  consists  in  the  perpetual  striving  toward  an 
ideal  goal  that  is  never  attained. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


T  OOKING  back  over  Schelling's  early  develop- 
"*~^  ment,  as  rapidly  sketched  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  we  can  see  that  there  has  been  a  gradual 
advance  beyond  his  first  position.  Even  more 
strongly  than  Fichte,  Schelling  rejects  as  absurd  and 
unthinkable  any  "objective"  God,  independent  of 
man  and  nature,  and  seeks  to  explain  each  entirely 
from  itself.  As  we  have  seen,  however,  the  uncondi- 
tioned which  had  been  rejected  as  God  gradually 
emerges,  from  a  conteknplation  of  human  intelligence, 
in  the  form  of  an  absolute  Ego,  which  is  presupposed 
in  all  knowledge  while  yet  it  is  distinct  from  the 
knowledge  of  the  individual  subject.  But  while 
Schelling  tends  to  separate  the  absolute  and  the  finite 
Ego  much  more  sharply  than  Fichte,  he  is  not  yet  pre- 
pared to  say  that  the  former  is  anything  apart  from 
the  consciousness  of  the  latter;  in  other  words,  the 
absolute  is  simply  the  supreme  form  of  human 
knowledge.  Vaguely  conscious,  however,  that  this 
subjective  idealism  was  not  a  completely  satisfactory 

explanation  of  the  unity  of  reality  and  knowledge, 

98 


PROBLEM  OF  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM.        90 

Schelling  endeavors  to  find  in  the  conception  of 
nature,  as  self-active  and  as  rising  through  various 
grades  up  to  organized  and  intelligent  beings,  an 
escape  from  the  one-sided  theory  which  he  had 
adopted  from  Fichte.  The  way  of  escape  was  sug- 
gested by  Kant,  in  his  "  Philosophy  of  Nature"  and 
his  "  Critique  of  Judgment."  But  if  the  individual 
man  is  related,  on  the  one  hand  to  the  absolute  Ego, 
and  on  the  other  hand  to  nature,  of  which  he  is  one 
of  the  highest  manifestations,  it  was  natural  for 
Schelling  to  hold  that  the  science  of  knowledge  is  but 
one  of  the  points  of  view  from  which  the  universe  as 
a  whole  may  be  regarded,  the  other  point  of  view 
being  contained  in  the  philosophy  of  nature.  To 
this  conclusion  the  thoughts  of  Schelling  had  grad- 
ually been  tending  ever  since  he  had  made  his 
"breach  to  nature."  At  first  he  regarded  the  phi- 
losophy of  nature  as  simply  the  application  of  the 
conclusions  reached  in  the  philosophy  of  knowledge 
to  external  phenohiena;  but  at  length  he  came  to 
the  conclusion  Miat  each  led  to  the  same  point  by  a 
different  route,  and  hence  that  they  were  coordinate 
branches  of  philosophy.  Such  a  view,  it  is  at  once 
evident,  could  not  be  final;  for,  if  philosophy  is  to 
be  a  single  system,  there  must  be  some  principle  to 
unite  these  coordinate  departments,  and  such  a 
principle  must  be  one  which  shall  reduce  intelli- 


Ji 


100     8CHELLINU*8  TRANHC'BNOENTAL  IDEALISM. 

gence  and  nature  to  the  unity  of  a  principle  higher 
than  either.  At  a  later  period  in  his  development 
this  became  plain  to  Schelling  himself,  but  at  the 
period  to  which  we  have  now  come,  he  was  content 
to  coordinate  the  two  without  seeking  for  a  unity 
combining  both.  This,  then,  is  the  view  which  pre- 
vails in  the  Transcendental  Idealiam^  to  the  careful 
consideration  of  whic'ii  we  must  now  give  our 
attention. 

Schelling  begins  by  distinguishing  between  Tran- 
scendental Idealism  and  Philosophy  of  Nature.  The 
aim  of  all  philosophy  is  to  explain  that  harmony  of 
subject  and  object  which  alone  makes  knowledge 
possible,  but  which  is  at  first  held  as  a  mere  unrea- 
soned conviction.  Nature  is  not  an  object  com- 
pletely independent  of  all  intelligence,  but  it  is 
distinguishable  from  intelligence  as  the  sum-total 
of  objects  from  the  complete  series  of  acts  consti- 
tuting the  knowing  subject.  As  neither  intelli- 
gence nor  nature  exists  in  indepehdence,  philosophy 
may  start  from  either  indifl'erently.  When  it 
begins  with  na^re,  the  problem  is  to  explain  how 
nature  comes  to  be  an  object  of  intelligence:  when, 
on  the  other  hand,  intelligence  is  made  the  starting 
point,  the  question  is  how  intelligence  can  have 
before  it  an  objectiv<e  world  which  is  in  harmony  with 
it.     The  answer  to  the  first  question  forms  the  con- 


PROULKM  (»K  TRANHC'ENnKNTAI.  IDKAI.IHM.     101 


tent  of  the  pliilosopliy  of  nature,  a  content  which 
consists  in  an  exhibition  of  the  ideal  stages  through 
which  nature  may  be  represented  as  pa^xing  until 
it  finally  issues  in  man,  or  rather  in  reason  as  con- 
stituting  the  essence  of  man.  The  solution  of  the 
second  question  demands  the  derivation  of  the  know- 
able  world  of  objects  from  the  nature  of  intelli- 
gence.  The  latter  problem  is  the  one  which  Trans- 
cendental Idealism  has  to  resolve. 

Perhaps  the  easiest  way  of  getting  a  more  definite 
notion  of  the  point  of  view  from  which  the  7VtfM- 
scendental  Idealism  contemplates  the  problem  of  phi- 
losophy, is  to  state  shortly  the  objections  which 
Schelling,  in  perfect  agreement  with  Fichte,  makes 
against  dogmatism.  Philosophical  dogmatism  is, 
in  a  word,  that  attitude  of  mind  in  which  real  ex- 
istence is  supposed  to  be  constituted  independently 
of  all  activity  of  the  intelligence  which  contem- 
plates it.  It  is  assumed  that  there  is  a  world  of 
reality,  all  of  whose  relations  are  properties  or  af- 
fections of  things  that  owe  absolutely  nothing  to 
the  constitutive  activity  of  the  knowing  mind.  And 
dogmatism  is  equally  dogmatic  whether  the  reality 
thus  assumed-  as  an  independent  thing  is  the  outer 
world  of  nature,  the  inner  world  of  mind,  or  a 
supersensible  God.  There  is  a  dogmatic  idealism 
and  spiritualism  as  well  as  a  dogmatic  realism.    The 


103     SCHELMNCi's  TRANSfENDEXTAL  IDEALISM. 


former  treats  the  mind  and  God  just  as  the  latter 
treats  the  outer  object  —  as  a  thing  to  be  observed, 
or  an  object  among  other  objects.  Both  alike  neg- 
lect to  turn  back  upon  the  spontaneous  activity 
which  is  characteristic  of  intelligence,  and  which 
is  the  true  and  only  clue  to  the  explanation  of  actual 
knowledge.  The  initial  principle  of  a  true  philo- 
sophy is  to  recognize  that  intelligence  is  self-active, 
and  that  only  by  reference  to  this  self-activity  can 
experience  as  the  knowledge  of  real  existence  be 
explained  at  all.  So  long  as  we  assume  that  intelli- 
gence counts  for  nothing  in  the  constitution  of 
objects  as  known,  philosophy  must  play  the  sophist 
in  explaining  the  intelligible  world. 

It  is  evident  from  what  has  been  said  that  the 
starting-point  of  philosophy  must  be  made  by  turn- 
ing away  from  all  objects  of  knowledge  as  such, 
and  casting  the  light  of  consciousness  upon  con- 
sciousness itself.  This  primary  act  of  abstraction 
is  the  means  by  which  the  philosopher  seeks  to  find 
out  the  various  factors  that  make  real  knowledge 
possible  for  us.  And  while  this  abstraction  from 
all  objects  is  the  condition  of  finding  the  principle 
of  all  knowledge,  it  yet  is  not  by  means  of  abstract 
conceptions  that  any  progress  in  the  construction 
of  a  true  system  of  philosophy  can  be  made.  An 
abstract  conception  is  merely  a  group  of  common 


PROBLEM  OF  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM.     103 


attributes  borrowed  from  objects  as  they  present 
themselves  in  our  immediate  experience,  and  hence 
it  cannot  be  made  to  yield  any  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion  as  to  the  ultimate  condition  in  knowledge  of 
those  objects.  The  true  method  is  not  concept  ion  f 
but  perception;  not  perception  in  the  ordinary  sense, 
as  the  immediate  apprehension  of  sensible  things, 
but  perception  of  a  kind  similar  to  that  employed 
by  the  mathematician  whfc-i  he  freely  constructs 
some  mathematical  figure.  The  points  of  distinction 
between  mathematical  and  philosophical  perception 
are  (1)  that  the  former  makes  outer  sense  its  object, 
while  the  latter  deals  with  inner  sense,  and  (2)  that 
the  one  lavishes  its  energy  upon  the  object  which  it 
constructs,  while  the  other  limits  itself  to  the  act 
of  construction  itself.  Thus  while  the  perception 
of  mathematics  is  single,  that  of  philosophy  is  dual, 
since  it  not  only,  like  mathematics,  freely  produces 
its  object,  but  contemplates  the  act  of  production 
itself.  The  process  by  which  philosophy  carries  on 
its  investigations  is  thus  in  one  way  identical  with 
that  by  which  the  creations  of  art  are  evolved  by 
the  artist;  the  difference  being  that  in  the  process 
of  creation  the  artist  is  immersed  in  his  products, 
while  the  philosopher  not  only  produces  his  objects, 
but  contemplates  intelligence  in  the  act  of  produc- 
ing  them.      Philosophy  is  thus  an  aesthetic  act  of 


104     SCHELLINO'S  TRANSCENDBNTAL  IDEALISM. 


the  productive  imagination,  demanding  a  special 
effort  and  perhaps  a  peculiar  faculty.  No  one  who 
fails  or  who  is  unable  to  perform  that  act  can  have 
anything  to  say  to  philosophical  problems,  and  it  is. 
not  to  be  wondered  at  that  men  who  have  overloaded 
their  memories  with  undigested  facts,  or  who  have 
come  under  the  influence  of  a  dead  speculation, 
destructive  of  all  imagination,  should  have  entirely 
lost  this  aesthetic  organ. 

It  may  seem  that  a  philosophy  which  rests  upon 
intellectual  perception,  or  a  free  act  of  the  aesthetic 
imagination,  must  be  purely  arbitrary.  But  this 
objection  overlooks  two  things:  first,  that  the  object 
of  philosophical  perception  is  consciousness  itself, 
and  therefore  something  necessarily  real;  and  sec- 
ondly, that  philosophy,  like  other  sciences,  must 
justify  itself  by  its  success  in  explaining  what  it 
pretends  to  explain.  As  to  the  first  point,  it  is  self- 
evident  that  we  cannot  know  without  an  activity  of 
intelligence,  and  that  this  activity  may  be  made  an 
object  of  philosophical  contemplation.  Now,  if  it 
can  be  shown  that  this  activity  presupposes  another 
activity,  which  again  presupposes  a  third,  and  so  on 
until  we  have  exhausted  all  that  is  implied  in  the 
first  act;  and  if,  further,  the  complete  series  of  acts 
thus  originated  is  found  perfectly  to  harmonize  with 
and  explain  our  whole  knowledge,  we  may  conclude 


PROBLEM  OF  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM.     105 


ide 


that  what  at  first  seemed  to  be  an  arbitrary  creation 
is  really  an  account  of  the  necessary  process  by 
which  the  world  has  been  built  up  for  us.  This 
method  will  also  have  the  advantage  of  exhibiting 
all  the  elements  of  knowledge  in  their  systematic 
connection  and  interdependences.  Just  as  the  com- 
plete knowledge  of  any  part  of  a  machine  involves 
a  knowledge  of  all  the  other  parts  and  of  their  rela- 
tion to  one  another;  just  as  to  understand  any  organ 
in  a  living  being  we  must  understand  its  function 
relatively  to  all  the  other  organs; — so  the  thorough 
comprehension  of  the  first  principle  of  philosophy 
is  only  possible  by  the  comprehension  of  all  the  other 
principles  which  it  presupposes  and  which  presup- 
pose it. 

That  there  must  be  a  first  principle,  and  not  more 
than  one,  is  implied  in  the  very  problem  which  we 
have  set  ourselves  to  solve.  That  problem  is  to 
exhibit,  in  systematic  order,  all  the  necessary  acts 
which  are  implied  in  actual  knowledge.  Now  there 
can  be  no  system  in  a  philosophy  iiiat  proceeds  by 
random  guesses,  and  puts  together  a  number  of 
parts  that  are  not  organically  connected  with  one 
another;  and  there  can  be  no  organic  connection 
unless  there  is  something  in  the  nature  of  the  object 
under  investigation  which  will  not  allow  us  to  pro- 
ceed except  in  one  definite  way.      But  if  we  are  to 


106     SCHKLUNO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


proceed  by  such  a  necessary  method,  we  must  start 
with  a  single  principle,  since  otherwise  we  should 
have  two  or  more  disconnected  systems;  and  this 
principle  must  be  one  higher  than  which  we  cannot 
go,  since  from  it  all  others  are  to  be  derived. 

Let  us,  without  further  preamble,  state  what  the 
supreme  principle  of  Transcendental  Idealism  is. 
To  obtain  it,  we  must  abstract  from  all  objects  of 
knowledge,  both  outer  and  inner,  and  bring  before 
our  minds  the  pure  activity  which  we  put  forth  in 
so  abstracting.  The  object  thus  presented  for  intel- 
lectual perception  or  contemplation  is  simply  pure 
self-activity, — an  activity  of  the  mind  which  returns 
upon  itself  or  is  its  own  object.  The  activity  which 
the  philosopher  thus  sets  before  himself,  by  a  free  act 
of  the  aesthetic  imagination,  is  pure  self-conscious- 
ness—  the  consciousness  of  consciousness.  From 
this  pure  activity  we  must  carefully  distinguish 
empirical  consciousness  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
consciousness  of  oneself  as  a  particular  individual 
on  the  other.  In  empirical  consciousness  our  object 
is  not  the  activity  of  consciousness  itself,  but  con- 
sciousness as  directed  on  certain  perpetually  chang- 
ing objects,  which,  whether  belonging  to  the  outer 
or  the  inner  world,  are  at  least  non- subjective. 
Empirical  consciousness,  in  short,  is  not  a  reflex  act 
in  which  consciousness  turns  back  upon  itself,  but 


PROBLEM  OP  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM.  107 


an  act  proceeding  out  from  itself  and  concentrating 
itself  upon  some  object  not-itself.  Nor,  again,  can 
pure  self-consciousness  be  identified  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  oneself  as  a  person;  for  such  a  con- 
sciousness involves  the  manifold  distinctions  by 
means  of  which  the  individual  compares  and  con- 
trasts himself,  as  possessed  of  a  particular  character 
and  disposition,  with  other  individuals  of  a  different 
character  and  disposition.  Pure  self-consciousness 
is  an'  absolutely  pure  act,  in  which  there  is  no  con- 
tent whatever,  but  a  pure  activity  returning  upon 
itself. 

The  philosopher  freely  produces  the  pure  self- 
consciousness,  and  mentally  registers  what  he  con- 
templates in  producing  it.  But  what  relation,  it 
must  now  be  asked,  does  this  pure  self-returning 
activity  bear  to  knowledge?  How  can  it  be  shown 
to  be  a  principle  of  knowledge  at  all,  and  especially 
the  supreme  principle  of  all  knowledge?  It  need 
hardly  be  said  that  it  is  not  possible  to  justify  a 
principle  which  is  the  ultimate  condition  of  all 
knowledge  by  reference  to  any  principle  higher  than 
itself;  all  that  can  be  done  is  to  show  that  unless  it 
be  admitted  there  can  be  no  knowledge  whatever. 
There  are  various  ways  in  which  this  might  be  made 
clear,  but  the  simplest  and  most  direct  method  is 
the  best.     While  we  are  not  entitled,  in  a  system 


108     SCHELLINg's  TRANSCKNI>ENTAL  iriKALIHM. 

which  claims  to  set  forth  the  grounds  of  all  knowl- 
edge, to  begin  with  the  assumption  that  any  single 
proposition  in  consciousness  is  objectively  true,  we 
are  at  least  entitled  to  assume  that  con^ciouHuess 
proves  itself — that  what  is  in  consciousness  actually 
is  in  consciousness.     Even  the  sceptic  must  make 
this  assumption,  for  he  at  least  takes  it  for  granted 
that  his  denial  of  all  real  knowledge  is  a  fact  of 
consciousness.     Let  his  denial,  then,  be  the  proposi- 
tion from  which  we  start.    It  is  assumed  that  the 
proposition  *'  there  is  no  real  knowledge"  is  actually 
in  consciousness,  and  this  proposition  w©  may  repre- 
sent by  the  formula  A=A.     It  is  not  asitrted  that 
A  has  any  truth  apart  from  its  occurrence  in  con- 
sciousness, but  only  that  if  A  is  true,  it  is  true. 
The    proposition    is    therefore    purely    analytical: 
nothing  is  asserted  in  the  predicate  but  what  is  con- 
tained in  the  subject.     From  such  a  proposition  no 
real  knowledge  can  be  extracted,  since  it  is  purely 
hypothetical.      It  may,  however,  be  shown  that  it 
presupposes  a  synthetical  act,  without  which  it  could 
not  be  in  consciousness  at  all.      For  A  to  be  in  con- 
sciousness, it  must  be  placed  there  by  an  act  of  con- 
sciousness, and  to  be  recognized  as  identical  with 
itself,  this  act  of  positing  A  mvM.  be  contemplated; 
in  other   words,  consciousness   must   return   upon 
itself  or  become  its  own  object,  and  this  is  self-con* 


PROBLEM  OF  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM.     109 


true, 
ytical: 
is  con- 
ion  no 
[)urely 
hat  it 

could 
In  con- 
If  con- 
with 

ilated; 
upon 

lf-con« 


sciousness.  Here,  therefore,  we  have  a  synthetical 
act  implied  in  the  bare  consciousness  of  an  identical 
proposition.  The  pure  activity  designated  self- 
consciousness  is  an  originative  act  in  this  sense, 
that  prior  to  self-consciousness  it  has  no  existence; 
the  self,  in  other  words,  is  not  an  object  known,  but 
the  pure  activity  without  which  there  could  be  no 
self.  While,  therefore,  we  may  still  doubt  whether 
there  is  any  real  object,  we  cannot  doubt  the  reality 
of  the  act  of  self-consciousness.  We  have  thus 
established  a  proposition  absolutely  indisputable, 
and  may  proceed  to  ask  whether  it  presupposes  any 
other  proposition  as  certain  as  itself,  although  of 
course  related  to  and  dependent  upon  it. 

The  proposition  which  has  just  been  established  is 
the  fundamental  proposition  of  philosophy  in  all  its 
departments.  It  is  not  only  the  supreme  condition 
of  knowledge,  but  of  action  as  well.  Assuming,  in 
the  meantime,  that  a  knowledge  of  objects  is  possi- 
ble, and  that  volition  also  is  possible,  it  is  evident 
that  both  alike  presuppose  our  fundamental  princi- 
ple. There  can  be  no  knowledge  of  anything  apart 
from  consciousness,  and,  as  has  been  shown,  no  con- 
sciousness apart  from  the  self-activity  which  we  call 
self-consciousness;  nor  can  there  be  any  volition 
which  is  not  in  consciousness,  and  therefore  none 
which  is  not  made  possible,  and  alone  made  possible. 


UO     SCIIKLLINg's  transcendental  mEALIHM. 


by  self-consciousness.  Without  determining  at  pre- 
sent whether  there  are  any  objects  apart  from  con- 
sciousness, we  can  at  least  affirm  that  such  objects, 
if  they  exist,  are  nothing /or  consciousness. 

It  need  hardly  be  added  that  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  I  of  self-consciousness  is  a  thing-in- 
itself  or  a  phenomenon  is  utterly  meaningless.  To 
speak  of  the  I  as  a  thing-in-itself  is  to  suppose  that 
the  I  exists  otherwise  than  for  itself,  which  is  as 
absurd  as  to  suppose  that  the  I  exists  before  it  exists. 
To  speak  of  the  I  as  a  phenomenon  is  to  affirm  it  to 
be  an  object  of  consciousness,  instead  of  being,  as  it 
•is,  simply  the  primary  activity  without  which  no 
consciousness  could  be.  The  I  is  a  pure  activity  that 
can  only  be  defined  as  that  which  is  not  an  object, 
and  which  therefore  cannot  properly  be  said  to  be, 
but  only  to  be  pure  activity  returning  on  itself. 

The  pure  activity  of  self-consciousness  has  been 
shown  to  be  the  necessary  presupposition  of  con- 
sciousness. But  consciousness  involves  the  presence 
to  it  of  some  object,  in  relation  to  which  it  is  limited 
or  defined.  There  can  be  no  consciousness  which  is 
not  a  consciousness  of  something.  The  question 
therefore  arises,  what  is  the  relation  of  consciousness, 
as  the  corisciousness  of  an  object,  to  pure  self-con- 
sciousness? The  dogmatist  assumes  that  there  is  a 
real  object  existing  independently  of  consciousness. 


PROBLEM  OF  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM.     Ill 


pre- 
con- 

iecis, 

as  to 

ig-in- 

.    To 

3  that 
is  as 

exists.    '• 

n  it  to 

g,  as  it 

ich   no 

ty  that 

object, 

to  be, 

■If. 

IS  been 
of  con- 
resence 
lliraited 
hich  is 
question 
(usness, 
|elf-con- 
re  is  a 
lusness, 


and  that  this  object  as  active  limits  or  determines 
consciousness.  Such  an  explanation  really  explains 
nothing.  The  question  is  how  an  object  becomes 
known,  and  it  is  no  explanation  to  say  that  it  exists 
independently  of  knowledge.  Such  an  unknown  and 
unknowable  thing-in-itself,  whether  it  exists  or  not, 
at  least  can  be  absolutely  notliing  for  knowledge. 
The  limitation  of  consciousness  to  an  object  must  be 
explained  in  consistency  with  the  supreme  principle 
of  knowledge,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  self-con- 
sciousness as  a  pure  activity.  The  object  of  con- 
sciousness, therefore,  must  be  something  relative  to 
that  activity;  it  must,  in  other  words,  be  a  limita- 
tion of  intelligence  by  itself.  The  consciousness  of 
self  as  activity  thus  implies  the  opposition  to  self  of 
that  which  is  not  self,  i.e.  of  an  activity  by  which 
the  pure  activity  of  self-consciousness  is  limited  or 
defined.  The  I  can  be  conscious  of  itself  only  in 
contrast  from  a  not-self.  At  the  same  time  this  not- 
self  or  limit  is  laid  down  by  itself,  and  so  in  limiting 
itself  it  recognizes  that  the  limit  is  its  own.  Thus 
the  limit  is  one  which,  as  posited  by  itself,  it  can 
in  virtue  of  its  self-activitv  remove.  The  I  is 
therefore  a  perpetual  process  of  laying  down  and 
removing  a  limit.  In  one  aspect  intelligence  is 
unlimited  only  as  it  is  limited;  in  another  aspect  it 
is  limited  only  as  it  is  unlimited.     To   these   two 


112   uciiblling's  traxscendbntal  idealism. 


aspects  correspond  Theoretical  and  Practical  Phi- 
losophy. In  the  one  the  limit  is  ideal,  or  only  for 
the  self;  in  the  other  it  is  real,  or  opposed  to  the 
self. 

We  have  now  before  us  two  acts  of  intelligence, 
the  consciousness  of  self  as  pure  activity  and  the 
consciousness  of  not-self  as  a  limit  to  that  activity. 
But  each  of  these,  as  existing  in  one  consciousness, 
must   be   combined    in    an   act  which    is    distinct 
from   both.    And  this  is  a  synthetical    act,  inas- 
much as  both  of  the  terms,  self  and  not-self,  must 
be  present  in  it.     Here,  therefore,  we  have  com- 
pleted the  trinity  of  acts  presupposed  in  all  con- 
sciousness.     We  are  still,  however,  far  from  the 
complexity  of  actual  kurvledge;   and  hence,   tak- 
ing this  synthetical  act  as  our  starting-point,   we 
must  go  on  to  develop   from   it  the  whole  series 
of  acts  implied   in   knowledge.     We  cannot,  how- 
ever, present  the  whole  infinite  series  of  acts,  but 
must   be   contented    with   setting   forth   the   main 
stages  in  knowledge. 

The  first  part  of  Transcendental  Idealism  seeks  to 
explain,  in  consistency  with  the  synthetical  unity 
of  self-consciousness,  the  presupposition  of  common 
consciousness  that  there  are  objects  outside  of  us 
which  we  did  not  make  for  ourselves.  The  solu- 
tion of  this   problem  cannot  be  given  in  the  way 


'»  "Wch  dogmatism  has  attempted  it 

""-'"in,  the  existence  of  sTeh  1    '  ''  *" 

poking  them  to  act  external  '"'  '"^  ^"P" 

«».  »ince  the  condition  „f  a  "v"  ""'T  "'- 
^^^  i»  the  synthesis  of      .     ^         "'"'«''  "■""■ 

'"Hii«ence  that   rneilr^r  ""'  "''"''  ''  " 
•»"  both  in  o,.e     Th!  ""'  ■""•  ""'  ««■«"•. 

^'"o-.  not  an  H^^St  ""  '  '"«"='"  ^"^ 
position  ,.«„,  ,„  b      Jr     "•     '""  "■»'  op- 

of  opposition   is  tatt  :,•;"'  ""'  ""P^""- 
^0  oan  see  geneaitrhr     '"'"■"  "'"'•'-od. 

»«t  in  showing  h  ;i L,     ""'  '•"""•'»  "■-'  con- 

■•«ng  itse,,  ml  al  e"    '  1""'  T'"*'  "*"'  ''™- 
•''   ^-m   to   be  limi  J   V"'^''  '''"'  "f  the  high- 

^e  W  that  th  Mtlr''''"«  "«'  ''-'f- 
■•''aUve;  but  so  long  aT  h  "  ""'  "'^"'"'^  ""' 
«nd  object  remains  i  so  ,„„     tr"'""  °*' ^"''J«o' 

«'   the   stage   of  !  ^'  *''""''''o™'  "^  *«  are 

stage   of  consciousness   or   k„„„i  j 

*nai  synthesis  must  be  impossible     S?''""*''^''-* 
have  to  set  forth    n„  .i,    '^""°-     ^''us  we  shall 

"  appears  torsCr/r-'-'o  object  as 

«-»««.  and.  on  the  otrhal  :f  t"'  "' '"»"'■ 
"--  to  us  .ho  c„nXL:\";:  "'^7'  -  ''  ap. 
»'°»nd   of  phi,os„ph„     And     /        ""^  ^^-tage- 

begin  with  the  first  1/  """""'*   "^^   "ust 

8  "'''  ""'»  ^'"P'est  form  in  which 


114    BCHELLINU^H  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 

the  relation  of  subject  and  object  presents  itself. 
The  successive  "epochs"  or  stages  of  knowledge 
are  (1)  from  Sensation  to  Perception,  (2)  from 
Perception  to  Reflection,  (3)  from  Reflection  to 
Will. 


tikumm  I  III  — ^<— — MWiM^Jwiaw 


itself. 

rledge 

from 

on   to 


CHAPTER  V. 

THEORKTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Tj^OLLOWING  the  method  inaugurated  by  Fichte, 
"*-  Schelling  always  begins  by  "  deducing  "  each 
stage  of  consciousness,  that  is,  by  explaining  it  in 
consistency  witii  the  principle  that  all  knowledge 
arises  from  a  self-limitation:  and  only  when  this 
deduction  has  been  completed  does  he  go  on  to 
show  that  the  result  is  consistent  with  the  actual 
facts  of  consciousness.  He  begins,  for  example,  at 
the  point  to  which  we  have  now  come,  by  show- 
ing that  the  simplest  form  of  consciousness  must 
be  the  perception  of  a  limit;  and,  having  done  so, 
he  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  immedi- 
ate consciousness  of  a  limit  is  identical  with  that 
stage  of  knowledge  known  as  sensation.  It  will, 
however,  be  advisable  rather  to  follow  the  reverse 
method;  to  begin  with  the  characterization  of  sen- 
sation as  it  actually  exists  as  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness,, and  then  to  consider  the  transcendental  ex- 
planation ol  it.. 

I.  The  first  phase  of  knowledge  is  sensation. 
What  then  is  sensation?  In  sensation  conscious- 
ness seems  to  be   purely  passive   or    receptive ;    it 

113 


116   schblling's  transcendental  idealism. 


simply  finds  something  in  itself,  which  stands  op- 
posed to  it,  but  which  yet  is  felt.  There  is  no 
affirmation  that  that  which  is  felt  is  actually  inde- 
pendent of  feeling,  but  simply  that  what  is  felt  is 
a  limit  to  it.  The  matter  of  sensation  is  some- 
thing that  immediately  presents  itself,  and  must 
be  apprehended;  it  is  not  something  which  can  be 
freely  constructed.  The  content  of  sensation  is, 
therefore,  something  alien  to  consciousness,  while 
yet  it  is  in  consciousness.  All  sensation  is  the 
immediate  consciousness  of  something  as  present, 
which  cannot  be  made  or  unmade;  but  must  sim- 
ply be  accepted.  The  ticking  of  the  clock,  and  the 
heat  of  the  fire  along  with  its  red  glow,  are  im« 
mediately  present  in  sensation,  and,  so  long  as  I 
am  sensitive,  they  cannot  be  made  or  unmade, 
but  must  be  taken  as  they  are.  Nor  in  sensation 
is  there  any  opposition  of  something  distinct  from 
that  which  is  felt,  but  the  sensation  and  that  which 
is  felt  are  immediately  identical  or  undistinguished 
from  one"  another.  Just  in  so  far  as  I  exclude  all 
reflection  and  immerse  myself  in  the  immediate 
object  have  I  sensation.  There  is  no  thought  of 
any  object  distinct  from  sensation,  conceived  as  its 
cause,  but  subject  and  object  are  immediately  identi- 
cal. Just  as  little  does  sensation  involve  the  concep- 
tion of  the  I  as  the  source  of  that  which  is  felt.  . 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


117 


e  Un- 
as I 
made, 
ation 
from 
which 
lish^d 
ie  all 
diate 
t  of 
s  its 
enti- 
eep- 


The  essential  characteristics,  then,  of  sensation 
are,  (1)  that  it  is  an  immediate  consciousness  or 
feeling,  and  (2)  a  consciousness  or  feeling  of  ne- 
cessity. Now,  when  we  make  sensation  an  object 
of  philosophical  consideration,  it  is  natural  that  we 
should  attempt  to  explain  it  by  the  causal  action  of 
a  thing-in-itself,  or  independent  reality,  upon  con- 
sciousness. The  feeling  of  necessity  which  accom- 
panies all  sensation,  and  is  essential  to  the  reality 
of  what  is  felt,  is  very  naturally  confounded  with 
the  existence  of  an  object  that  exists  independently 
of  consciousness.  This  is  the  solution  proposed  by 
the  dogmatic  materialist.  The  object  as  active  is 
conceived  to  act  upon  consciousness  as  one  billiard 
ball  hits  upon  another,  and  so,  it  is  supposed,  there 
arises  the  consciousness  of  something  not-self.  Now, 
even  granting  that  any  meaning  can  be  attached 
to  the  idea  of  an  independent  matter,  the  feeling 
of  necessity  is  not  thereby  explained.  Ofle  billiard 
ball  is  set  in  motion  by  another,  but  it  has  no  con- 
sciousness of  being  acted  upon.  The  materialist 
overlooks  the  fact  that  the  feeling  of  necessity  exists 
only  for  consciousness.  Sensation  is  not  a  mere 
limitation,  but  a  consciousness  of  limitation,  and 
such  consciousness  necessarily  presupposes  that  there 
is,  at  the  very  least,  a  reaction  of  consciousness 
against  that  which  is  opposed  to  it.     No  affection 


X 


118   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


produced  by  an  independent  thing  can  be  conceived 
as  changing  into  a  state  of  consciousness.  If  con- 
sciousness were  a  mode  of  existence,  it  might  be 
correct  to  say  that  it  is  acted  upon  by  something 
from  without;  consciousness,  however,  is  not  a  mode 
of  existence,  but  a  mode  of  knowledge.  The  materi- 
alist who  is  consistent  with  himself,  must  reduce 
matter  to  a  mere  phantom,  and  regard  mind  and 
matter  as  functions  of  something  that  is  higher 
than  both. 

The  true  explanation  of  sensation  must  therefore 
be  found  within,  and  not  without,  consciousness; 
and  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  consciousness 
is  not  absolutely  passive  in  sensation,  inasmuch  as 
passivity  implies  the  independent  reality  and  activity 
of  something  distinct  from  consciousness.  Still  it 
is  a  fact  that  in  sensation  there  is  a  feeling  of  neces- 
sity or  compulsion,  and  so  of  limitation  or  depend- 
ence on  something  unknown.  How  is  this  to  be 
explained  consistently  with  the  nature  of  knowl- 
edge, which  allows  of  nothing  as  real,  except  that 
which  exists  in  consciousness?  There  can  be  no 
difficulty  in  seeing  what  the  answer  must  be,  if  we 
refer  back  to  the  analysis  already  made  of  self-con- 
sciousness. The  consciousness  of  self  we  have  seen 
to  be  a  pure  activity  which,  considered  in  itself,  is 
absolutely  unlimited  or  infinite.     But,  on  the  other 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


119 


hand,  such  a  pure  activity  cannot  be  known  unless 
there  is  opposed  to  it  something  limiting  it;  there  is 
no  consciousness  of  self  apart  from  the  consciousness 
of  some  not-self.  Now,  this  not-self  is  still  in  con- 
sciousness, and  so  relative  to  the  self.  It  must 
therefore  be,  not  an  actual  reality  apart  from  con- 
sciousness, but  simply  an  activity  acting  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  pure  activity  of  self-consciousness,  and 
therefore  limiting  it.  Self-consciousness  we  may 
call  a  centripetal  activity;  consciousness  of  not-self 
a  centrifugal  activity.  If,  therefore,  the  former 
activity  is  opposed  by  the  latter,  the  product  must 
necessarily  be  the  consciousness  of  a  limitation  of 
the  free  activity  of  self-consciousness.  Conscious- 
ness is  prevented  from  returning  upon  itself,  and 
so  feels  or  perceives  that  it  is  limited.  And  this 
feeling  of  limitation  is  sensation. 

It  may  be  asked,  how,  if  sensation  is  the  product 
of  a  relation  between  two  contrary  activities,  the 
consciousness  of  self  and  the  consciousness  of  not- 
self,  it  is  not  accompanied  by  the  consciousness  of 
self.  The  answer  is  that  sensation,  as  the  first  and 
simplest  relation  of  these  activities,  excludes  all 
reflection  on  that  relation.  In  sensation  there  is 
no  explicit  opposition  of  subject  and  object,  but  an 
immediate  unity  of  the  two.  Certainly  the  oppo- 
sition is  implicit,  and  must  appear  the  moment  re- 


120   scuelling's  tbanscendbntal  idealism. 


flection  upon  sensation  begins;  but  the  condition 
of  such  reflection  is  that  there  should  be  some- 
thing to  reflect  upon.  Consciousness  cannot  at 
once  perceive,  and  contemplate  itself  as  perceiv- 
ing; the  first .  immediate  product  of  the  two  con- 
trary activities  must  be  an  undifferentiated  unity. 
And  this  explains  the  fact  that  in  sensation  there 
is  simply  an  immediate  feeling  in  consciousness 
that  there  is  something  we-know-not-what  which 
limits  or  opposes  us.  Thus  we  have  explained  at 
once  how  there  can  be  in  sensation  (1)  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  limit  and  (2)  the  consciousness  of 
a  limit.  Any  other  explanation  must  deny  either 
the  one  or  the  other.  Dogmatic  idealism  explains 
the  consciousness,  but  not  the  limit;  for,  in  as- 
suming that  sensation  is  a  purely  subjective  state, 
it  fails  to  explain  the  reality  of  the  limit,  and 
makes  it  a  mere  product  of  arbitrary  imagination. 
Dogmatic  materialism  may  account  for  the  limit, 
if  it  is  allowed  to  make  the  perfectly  gratuitous 
supposition  of  an  unknowable  thing- in-itself,  but 
it  fails  to  explain  how  there  should  be  any  con- 
sciousness of  a  limit.  The  solution  we  have  of- 
fered accounts  both  for  consciousness  and  for  the 
consciousness  of  a  limit.  The  most  stubborn  dog- 
matist must,  therefore,  grant  that  his  assumption 


s 


, 


ASM. 

condition 
be  some- 
annot  at 
perceiv- 
two  con- 
d  unity. 
3n  there 
iousness 
t  which 
ined  at 
le   con- 
ness  of 
either 
^plains 
in  as- 
state, 
'i   and 
ation. 
limit, 
"tons 
\  but 
con- 
J   of- 
tbe 
dog. 
tion 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


Idl 


«f  a  subject  without  an  object   or  .„  ni  •    . 
out  a  subject   i.  r«„^      ^  ^^J®^*  ^^th 

UDject,  ,s  rendered  superfluous. 

sciouTr;^^^^ 

^^^ectandlbSrir^r^^^^^^^^^ 
becomes    explicit       r  opposition 

^n  opposition  to  it  and  Umi*  ^  ,  standing 

»f  -   oyec?     t  :  "*"''"'    *^  *"«  -™  effect 

fe  feUime  there  aril  t  J::-.  "'^'•^'■'"•'''  ^- 
"""•Id.    More  exactl.    J       .     """'"""^"e^^  «  real 

'- -ten:  ::2tt''' »■'--> -.a 

manifests  itself  a!  "/"'  '"  ''^'''    "»«» 

icseit   as   possessed   of   the   aff.n    .       , 

«'-avity.      And    as    the    object    is  '  *" 

viewed  as  altogether   indep    den    of  th'"""""" 

«f  perception,  .natter  is  ZTj  """'^ 

or  thing-in-itself  .„f  *  ''"''  "''Jeet 

?      .tself,  not  as  something  dependent  for 


Its  constitution   upon  Hip  ..,!•. 

Planation  of  .^rltL      ,  •  ""»'""""  ««• 

-"Ject  as  tw    M    ::J^  ""'J-'  "".> 

Pendent  object    butH    "T    """""    "'■   ««    '"de- 

opposition  oflbjectt.ro.      /""'""'•'•    ^'"' 
-»'  'vitbout   con  ct  It    'irr'"'"  "'«' 
P"««  the  activ.  relation!;     "',"""■«'<"•«  "    "•>• 
No  doubt    the   obLc  ""      ••  "'  '"  •  •"'■J'^^'- 

i"depe„dent,Xf  Crce'li"'";'"'  "   "'""""^^ 

"-^  it  is  :ssnn..r:t  J:; "  "'^ """'' 

and   therefore   to  exist  foT.  '''™*''"»''' 

theory  of  nercentin  '""'"ousne^s,    A  true 

«.o  olject  rre     :    ""'  "'"^'»™  «P""-->  "0. 

ness  of  it.  .  ''  °"'^  '»  "«'•  co«,eiou,. 

Let  us  get  a  clear  coneen«n„  „<•  *> 

«P>ained.    Sensation  "r  the  !'''''''''"•''« ''•       ' 

"ess  of  a  limit   „  ,        ""med.ate  conscious. 

'"nitation  o    t  I  ""    "'  "'  *"«  '•^«»"  of  a 

-^.thelrVrracritrt"'"'^"^-"""^—- 
fi'-t  act  of  intelZ'     ^f  «»»«e'o„s„ess.     I„  M, 

-«vitiesdid:oTi:^;r^'«-»^"-'- 

Piesent  .(self  m  consciou«neM,  but 


T..EOBET.CAL   PMILOSOPHV.  jj,, 

o»ly  their  pi-oduet      At  *i. 

«on  contains  in  a  kt   T    '""  ""'"'''""'■     «»■'- 

"f  sensation  n,„st  „vea   thif  »»"'«'«P'atio» 

-'0  clear  consciou.,  '"l"^-^"''''  or  bring  ie 

place.     Sensation  ca    ll        "'  '''  ''""  ""^  '*''«' 

contemplation  in  an  alT^-        '"'"'  ""  ""J"''  "' 

tion  itself.     VIZ     \  "'  ''"'"  "'=''  of  ^"'•^a- 

^"-ni.itaS„"ar,:::;:;r^^""^"^»-- 

"•albeit  its  «.„.    Ttt  :;;"  T  ""''''' '•'■'' 
«f«'-ed  to  the  self         f        »o»'«n.plation  here 

--ensatiotvir:  j;rr '^-'-'-f 

In  other  words  ih.     1/  "^^  ^^<^  »^  »"• 

-iousness,  not  as  before  I  ,  "  -'^  T  '"  """■ 
•>"'  t-o  distinct  activi  ie??  k""^'"  ■'"''''"'• 
objective-inexplicit  1  ''•"*"™  """^  »" 

O'-fficult,  here    s  r         '""      °"'  '"""'«^-    ^"^ 
activit/can  Ino^  «    7   "   '"""   *•■«   «"y»««va 

objecti  e  aeti  r  tI"  ■  '^"'"""  ''"""^■'"^  "'^ 

"^  l^ea,  aetiv^JiT'^'^^^^^^^^^ 

'''■^"""^ainLatirX^^^^^^^^ 

-rds,  the  contemplation  o    t      rr::?  •/"  "''" 

a  negation  of  it  h„f     .•  "^''"'^  '«  "ot 

o         of  .t,  bat  a  hmitatio„  of  the  self  which 


134   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


so  contemplates  it.  Now  this  can  only  take  place  in 
so  far  as  there  is  a  third  activity  which  relates  the 
other  two  activities  to  one  another,  and  so  relates 
them  that  in  so  far  as  the  one  is  active  the  other  is 
passive  and  vice  versa.  This  activity  uniting  the 
other  two  is  one  which  floats  between  both. 

We  have  explained  how  it  comes  that  in  percep- 
tion there  is  an  opposition  of  subject  and  object,  but 
we  have  yet  to  explain  how  it  is  that  the  object  is 
supposed  to  be  independent  of  the  subject.  The 
explanation  is  of  the  same  nature  as  that  which 
accounted  for  the  absence  of  the  consciousness  of  its 
own  activity  by  the  self  in  sensation.  In  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  real  self  as  limited,  there  is  the 
consciousness  of  something  beyond  the  limit,  and  in 
becoming  conscious  of  the  ideal  self  as  limited  there 
is  the  consciousness  of  the  self  as  independent  of 
the  limit;  but  there  can  be  no  consciousness  of  the 
relation  of  that  self  and  the  object  without  a  new 
activity,  and  hence  they  are  only  brought  into  rela- 
tion at  a  subsequent  stage  in  the  development  of 
self-consciousness.  The  thing-in-itself  is  therefore 
just  the  shadow  of  the  ideal  activity  which  has  gone 
beyond  the  limit,  a  shadow  thrown  back  upon  the 
self  by  contemplation. 

From  the  two  factors  now  obtained  we  can 
explain  the  nature  of  that  which  presents  itself  as 


THEORETICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


1S5 


)f 
re 
le 
|e 


. 


an  eject  in  productive  perception.  On  the  one 
hand  we  have  the  ideal  activity  going  beyond  the 
limit,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  objective  or  real 
activity  restrained  by  the  limit.  Both  of  these 
must  be  comprehended  by  intelligence,  for  otherwise 
they  would  have  no  reality  for  knowledge.  And 
each  activity  is  relative  to  the  other,  while  yet  each 
is  infinite.  But  intelligence  cannot  com'prehend 
both  without  giving  rise  to  a  product  which  com- 
bines them  in  a  unity.  In  this  unity,  therefore, 
there  must  be  the  implicit  distinction  of  two  con- 
trary activities,  each  of  which  is  infinite  in  itself 
but  yet  is  limited  by  the  other,  the  product  being 
something  finite.  Now  these  contrary  activities  of 
the  object  of  intelligence  are  just  what  we  mean  by 
the  forces  of  matter,  and  their  synthesis  constitutes 
the  essential  nature  of  matter,  i.e.,  gravity. 

II.  In  the  first  stage  of  consciousness  we  have 
advanced  beyond  sensation,  as  the  me?e  conscious- 
ness of  a  limit,  to  perception  as  the  consciousness  of 
a  real  object  standing  in  opposition  to  the  subject. 
We  have  now  to  distinguish  the  various  phases  of 
perception,  or,  in  other  words,  to  show  how  nature  as 
an  object  of  knowledge  becomes  divided  for  intelli- 
gence into  an  inner  and  an  outer  world.  The  ques- 
tion here  is  how  intelligence  separates  itself  from 
the  object  which  it  perceives,  and  turns  back  upon 


126   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


itself :  how,  in  other  words,  it  not  only  perceives  but 
knows  itself  as  perceiving. 

In  this  section  Schelling  seeks  to  show,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  general  principle  of  Transcendental 
J*hilosophy,  that  the  world  of  nature  as  an  object 
standing  in  contrast  to  the  knowing  subject,  is 
really  only  a  product  of  intelligence  itself,  and  that 
perception  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  a  process 
of  intelligence,  not  as  a  dead  product  existing  apart 
from  intelligence.  Accordingly  he  endeavors,  in 
imitation  of  Fichte,  to  connect  together,  in  the 
closest  way,  space  and  time  and  the  categories, 
which  Kant  had  separated.  It  further  seems  to 
him  that  the  categories  are  all  reducible  to  those 
classed  by  Kant  under  the  head  of  Relation,  and  the 
hint  which  Kant  threw  out,  of  a  close  connexion 
between  each  group  of  categories,  Schelling  follows 
up,  and  so  is  led  to  develop  the  view,  that  substance 
and  cause  are  simply  lower  forms  of  the  category 
of  reciprocity. 

Evidently  there  can  be  no  consciousness  of  the 
self  as  perceiving  a  real  world  unless  to  the  subject 
as  perceiving  there  is  explicitly  opposed  the  object 
perceived.  The  former  must  be  distinguished  from 
the  latter  as  inner  from  outer.  And  these  two 
perceptions  —  the  perception  of  the  self  as  perceiv- 
ing, and  of  the  object  as  perceived  —  are  mutually 


THEORETICAL   nilLOSOl'llY. 


127 


determined  in  relation  to  one  another;  there  can 
be  no  perception  of  tlie  self  as  inner  unless  there 
is  a  perception  of  the  object  as  outer.  In  the 
contemplation  of  inner  and  outer  sense  there  is 
necessarily  a  comprehension  of  both,  and  therefore 
the  distinction  between  inner  and  outer  —  subject 
perceiving  and  object  perceived  —  is  quite  contin- 
gent as  respects  the  self  which  thus  contemplates 
both.  While  therefore  the  self,  as  perceiving  a 
real  object,  is  limited  to  the  perception  of  that 
object,  and  cannot  at  the  same  time  comprehend 
itself  as  perceiving,  the  self,  as  that  which  knows 
at  once  itself  and  the  object,  is  a  free  activity. 
Thus  there  is  an  immediate  consciousness  of  the 
self  as  distinct  from  and  contrasted  with  an  outer 
object.  In  this  feeling  of  self  there  is  therefore  a 
consciousness  of  the  self  as  the  subject  of  an  im- 
mediate feeling.  How  then  does  the  self  become 
an  object  of  immediate  consciousness  or  feeling? 
Only  in  so  far  as  it  perceives  itself  to  be  in  Time. 
In  opposing  to  itself  an  object  there  arises  the 
immediate  consciousness  of  self,  that  is.  the  con- 
sciousness of  self  as,  so  to  speak,  concentrated  in  a 
point,  and  therefore  as  incapable  of  being  extended 
except  in  one  direction.  In  the  consciousness  of 
myself  as  feeling  I  appear  to  myself  as  pure  in- 
tensity, and  pure  intensity  is  only  in  time,  not  in 


128     HCHELLING's  TRANSCENDBNTAL  IDEALI8M. 


space.  Time  is  thus  simply  the  general  activity 
by  which  intelligence  relates  its  changing  states  to 
one  another;  it  is  the  immediate  consciousness  by 
the  self  of  its  own  independent  activity.  But  the 
consciousness  of  self  as  relating  its  own  states  in 
succession  is  not  possible  apart  from  the  conscious- 
ness of  something  which,  in  contrast  to  the  self, 
is  out  of  itself  or  in  Space.  Thus  arises  the  con- 
trast of  inner  and  outer  perception,  which  together 
form  the  object  of  the  intelligence  as  perceptive. 
In  the  discrimination  of  the  subject  as  in  time  and 
the  object  as  in  space  an  advance  has  therefore 
been  made  beyond  the  undifferentiated  unity  of 
inner  and  outer  sense  which  first  presented  itself. 
The  object  can  only  appear  as  pure  extension  when 
the  consciousness  of  self  as  pure  intension  has 
arisen;  each  therefore  has  to  be  combined  in  a 
consciousness  that  includes  both.  Time  and  space 
are  thus  necessarily  correlative,  and  each  can  only  be 
measured  by  the  other.  To  determine  the  quantity 
of  time  we  refer  to  the  space  passed  over  by  a  body 
moving  uniformly;  to  determine  the  quantity  of 
space,  we  refer  to  the  time  which  a  body  moving 
uniformly  takes  to  pass  over  it. 

The  sensible  object,  therefore,  is  knowable  not 
as  pure  extension  but  as  extension  which  is  rela- 
tive to  intension,  that  is,  as  Force.    To  determine 


1 


sfW 


THEORKTICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


129 


be 

bity 

)dy 

of 

fng 

lot 
lla- 
ine 


the  intensity  of  a  force  we  have  to  measure  the 
space  to  which  it  can  extend  without  becoming 
zero.  Conversely  this  space  is  determined  by  the 
intensity  of  the  force  for  the  inner  sense.  Hence 
that  which  is  known  as  merely  in  time  appears 
not  as  necessary  but  as  contingent,  since  it  ex- 
isi<<  only  ideally  or  for  the  inner  sense;  while  that 
which  has  a  quantity  in  space  appears  as  neces- 
sary or  substantial.  As,  however,  there  is  no 
outer  sense  except  in  relation  to  inner  sense  —  no 
extension  apart  from  intension  —  substance  and  ac- 
cident are  essentially  correlative.  Here,  then,  we 
have  the  origin  of  the  perceptions  of  Substance 
and  Accident.  That  which  is  viewed  as  only  in 
space  is  substance;  that  which  is  perceived  as  only 
in  time  is  accident.  Space  and  time,  then,  are  not 
empty  frames  into  which  objects  apprehended  inde- 
pendently by  perception  are  put,  nor  is  substance  a 
notion,  which  first  exists  in  the  mind  ready-made, 
and  is  brought  into  play  upon  occasion  of  percep- 
tion; both  are  modes  of  activity  by  which  intelli- 
gence constitutes  the  world  of  nature.  Accordingly, 
Schelling  goes  on  to  show  that  substance  leads  neces- 
sarily to  causality  and  both  to  reciprocity. 

It  has  been   maintained   by   the  Kantians   that 
objectivity   or  substantiality  belongs   to   things  in 

themselves,  while  their  successive  states  as  only  in 
9 


/■•iW^t'J"!      ■<     lUm    III.WW^III     IWj  >■ 


130    schbllinq's  transcendental  idealism. 


time  are  supplied  by  the  knowing  subject.  It  is 
easy  to  show  that  such  a  view  does  not  explain 
the  origin  of  perceived  objects  at  all.  There  is 
no  such  contrast  of  the  subjective  sequences  of 
mental  states  and  the  objective  sequence  of  real 
events.  An  objective  sequence  is  simply  one  which, 
as  not  due  to  the  free  activity  of  the  individual, 
does  not  se^^m  to  be  produced,  but  to  be  externally 
apprehended.  But  in  truth  the  occurrence  of  the 
succession  and  the  perception  of  the  occurrence  are 
the  same  object  contemplated  from  different  points 
of  view.  Let  us  suppose  for  a  moment  that  per- 
ception consists  in  a  mere  succession  of  mental 
states.  Now  substance  is  that  which,  as  fixed  or 
indifferent  to  time,  can  neither  come  into  exist- 
ence nor  go  out  of  existence.  The  accidents  of  any 
objects  B  and  C,  may  arise  or  disappear,  but  not  the 
objects  themselves.  If,  therefore,  C  is  causally  deter- 
mined by  B,  it  can  only  be  the  accidental  in  C  that 
is  determined  by  B,  not  C  itself.  In  order  that 
intelligence  may  recognize  the  accident  B  as  the 
ground  of  the  accident  C,  B  and  C  must  be  opposed 
in  one  and  the  same  act,  and  at  the  same  time  re- 
lated to  each  other.  That  there  is  an  opiwsition 
between  them  is  evident,  for  in  a  mere  succession 
B  must  be  driven  out  of  consciousness  by  C,  and 
go  away  into  the  past  moment.    But  how  they  can 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


131 


le  re- 
Isition 
jssion 
a»,nd 

hy  can 


be  related  to  one  another  is  not  comprehensible  so 
long  as  the  self  is  regarded  simply  as  a  succession 
of  simple  representations,  each  of  which  drives  out 
the  other.     Now  it  has   been  shown  that  only  ac- 
cidents can   come    into   being  or  go  out  of  being, 
not  substances.     What,  then,   is  substance?     It  is 
only  conceivable   as   fixed   time.      But  time  is  not 
fixed,  but  fleeting  —  fleeting  of  course  not  in  itself 
but  for  the  self, —  and  therefore  substances  cannot 
be  fixed,  since  the  self  is  not  itself  fixed,  but  from 
the  present  point  of  view  is  simply  this  succession 
itself.     The  supposition,  therefore,  that  the  self  as 
active  is  merely  a  succession  of  representations  is 
a  pure  hypothesis,  which  reflection  shows  to  be  in- 
admissible.    Substance,  however,  must  be  regarded 
as  permanent,  if  there  is  to  be  any  opposition  be- 
tween  C   and  B.     Now   the   succession   cannot   be 
fixed,  unless  opposite  directions  enter  into  it.    Mere 
succession  has  only  one  direction.     This  one  direc- 
tion, taken   in   abstraction   from   the  succession  of 
feelings,  is  just   time,  which  looked  at  externally 
has   only   one   direction.      Opposite   directions   can 
therefore  only  come   into  the  succession,   provided 
that  the  self,  whilst  it  is  driven  from  B  to  C,  is 
again   driv^en  back  at  the  same  time  to  B;  for  in 
that  case  the  opposite   directions  will  negate  each 
other,    the    succession  will    be    fixed,    and    conse- 


132    schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

quently  also  the  substances.  Now,  undoubtedly^ 
the  self  can  be  driven  back  from  C  to  B,  only  in 
the  same  way  in  which  it  has  been  driven  from 
B  to  C.  That  is  to  say,  just  as  B  contained  the 
ground  of  a  determination  in  C,  C  must  again  con- 
tain the  ground  of  a  determination  in  B.  This 
determination  in  B  cannot  have  been  before  C  was, 
for  the  accidental  of  C  is  to  contain  the  ground 
of  that  determination,  and  C  arises  for  the  self  as 
this  determinate  object  only  in  the  present  mo- 
ment, and  hence  also  that  determination  in  B, 
whose  ground  C  is  to  contain,  first  arises  at  this 
stage.     B  and  C  must  determine  each  o^her. 

It  has  been  shown  that  any  two  objects  are  deter- 
mined as  substances  only  by  being  known  as  mutu- 
ally determined  in  one  indivisible  moment.  But 
intelligence  is  a  perpetual  process  or  continual  pro- 
duction of  new  objects.  Can  it,  then,  be  shown  that 
the  same  principle  is  universally  true,  and  that  all 
the  substances  in  the  world  are  in  reciprocal  causa- 
tion? The  mutual  action  tf  two  substances  implies 
their  co-existence,  and  it  nev?d  not  be  said  that  such 
co-existence  exists  only  for  intelligence.  In  the  per- 
ception of  substance  space  presents  itself  merely  as 
extension  or  a  side-by-side  of  exclusive  parts:  only 
in  the  perception  of  reciprocity  does  it  appear  in  tl)e 
form  of  co-existeEce,  or  a  side-by-side  of  objects  ex- 


rZ      —  ;-.v-^::- 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


133 


as 


ly 


eluding  one  other.  Space  is  therefore  simply  the 
reproduction,  in  an  act  of  intelligence  distinct  from 
the  actual  knowledge  of  co-existing  objects,  of  the 
mere  form  of  co-existence.  Primarily,  space  has  no 
direction,  and  hence  it  is  the  possibility  of  all  direc- 
tions; in  the  relation  of  causality  there  is  only  one 
direction;  in  the  category  of  reciprocity  all  direc- 
tions alike  are  possible.  Now  substance  and  cause 
are  only  ideally  distinguishable;  actual  knowledge  is 
possible  only  as  a  synthesis  of  two  substances  in 
mutual  action,  which  again  are  relative  to  others, 
and  hence  there  can  be  no  knowledge  of  objects  not 
in  reciprocal  action;  or  in  other  words.  Nature  is  a 
synthesis  of  objects,  all  of  which  determine  each 
other. 

We  have  so  far  assumed  that  in  intelligence  is  to 
be  found  the  ground  of  the  continuous  production  of 
objects.  This  has  now  to  be  proved.  Originally 
the  self  implies  an  opposition  of  two  diverse  tenden- 
cies. But  as  the  nature  of  the  self  is  pure  and 
absolute  identity,  it  must  continually  strive  to  re- 
turn to  identity,  while  yet  it  can  never  completely 
do  so,  because  of  its  original  duality.  The  condition 
of  continuous  production,  i.  e.,  the  presentation  of  an 
object  as  opposed  to  the  subject,  is  the  perpetual 
re-establishment  of  the  original  conflict  of  opposite 
activities.     Intelligence  is  intelligence  only  so  long 


134     SCHELLINU'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDRALISM. 

as  the  conflict  continues.  The  opposition,  to  borrow 
a  phrase  of  Mr.  Spencer,  is  one  "  never  to  be  tran- 
scended while  consciousness  lasts."  Evidently,  there- 
fore, it  cannot  come  to  an  end  with  the  production 
of  any  individual  object;  in  other  words,  each  indi- 
vidual object  as  such  is  but  an  apparent  product  of 
the  infinite  activity  of  intelligence.  And  here  a  diffi- 
culty arises.  All  empirical  consciousness  begins  with 
an  object  immediately  present,  and  in  its  first  con- 
sciousness intelligence  sees  itself  seemingly  involved 
in  a  determinate  succession  of  representations  from 
which  it  cannot  get  free.  On  the  other  hand, 
individual  objects  are  only  possible  as  part  of  a  sin- 
gle universe,  and  because  of  the  causal  relation 
of  events  the  succession  already  presupposes  not 
merely  a  multiplicity  of  substances,  but  a  reciprocal 
action  or  dynamical  co-existence  of  all  substances. 
The  difficulty,  then,  is  this:  Intelligence,  as  con- 
scious of  the  succession,  can  take  hold  of  it  only  at 
one  point,  and  hence,  to  be  conscious  of  succession  at 
all,  it  must  presuppose  as  independent  of  itself  a 
totality  of  substances  and  a  reciprocity  of  action 
between  them.  There  is  no  nature  apart  from 
intelligence,  yet  nature  is  apparently  independent  of 
intelligence,  and  the  necessary  presupposition  of  any 
consciousness  of  the  parts  of  nature  as  revealed 
piecemeal.     There  is  no  way  of  solving  this  contra- 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


135 


diction  but  by  distinguishing  between  absolute  and 
finite  intelligence.  There  must  be  a  universe  —  a 
system  of  substances  all  mutually  related  —  if  the 
self  Is  originally  limited  at  all.  Because  of  this 
primary  limitation  —  or,  what  is  the  same  thing, 
the  original  conflict  of  self-consciousness — the  uni- 
verse as  a  whole  originates  for  the  self,  not  gradually, 
but  by  one  absolute  synthesis.  The  idea  of  Nature 
as  a  whole,  as  Kant  said,  must  precede  the  knowledge 
of  its  parts.  But  this  does  not  explain  the  limitation 
of  self-consciousness  for  me  as  a  finite  individual. 
This  particular  or  second  limitation  must  appear  as 
occurring  at  a  deform inate  moment  of  time.  All 
that  is  posited  in  this  second  limitation  is  already 
posited  in  the  first  limitation,  but  with  this  dififer- 
ence,  that  in  the  first  all  is  posited  at  once  or  as  a 
whole,  while  in  the  second  it  takes  the  form  of  a 
successive  synthesis  ^of  parts.  The  absolute  synthe- 
sis cannot  be  said  to  be  limited  by  time,  for  time  is 
impossible  apart  from  it,  while  in  the  empirical  con- 
sciousness the  whole  is  produced  only  by  the  grad- 
ual synthesis  of  the  parts,  hence  by  successive  repre- 
sentations. Now,  in  so  far  as  intelligence  is  free 
from  the  limitation  of  time,  it  is  just  that  absolute 
synthesis  itself,  and  as  such  it  neither  begins  to  pro- 
duce nor  ceases  to  produce;  in  so  far  as  it  is  limited, 
it  can  only  appear  as  entering  the  series  at  a  defi- 


iV 


136     SCHELLINO'S  TBANSCENOENTAL  IDEALISM. 

nite  point.  Not  indeed  as  if  the  infinite  intelli- 
gence were  absolutely  separate  from  the  finite;  for 
if  we  abstract  from  the  particular  limitation  of  the 
finite  intelligence,  we  at  once  obtain  the  absolute 
intelligence,  just  as  when  we  add  on  the  limitation 
thus  abstracted  from  absolute  intelligence  the  latter 
becomes  specialized  as  finite  intelligence.  It  must 
not  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  absolute  nynthesis 
and  the  special  or  empirical  synthesis  are  two  inde- 
pendent acts;  on  the  contrary,  in  one  and  the  same 
primary  act  there  arises  for  intelligence  at  once  the 
universe  as  a  whole  and  the  specification  of  it  in  the 
series  of  particular  objects.  It  is  easy  to  see  why 
intelligence,  in  the  point  at  which  its  consciousness 
begins,  must  appear  as  determined  entirely  without 
its  own  cooperation ;  for,  just  because  at  that  point 
consciousness,  and  with  it  freedom,  arisei,  that  which 
lies  beyond  that  point  must  appear  as  completely 
independent  of  freedom. 

What  has  just  been  said  throws  fresh  light  on 
the  nature  of  the  problem  of  philosophy.  Each 
individual  may  consider  himself  as  the  object  of 
these  investigations.  But,  to  explain  himself,  he 
must  first  negate  all  individuality  within  himself, 
for  this  is  just  what  has  to  be  explained.  When 
all  limits  of  individuality  are  taken  away,  there 
remains  absolute  intelligence.     When  all  limits  of 


,/ 


PlJWMWWSWfrWP^W^gSBH! 


THEORETICAL   IMIILOSOPilY. 


187 


/ 


intelligence  are  negated,  there  remains  simply  the 
absolute  I  as  the  unity  of  subject  and  object. 
When  we  take  away  from  the  I  all  individuality, 
and  even  the  limits  on  account  of  which  only  it 
h  an  intelligence,  we  yet  cannot  negate  the  funda- 
1.  ^tal  character  oi  lic  I,  which  makes  it  at  once 
subject  and  object.  Hence  the  I  in  itself,  and  in 
its  very  nature  as  its  own  object,  is  primarily 
limited  in  its  activity.  From  this  first  or  primary 
limitation  of  its  activity  arises  immediately  for 
the  I  the  absolute  synthesis  of  the  infinite  conflict 
which  is  the  ground  of  that  limitation.  If  now 
intelligence  should  remain  at  one  with  the  absolute 
synthesis,  there  would  indeed  be  a  universe,  but 
no  intelligence.  Hence  intelligence  must  come 
out  of  that  synthesis,  and  consciously  reproduce  it; 
and  this  is  impossible  unless  there  comes  into  that 
first  limitation  a  particular  or  second  limitation, 
which  cannot  consist  in  intelligence  being  identical 
with  the  universe  as  a  whole,  but  in  its  perception 
of  the  universe  from  a  particular  point  of  view. 
The  difficulty  of  explaining  how  everything  is  de- 
pendent on  the  original  act  of  intelligence,  while 
yet  intelligence  can  take  hold  only  of  a  determin- 
ate succession,  is  resolved  through  the  distinction 
of  absolute  and  finite  intelligence.  The  empirical 
succession  is  merely  the  evolution  in  time  of  an 


S!  1 


13&   hciielung's  transcendental  idealism. 


1 


aosoluie  synthesis,  in  which  all  that  happens,  or 
will  happen,  is  wrapt  up;  and  the  reason  why  the 
succession  must  appear  as  independent  is  simply 
that  the  individual  cannot  produce  it  beforehand, 
but  must  wait  for  its  fulfilment. 

The  determination  of  the  universe  as  an  infinity 
of  objects,  all  of  which  are  in  reciprocal  action,  is 
virtually  the  conception  of  the  world  as  an  organic 
unity.  But  this  universal  organism  must  be  still 
further  specified,  since  the  knowledge  of  the  objec- 
tive world  as  given  in  perception  includes  the  recog- 
nition of  a  particular  part  of  it  as  the  immediate 
organ  of  its  activity.  Organization  in  geneial  is 
succession  checked  and,  as  it  were,  petrified.  The 
mechanical  conception  of  the  universe  regards  every 
part  as  tending  away  out  of  every  other  to  infinity, 
or,  subjectively,  as  a  mere  empirical  series.  An 
organism  is  that  which  has  its  centre  within  itself, 
or  which  forms  a  series  that  returns  upon  itself; 
and  thus  only  can  intelligence  represent  to  itself 
organic  as  distinguished  from  inorganic  beings.  In 
the  widest  sense  of  the  term  all  organized  existence 
has  an  inner  principle  of  movement,  and  is  there- 
fore living.  The  various  stages  of  organization 
are  but  phases  in  the  ideal  evolution  of  the  universe. 
Just  as  intelligence  is  perpetually  striving  to  repre- 
sent the  absolute  synthesis,  so  organic  nature  pre- 


ss 


TIIEORKTICAL    PIIILOSOPIIV. 


139 


sents  itself  as  a  perpetual  struggle  with  inorganic 
nature.  It  is  only,  however,  in  the  highest  organ- 
ism that  intelligence  recognizes  itself.  Hence  in- 
telligence is  not  only  organic,  but  it  «;tands  at  the 
apex  of  organization.  As  we  have  before  seen  that 
intelligence  could  not  determine  the  world  as  sub- 
stance and  accident  without  contemplating  it  as 
cause  and  effect,  nor  the  latter  without  going  on 
to  determine  it  as  a  system  of  substances  mutually 
acting  on  each  other,  so  we  now  see  that  even  the 
category  of  reciprocity  must  give  place  to  the  idea 
of  organization  which,  thought  universally,  leads 
to  the  notion  of  nature  as  a  universal  organism, 
in  relation  to  which  all  individual  organisms  are 
accidents. 

III.  We  have  now  reached  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant sections  in  the  whole  of  the  Transcend- 
eut(d  Idealism  —  that  in  which  Schelling  endeavors 
to  give  a  final  explanation  of  the  peculiar  prob- 
lem of  philosophy,  so  far  as  that  can  be  done  from 
the  point  of  view  of  knowledge.  In  the  consider- 
ation of  Reflection,  the  last  stage  of  Theoretical 
Philosophy,  the  distinction  of  Transcendental  Ideal- 
ism from  the  doctrine  contained  in  Kant's  Ana- 
lytic is'  most  clearly  seen.  Here  it  is  that  Schel- 
ling, turning  to  good  account  the  hints  of  Fichte, 
tries  to  free  the  critical  theory  of  knowledge  from 


140     SCHEI.LIXg's  TnANSC.'ENDENTAL  IDKAI.ISM. 

that  appearance  of  dogmatism  whioli  arose  mainly 
from  the  way  in  which  Kant,  from  historical 
causes,  was  led  to  present  his  theory;  to  connect 
the  objects  of  perception,  the  schemata  and  the 
categories,  in  a  more  intimate  way;  to  show  the 
true  dependence  of  the  four  groups  of  categories 
contained  in  Kant's  table,  and  the  relation  of  the 
special  categories  of  each  group  to  one  another; 
and,  finally,  to  show  the  origin  of  that  irrational 
assumption  of  the  independence  of  nature  on  intel- 
ligence which  is  the  characteristic  mark  of  dog- 
matism. This  part  of  Schelling's  work,  unsatisfac- 
tory as  in  some  respects  it  is,  undoubtedly  proved 
rich  in  suggestion  to  Hegel,  when  he  came  to 
develop  his  complete  system  of  all  the  categories 
in  the  true  order  of  their  dependence,  and  to 
transform  the  doctrine  of  Kant  into  a  self-consist- 
ent system  of  Absolute  Idealism. 

In  his  characterization  of  perception,  as  the  sec- 
ond stage  of  knowledge,  Schelling  has  shown  that 
what  we  have  before  us  in  our  ordinary  experi- 
ence is  a  system  of  objects  in  space  and  time,  act- 
ing and  reacting  on  each  other,  and  containing 
among  them  organized  beings.  But  while  it  is 
evident  enough  to  an  idealist  philosophy  that  the 
world  of  nature  is  simply  the  other  side  of  intel- 
ligence, this  insight  is   impossible   to   one   who  is 


THEORETICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


141 


mainly 
itorical 
connect 
nd  the 
lOW  tlie 
tegories 

of  the 
mother; 
rational 
m  intel- 

of  dog- 
isatisfac- 
proved 
came   to 

tegories 
and   to 

-consist- 

the  sec- 
^wn  that 

experi- 
tme,  act- 
Intaining 
lile  it  is 
Ithat  the 

3f  intel- 
who  is 


still  at  the  stage  of  perception.  It  is  impossible, 
because,  while  inner  and  outer  sense  have  become 
for  him  an  object  which  he  knows,  no  separation 
of  intelligence  as  active  from  nature  as  something 
distinct  from  that  activity  has  yet  been  made. 
That  this  opposition  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  actu- 
ally made  by  intelligence  at  a  certain  stage  in  its 
progress,  the  existence  of  dogmatic  systems  of  phi- 
losophy is  there  to  testify.  It  is,  then,  with  this 
seeming  dualism  of  intelligence  and  nature  that 
we  are  here  especially  concerned.  The  necessary 
progress  of  knowledge  has  brought  us  to  the  point 
where  that  dualism  can  be  accounted  for,  and  par- 
tially at  least  exploded. 

How  does  it  come  that  intelligence  and  nature, 
thought  and  reality,  subject  and  object,  seem  to  be 
mutually  opposed?  The  first  condition  evidently  is 
that  intelligence  should  be  able  to  free  itsfilf  from 
its  immersion  in  nature  as  an  object,  and  to  contem- 
plate itself  as  active  in  knowing.  To  this  power  of 
separating  one's  self  from  the  objective  world,  we 
may  apply  the  common  term  abstraction.  Now,  in 
considering  the  nature  of  perception  we  found  that 
it  implies  a  universal  and  a  particular  element;  or, 
in  other  words,  the  belief  in  nature  as.  a  complete 
whole,  and  the  limitation  to  specific  objects  of 
nature.     Corresponding  to  this  distinction  we  find, 


;«' 


u 


I 


f   l' 

i'. 


i    I 


IS 


14!Si     H(?IIULMN(i*S  TKANBCKNDKNTAt  IDEAhlAM. 

as  we  should  naturally  expect,  that  abstraction  is 
either  partial  or  complete,  empirical  or  transcenden- 
tal. And  as  the  universal  element  in  perception  is 
implicit  rather  than  explicit,  while  the  particular 
element  alone  comes  to  the  foreground,  the  elevation 
of  intelligence  to  the  stage  of  reflection  naturally 
begins  with  a  recognition  of  the  relatively  independ- 
ent activity  of  intelligence  in  its  consciousness  of 
particular  or  specific  objects.  Empirical  abstraction 
therefore  consists  in  a  separation  in  consciousness 
from  the  special  objects  presenting  themselves  in 
perception,  and  a  concentration  upon  the  activity 
of  thought  in  knowing  those  objects.  Thus  dualism 
is  introduced  into  consciousness.  The  immediate 
identity  of  the  act  of  knowledge  with  the  object 
known  is  destroyed,  and  the  act  is  contrasted  with 
its  object.  The  result  of  abstraction  is  therefore 
the  origination  in  consciousness  of  a  perception  of 
the  activity  of  thought,  i.e.,  conception.  It  is  evident 
that  there  is  no  propriety  in  asking  how  conceptions 
harmonize  with  objects,  if  by  this  is  meant:  How 
do  conceptions  which  are  completely  independent  of 
objects  come  to  agree  with  them?  This  way  of  stat- 
ing the  problem  assumes  that  conceptions  originate 
independently  of  objects,  whereas  a  'conception  has 
no  existence  except  as  an  act  of  abstraction  from 
actual  objects.    There  must,  then,  be  a  special  act  in 


TIIEOKKTK'AL    IMIILOSOI'IIY. 


143 


which  conceptions  and  perceived  objects,  originally 
united,  are  first  opposed  to  one  another,  and  then 
combined.  This  is  the  act  significantly  called  Jmlg- 
ment  (ur-theil).  And  as  judgment,  in  specifying 
itself  in  particular  judgments,  must  take  place  ac- 
cording to  a  rule,  this  rule  must  be  capable  of  being 
made  an  object  of  reflection.  To  the  rule  itself 
Schelling  gives  the  name  employed  by  Kant,  of  a 
schema.  The  schema  uifliers  fom  the  fnar/e  in  being 
a  rule  in  accordance  with  which  u  detenninate 
object  may  be  produced,  wV»ereas  the  im  re  only 
differs  from  the  concrete  object  in  not  being  limited 
to  a  definite  part  of  space. 

By  empirical  reflection  the  activity  of  thought  in 
subsuming  a  perception  under  a  rule  is  made  an 
object  of  consciousness,  but  complete  liberation  from 
perception  is  not  thereby  attained.  The  abstraction 
is  essentially  relative  to  the  perception  of  particular 
objects,  and  hence,  while  the  activity  of  thought  is 
raised  into  conbrioijsness  and  distinguished  from 
perception,  there  is  still  a  reference  to  perception  in 
the  application  of  the  schema  in  judgment  to  a  par- 
ticular o'/ject.  But  the  same  power  which  enables 
intelligence  to  abstract  from  individual  perceptions 
enables  it  to  abstract  from  all  objects,  and  to  con- 
centrate attention  upon  the  universal  modes  of 
activity  by  which  objects  are  made  possible  at  all. 


SSB 


144   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


f  I 


It  I 


; 


This  supreme  abstraction  may  be  called  transcenden- 
tal abstraction,  the  object  of  which  is  the  pure  con- 
ceptions or  categories  that  constitute  the  fundamental 
modes  of  activity  of  intelligence  as  reflective.  And 
just  as  the  empirical  conceptions  and  perceived 
objects  are  mediated  by  the  empirical  schema,  so  the 
category  is  related  to  the  world  in  general  through 
the  transcendental  schema. 

In  considering  the  nature  of  transcendental  ab- 
straction, Schelling's  main  aim  is  to  avoid  that 
absolute  separation  of  tliought  and  reality,  con- 
ception and  perception,  which  gives  color  to  the 
dualism  upon  which  dogmatism  is  built.  Hence 
he  seeks  to  show  that  the  opposition  of  intelligence 
and  nature  arises  from  the  failure  to  apprehend 
the  abstracting  or  separative  character  of  reflec- 
tion. That  "  perceptions  without  conceptions  are 
blind,  and  conceptions  without  perceptions  are 
empty,"  he  explains  from  the  fact  that  perception  is 
already  the  indissoluble  unity  of  thought  and  its 
object.  For  (1)  perception  regarded  as  indepen- 
dent of  conception  is  the  mere  form  of  objectivity, 
not  objectivity  itself ;  it  is  simply  the  purely  in- 
definite act  by  which  possible  objects  may  be 
related  to  each  other  as  out  of  each  other  or  in 
space.  But  the  objective  world  is  something  quite  ' 
different   from   mere    outness ;    it   is   a   congeries 


THEOBETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


145 


of  substances,  all  of  which  are  in  mutual  action 
and  reaction.  The  determination  of  the  objective 
world  thus  involves  those  definite  ways  in  which 
thought  relates  objects  to  each  other;  it  implies,  in 
short,  as  has  been  show:  in  considering  the  sec- 
ond stage  of  knowledge,  the  categories  of  relation. 
(2)  Conceptions  isolated  from  perceptions  are,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  mere  abstraction  of  activity  in 
general.  When  abstraction  is  made  from  the  em- 
pirical schemata  —  the  modes  in  which  intelligence 
relates  individual  objects  to  one  another  —  there 
arises,  on  the  one  side,  conceptionless  perception,  or 
the  mere  form  of  space,  and,  on  the  other  side,  per- 
ceptionless  conception,  or  the  mere  form  of  relation. 
Hence  the  categories  come  to  be  regarded,  as  they 
are  regarded  in  formal  logic,  merely  as  formal  or 
abstract  modes  of  relation.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  pure  reflection  or  analysis,  the  categories 
are  necessarily  viewed  as  formal  determinations, 
and  hence  the  attempt  of  Kant  to  derive  them 
from  the  functions  of  judgment  in  formal  logic. 
Now,  not  to  mention  that  these  functions  of  judg- 
ment must  themselves  be  derived  from  transcenden- 
tal philosophy,  it  is  evident  that,  when  separated 
from  the  schematism  of  perception,  they  are  no 
longer  conceptions  making  real  objects  possible  for 

knowledge,  but  mere  abstract  forms   of  thought. 
10 


'■I '. 
•I' 


146    schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

Accordingly  dogmatic  philosophy  has  never  been 
able  to  explain  how  it  comes  that  conceptions  har- 
monize with  objects.  When  the  two  are  absolutely 
separated,  the  only  modes  of  explanation  possible 
are  to  say,  either  that  conceptions  and  objects  are 
related  as  cause  and  effect,  or  that  conceptions  agree 
with  objects  because  of  a  pre-established  harmony 
between  them.  If  we  adopt  the  first  view,  we  must 
suppose  that  objects  produce  conceptions,  in  which 
case  conceptions  can  have  no  claim  to  universality 
and  necessity;  or  that  they  are  the  formative  cause 
of  objects,  in  which  case  we  are  driven  to  a  conclu- 
sion which  is  inconsistent  with  the  facts,  namely, 
that  objects  are  formless  matter.  These  difficulties 
all  arise  from  not  attending  carefully  to  the  way  in 
which  the  distinction  of  conception  and  object  origi- 
nates. Prior  to  the  act  of  abstraction  there  is  no 
such  distinction:  perception  and  its  object  consti- 
tute one  indivisible  act.  The  question  as  to  the 
harmony  of  conception  and  perception  is  thus 
solved,  the  moment  we  see  that  the  separation  is 
due  to  an  act  of  abstraction.  Reflection  concentrates 
itself  upon  the  act  by  which  an  object  of  perception 
arises,  and  hence  comes  to  oppose  the  conception  to 
the  object.  But  the  opposition  is  merely  relative  or 
logical,  not  real.  And  as  the  object  thus  contrasted 
with  the  act  is,  as  has  been  shown  above,  a  necessary 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


147 


product  of   intelligence,  so  also  must  be  the  act 
which  is  inseparably  bound  ui^  with  it. 

It  is  then  at  the  stage  of  reflection  that  the  dis- 
tinction of  the  unconscious  and  conscious  production 
of  intelligence  is  clearly  seen.  As  conceptions  are 
necessary  acts  of  intelligence,  they  may  be  said  to  be 
a  priori',  as  they  are  conscious  acts,  they  seem  to  be 
obtained  by  abstraction  from  objects  given  inde- 
pendently of  intelligence  and  may  be  termed  a  pos- 
teriori. The  distinction  is  a  purely  relative  one. 
For  philosophy  all  reality  is  a  priori,  in  the  sense  of 
being  a  manifestation  of  the  activity  of  intelligence; 
from  the  point  of  view  of  reflection  all  knowledge, 
as  the  product  of  the  unconscious  activity  of  intelli- 
gence, is  a  posteriori,  or  empirical.  To  draw  a  broad 
line  of  demarcation  between  conceptions  and  percep- 
tions is  utterly  indefensible;  the  distinction  exists 
only  for  the  individurl  who  has  not  gone  beyond  the 
stage  of  reflection,  and  is  forever  done  away  in  a 
philosophy  which  derives  knowledge  from  the  origi- 
nal duality  of  self-consciousness.  Schelling  claims 
that  this  view  of  reflection  exhibits  the  true  nature 
of  the  categories  shown  by  Kant  to  be  implied  in 
experience.  Their  mechanism  cannot  be  derived,  as 
even  Kant  holds,  from  the  purely  formal  functions 
of  judgment.  That  mechanism  can  be  explained 
only  from  the  relation  of  the  categories  to  inner 


148   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

and  outer  sense.  It  is  pointed  out  by  Kant  as  a 
striking  peculiarity  of  the  dynamical  categories  — 
comprehending  substance,  cause  and  reciprocity  as 
the  modes  of  relation,  and  possibility,  actuality  and 
necessity,  the  forms  of  modality  —  that  each  has  a 
correlate;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mathemati- 
cal categories  of  quantity  and  quality  have  no  such 
correlates.  But  this  is  at  once  explained  when  we 
see  that  in  the  dynamical  categories  inner  and  outer 
sense  are  as  yet  unseparated,  while  quality  and 
quantity,  the  mathematical  categories,  are  connected 
respectiv1?ly  with  the  inner  sense  and  the  outer 
sense.  Substance  and  accident,  for  example,  is  that 
mode  of  activity  by  which  intelligence  determines 
a,n  object  in  space  whose  accidents  are  in  time, 
although  this  distinction  is  not  drawn  by  intelli- 
gence at  the  stage  of  perception.  Quality  again  is 
the  intensity  of  a  feeling  viewed  as  in  time  alone, 
and  quantity  the  extension  of  an  object  viewed  as 
only  in  space.  Again,  the  fact  that  in  each  class 
there  are  three  categories,  of  which  the  two  first  are 
opposed  to  one  another,  while  the  third  is  the  syn- 
thesis of  the  other  two,  proves  that  the  mechanism 
of  the  categories  rests  upon  a  higher  opposition. 
And  as  this  higher  opposition  does  not  present  itself 
at  the  stand-point  of  reflection  or  analysis  —  since 
analysis  cannot  go  beyond  the  mere  form  of  rela- 


THEORETICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


149 


tion  —  there  must  be  an  opposition  which  belongs  to 
a  higher  sphere,  or  is  the  condition  of  the  logical 
opposition.  Moreover,  this  opposition  runs  through 
all  the  categories,  and  hence  there  must  without 
doubt  be  only  one  fundamental  category.  This  cate- 
gory we  should  expect  to  be  that  of  relation,  since 
this  is  the  only  one  which  we  can  derive  from  the 
original  mechanism  of  perception.  And  this  can 
actually  be  proved,  Apart  from  reflection  the 
objective  world  is  not  determined  by  the  mathemati- 
cal categories.  No  object,  for  example,  is  a  unity  in 
itself,  but  only  in  relation  to  a  single  subjUt,  which 
at  once  perceives  and  reflects  on  its  perception.  On 
the  other  hand,  apart  from  any  explicit  reflection  on 
the  activity  of  thought,  the  objective  world,  to  be 
known  at  all,  must  be  determined  in  the  way  of 
snbstance  and  accident.  Hence  the  mathematical 
categories  are  dependent  upon  or  presuppose  the 
dynamical  categories.  The  former  can  only  repre- 
sent as  separate  that  which  by  the  latter  is  repre- 
sented as  united,  since  they  belong  to  the  inner  and 
outer  sense  as  such,  and  therefore  only  originate  at 
the  stage  of  reflection.  The  same  conclusion  may 
be  reached  even  more  simply  if  we  consider  that,  in 
the  original  mechanism  of  perception,  the  third  of 
each  of  the  two  groups  of  mathematical  categories 
always    presupposes    the    category    of    reciprocity. 


( 


150    SCHELLINO'S  TRANSCBNDRNTAL  lUKALIMM. 

The  third  category  of  quantiiy,  that  of  totality,  is 
not  thinkable  apart  from  the  recipronal  activity  of 
objects  on  one  another,  nor  does  the  third  category 
of  quality,  that  of  limitation,  apply  to  iin  individual 
object,  but  only  to  two  or  move  objicts  standing  to 
each  other  in  the  relation  of  reciprocity.  The  fun- 
damental categories  are  therefore  the  categoriei*  of 
relation.  Those  of  modality  only  come  into  opera- 
tion at  the  stage  of  reflection.  PosKibility,  actuality 
and  necessity  express  merely  a  relation  of  the  object 
to  the  complete  faculty  of  knowledge  (inner  and 
outer  seiise)  so  that  they  do  not  dotin'niiue  the 
objective  world  in  any  new  way.  Just  m  the  cate- 
gories of  relation  are  the  highest  in  actual  percep- 
tion, so  the  categories  of  modality  are  the  highest  in 
relation  to  knowledge  as  a  whole.  Whence  it  is 
evident  that  they  do  not  present  themselves  origi- 
nally in  perception. 

By  following  knowledge  through  all  iti  phases  we 
have  come  back  to  the  opposition  of  intelligence 
and  nature,  subject  and  object,  from  which  theoreti- 
cal philosophy  begins.  By  means  of  transcendental 
abstraction  the  individual  is  capable  of  raising 
himself  above  all  objects  of  perception,  and  contem- 
plating himself  as  purely  active  in  relation  to 
knowledge.  Still  the  world  remains  for  him  some- 
thing which  seems  to  be  independent  of  intelligence, 


THEORETICAL   PIllIiOROPHT. 


151 


we 
lence 
Ireti* 
ntal 
sing 
Iteni- 
to 
>me- 
mce, 


and  must  so  remain  until  for  tlie  individual,  as  for 
philosophy,  it  is  seen  to  be  the  product  of  intel- 
ligence itself.  This  insight  cannot,  however,  be 
gained  in  a  new  act  of  knowledge,  since  the  process 
of  knowledge  is  now  complete;  hence,  starting 
from  the  free  activity  of  intelligence,  we  must  see 
hov/  the  ultimate  problem  of  philosophy  —  the  abso- 
lute identity  of  subject  and  object  —  fares  when 
considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  Practical  Phi- 
losophy. 


CHAPTER  71. 


PRACTICAL  FFILOSOPHY, 

"1"N  the  theoretical  part  of  his  system,  Schelling 
■*"  has  shown,  by  a  consideration  of  the  various 
ideal  phases  through  which  knowledge  may  be  said 
to  pass,  that  an  ultimate  explanation  of  intelligence, 
and  therefore  even  of  knowledge,  must  be  sought  in 
the  nature  of  Will.  Intelligence,  regarded  as 
merely  theoretical,  never  goes  beyond  the  conception 
of  reality  as  something  more  or  less  alien  to  itself. 
It  cannot  indeed  be  said  that  in  knowledge  we 
regard  ourselves  as  passively  apprehending  a  world 
of  objects,  exis*^'-^^  apart  by  themselves  and  acting 
on  our  intelligence  in  a  purely  external  or  mechani- 
cal way.  Such  a  view  is  the  distorted  explanation 
which  is  put  forward  by  the  dogmatist  to  explain 
knowledge.  Not  to  speak  of  those  objections  that 
have  already  been  made  against  this  uncritical  and 
unthinkable  hypothesis,  it  utterly  fails  to  account 
for  the  fact  of  intelligence  as  active  or  willing  and 
as  displaying  its  activity  in  a  world  of  real  objects, 
which  passively  submit  to  be  moulded  by  it.  It  is 
no  explanation  of  the  consciousness  of  self  as  de- 
termining itself,  or  at  least  as  apparently  determin- 


PRACTICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


163 


ing  itself,  to  say  that  by  abstracting  from  this  and 
that  object  we  become  conscious  of  our  own  prac* 
tical  activity,  for  it  is  just  this  power  of  abstraction 
which  demands  explanation.  The  perception  of  self- 
activity  is  therefore  inexplicable,  so  long  as  we  re- 
main at  the  point  of  view  of  knowledge.  We  can 
only  explain  the  knowledge  of  our  own  mental 
activity  as  it  exists  for  the  reflective  consciousness 
by  supposing  an  absolute  power  of  self-determina- 
tion which  is  utterly  independent  of  any  act  of 
mere  knowing.  Even  at  the  highest  stage  of  knowl- 
edge we  do  not  become  conscious  of  the  activity 
of  intelligence  as  such.  All  knowledge  implies  the 
direction  of  intelligence  outward  upon  objects,  and 
hence  there  can  be  for  knowledge  no  perception 
of  intelligence  as  self-determining  or  practically 
active.  The  self  is  not  one  of  the  possible  objects 
of  knowledge:  it  is  not  simply  a  part  of  nature, 
but  a  pure  self-activity  which  is  the  condition  oT 
the  knowledge  of  nature.  It  is  thus  evident  that 
to  explain  intelligence  as  knowing  we  must  go 
beyond  it  to  intelligence  as  willing. 

Our  investigation  into  the  nature  of  knowledge 
has  prepared  us  for  this  conclusion.  As  the  original 
condition  of  knowledge  we  found  that  we  had  to 
assume  a  primary  act  of  self-limitation  by  which 
the  knowledge  of  objects  was  made  possible  at  all. 


154     SniELLINO's  TRANSCENDENTAL  IPEALI8M. 

The  fundamental  proposition  of  idealism  is  that 
nothing  can  exist  for  intelligence  which  is  not  its 
own  product.  There  can  be  as  object  of  intelli- 
gence nothing  that  is  not  in  relation  to  intelligence, 
and  intelligence  can  be  acted  upon  by  nothing  but 
itself.  To  effect  the  transition  from  the  sphere 
of  knowledge  to  that  of  practical  activity,  we  have 
again  found  ourselves  compelled  to  suppose  that 
intelligence  is  free  or  self-determined.  It  must 
not  be  supposed,  however,  that  we  have  been  mov- 
ing round  in  a  circle  without  making  any  progress. 
The  primary  act  of  self-consciousness  or  self-limi- 
tation is  a  hypothesis  which  the  idealist  philosopher 
is  compelled  to  assume,  in  order  to  explain  the 
fact  of  knowledge;  tlie  absolute  act  of  abstraction, 
by  which  a  perception  of  intelligence  as  will  is 
obtained,  is  one  that  can  be  shown  to  be  possible 
for  intelligence  itself.  Hence  there  is  a  contrast 
between  the  original  act  of  self-consciousness  and 
the  act  of  self-determination  which  is  now  under 
consideration.  Both  are  indeed  acts  of  self-de- 
termination, or  the  absolute  origination  of  an 
activity  which,  as  dependent  upon  nothing  foreign, 
is  perfectly  free.  There  are,  however,  two  points 
in  which  the  original  act  by  which  intelligence  in 
limiting  itself  places  an  objective  world  in  oppo- 
sition to  itself,  and  the  act  by  which  it  raises  itself 


PRACTICAL    PUILOSOIMIY. 


155 


i  that 

lot  its 

inteUi- 

igence, 

ig  but 

sphere 

re  have 

se   that 

t  must 

sn  mov- 

ii'ogress. 

elf-Umi- 

losopher 

lain   the 

itraction, 
will   is 
possible 
contrast 
ess  and 
,w  under 
self-de- 
of   an 
foreign, 
0  points 
igence  in 
in  oppo- 
Lises  itself 


above  all  objects,  outer  and  inner,  differ.  In  the 
first  place,  the  original  act  of  limitation  does  not 
enter  into  the  consciousness  of  the  individual  as 
knowing,  while  the  act  of  abstraction,  by  which 
intelligence  contemp'  vtes  itself,  is  not  only  an  ac- 
tivity, but  is  recognized  by  the  individual  as  such. 
Secondly,  the  first  act,  as  not  entering  into  explicit 
consciousness,  is  independent  of  time,  whereas  the 
second  act  occurs  at  a  definite  point  in  the  evolu* 
tion  of  self-consciousness,  and  is  therefore  in  time. 
But,  notwithstanding  these  points  of  contrast,  self- 
determination  or  will  manifestly  lies  at  the  basis 
of  all  objectivity,  whether  conscious  or  unconscious ; 
and  hence  will  is  in  a  peculiar  sense  of  the  very 
essence  of  intelligence.  There  could  be  no  knowl- 
edge at  all  did  not  intelligence  determine  itself  to 
activity,  and  hence  will  is  the  condition  of  knowl- 
edge. The  activity  by  which  a  world  of  objects 
is  perceived,  and  the  activity  by  which  intelligence 
consciously  determines  itself  to  action,  are  at  bot- 
tom identical. 

So  much  is  plain,  but  a  difficulty  arises  when 
we  go  on  to  enquire  into  the  nature  of  that  con- 
scious self-determination  which  is  of  the  essence 
of  practical  intelligence.  In  our  explanation  of 
the  nature  of  knowledge  it  was  sufficient  to  point 
out  that  there  can  be  no  object  in  relation  to  in- 


M 


156   mchellinu'h  trankcknuunial  idealism. 


ielligence    that   is    not    actively   produced    by   it. 
Thus  we  have  determined  the  condition?  of  intelli- 
gence in  general.    But  with  the  transition  to  the 
practical  part  of  philosophy,  a  new  difficulty  arises. 
The  innermost  nature  of  intelligence  is  will,  but 
will  cannot  be  explained  apart  from  its  relation  to 
specific   objects.     The  absolute   act  of  abstraction 
by   which    intelligence    rises  above  all   objects  of 
knowledge  is  the  condition  of  the  explicit  distinc- 
tion of  intelligence  and  nature;  in  other  words  it, 
and  it  alone,  explains  how  there  can  be  any  oppo- 
sition   for     intelligence    of    the    active    and     the 
knowing  self.     This  act   as  taking  place  in  time 
demands  explanation,  while  on  the  other  hand  as 
the  supreme  condition   of   all   reality,  outer   and 
inner,  it  apparently  admits  of  no  explanation.     To 
put  the   matter  in  a  form  that  will  probably  be 
more  easily  intelligible:  in  willing  I  contrast  my- 
self as  purely  self-determined  with  myself  as   ac- 
tively knowing   objects,   and,   thus    contemplating 
myself  as  raised  above  all  particular  perceptions, 
I  set  before  myself  an  object  as  an  ideal  which  I 
am  freely  to  realise.     But  if  all  reality  is  produced 
by  intelligence,  how  does  it  come  that  in  willing 
I  am  determined  to  a  certain  specific  object?     How 
is   the  apparent  limitation   of  my  will  to  be  ac- 
counted for?    Just  as  in  sensation,  the  first  stags 


rRACTICAL    1>IIIL0H01>IIY. 


157 


,y    it. 

itelU- 

0  t\ie 

irise«!. 

1,  but 

Lion  to 

•action 

jcts  of 

iistinc- 

jrds  it, 

y  oppo- 

ad    the 

^n  time 

iiand  as 

ier  and 
.n.  To 
lably  be 
ast  my- 
as  ac- 
iplating 
•options, 

Iwhich  I 
(toduced 

willing 
?    How 
be  ac- 
I'st  stage 


of  knowledge,  intelligence  found  itself  limited,  so 
here  the  beginning  of  will  seems  to  imply  that 
intelligence  finds  itself  determined  in  relation  to 
certain  definite  objects  which  it  seeks  to  realize. 

In  answering  this  question,  8chelling,  in  substan- 
tial agreement  with  (^ichte,  finds  the  explanation,  at 
once  of  the  fact  that  there  are  a  number  of  finite 
intelligences,  and  that  for  each  of  these  there  is  a 
world  which  is  not  only  external,  in  the  sense  of 
being  in  space,  but  also  as  being  independent  of 
each  finite  intelligence  as  such,  in  the  peculiar  char- 
acter of  will  as  determining  intelligence  to  individ- 
uality. For  mere  knowledge  there  can  be  no  con- 
sciousness either  of  a  world  of  finite  intelligences 
or  of  a  world  of  objects  independent  of  any  one 
of  these  intelligences.  There  can  be  no  such  con- 
sciousness, because,  prior  to  explicit  self-conscious- 
ness, intelligence  has  made  no  separation  between 
itself  and  objects,  but  contemplates  its  own  laws  in 
the  world  that  immediately  presents  itself,  as  in  a 
mirror.  Will,  however,  as  the  determination  of  in- 
telligence in  a  specific  way  —  in  other  words,  as  the 
consciousness  by  the  individual  of  his  own  free 
activity  —  explicitly  brings  up  the  problem:  how  do 
I  become  conscious  of  my  own  self-activity  as 
limited  or  determined?  The  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem is  briefly  as  follows.     The  dogmatist  of  course 


158   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 

assumes  that  we  first  have  a  knowledge  of  other 
finite  intelligences  besides  our  own,  and  that  the 
limitation  of  the  will  of  each  is  explained  by  their 
mutual  action  and  reaction.  Inherited  disposition, 
education  and  the  force  of  circumstances  make  the 
individual  what  he  is,  and  explain  why  he  acts  as  he 
does.  Such  an  explanation  the  idealist  cannot  possi- 
bly accept.  Assuming  the  existence  of  independent 
intelligences,  which  is  the  very  thing  to  be  ex- 
plained, dogmatism  virtually  denies  all  will  or  indi- 
viduality by  asserting  that  it  is  absolutely  deter- 
mined by  something  external  to  itself.  It  need  not 
be  said  that  such  a  denial  is  of  all  absurdities  the 
most  absurd,  since  it  makes  not  only  practical 
activity  but  even  knowledge  impossible.  We  must 
therefore  in  explaining  the  limitation  of  intelli- 
gence proceed  in  exactly  the  reverse  way.  As  noth- 
ing can  be  known  for  me  which  is  out  of  relation 
to  my  thinking  activity,  so  nothing  can  be  done  by 
me  which  is  out  ( f  relation  to  my  practical  activity. 
No  other  intelligence,  human  or  divine,  can  act 
upon  me  except  in  so  far  as  I  act  on  myse.f. 
How,  then,  (1)  do  I  know  that  there  are  other  intel- 
ligences besides  myself?  and  how  (2)  can  I  be 
said  in  any  sense  to  be  acted  upon  by  them?  If 
these  two  questions  can  be  satisfactorily  answered, 
we  shall  have  explained  how  it  is  that  I,  as  an 


PRACTICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


159 


individual,  am  free  and  yet  limited  in  my  free 
activity.  (1)  The  answer  to  the  first  question  is 
implied  in  the  fact  that  in  willing  I  find  myself 
limited  to  certain  specific  ends.  In  the  conscious- 
ness of  that  limitation  I  become  conscious  of  mv- 
self  as  an  individual  and  hence  of  other  individ- 
uals as  in  relation  to  me.  I  cannot  determine 
myself  or  will  without  being  conscious  of  myself, 
and  I  cannot  be  conscious  of  myself  except  in  rela- 
tion to  other  selves.  The  consciousness  therefore  of 
myself  as  limited  implies  the  correlative  conscious- 
ness of  the  activity  of  other  selves.  (2)  But  this 
consciousness  of  self-limitation  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  any  supposed  consciousness  of  the 
direct  activity  of  other  intelligent  beings  upon  me. 
There  can  be  no  such  activity,  simply  because  no  in- 
telligence can,  so  to  speak,  go  out  of  itself  to  act 
upon  another  intelligence.  This,  however,  does  not 
hinder  that  there  should  be  an  indirect  relation  of 
diiFerent  intelligences  to  one  another,  a  relation 
which,  after  Leibnitz,  we  may  call  a  "  pre-established 
harmony."  The  world  of  nature  as  I  know  it, 
exists  only  in  relation  to  my  knowledge;  it  has  no 
independent  existence  of  its  own.  But  this  is  not 
incompatible  with  the  recognition  that  to  other 
intelligences  the  world  is  in  its  essence  the  same  as 
it  is  to  me.     What  this  common  world  is,  may  be 


I 


160   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


seen  if  we  abstract  from  the  peculiarities  of  myself 
as  an  individual.  The  world  of  nature  is  thus  for 
each  finite  intelligence  the  same  in  its  broad  out- 
lines. For  all  it  is  a  world  of  objects  in  space  and 
time,  acting  and  reacting  on  each  other,  and  form- 
ing an  organic  unity  or  system.  But  besides  this 
common  world,  there  is  for  each  individual  a  con- 
sciousness of  his  own  acts,  and  a  representation  of 
the  acts  of  others.  Thus  others  can  act  upon  me 
only  in  and  through  my  representations  of  their  acts: 
their  action  is  not  direct  but  indirect;  it  does  not 
compel  but  only  limits  me.  This  limitation  is 
therefore  compatible  with  my  freedom,  while  yet  it 
explains  the  fact  of  my  limitation  as  an  individual. 
I  cannot  be  conscious  of  myself  as  an  individual 
among  other  individuals  unless  there  is  a  common 
world  of  objects  which  presents  itself  as  the  same 
to  us  all.  Moreover,  my  individuality  must  be  con- 
stituted through  the  limitations  under  which  I  am 
placed  by  the  represented  activity  of  the  individ- 
uality of  other  individuals.  Hence  the  correlativity 
of  the  natural  talent  or  capacities  which  I  possess, 
and  the  process  of  education  to  which  I  am  sub- 
jected by  the  indirect  influence  of  others  upon  me. 
Education  in  the  widest  sense  is  the  continuous 
action  of  one  intelligence  on  another.  The  begin- 
ning of  actual  volition  as  the  starting-point  of  free 


PRACTICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


161 


myself 

lus  for 

,d  out- 

ice  and 

[  form- 

ies  this 
a  con- 
ation of 

ipon  me 

teir  acts : 

does  not 

nation   is 

ile  yet  it 

^dividual, 
idividual 
common 

|the  same 
,t  be  con- 
lich  I  am 
individ- 
relativity 
I  possess, 
am  sub- 
upon  me. 
continuous 

'he  begin- 
int  of  fvee 


and  conscious  acts  can  only  be  explained  when  we 
contemplate,  not  isolated  intelligence,  but  the  com- 
munity of  intelligences  as  constituting  the  histori- 
cal life  of  man. 

It  has  now  to  be  added  that  the  knowledge  of 
nature  as  objective  or  independent  of  individual 
consciousness,  is  explicable  solely  from  the  nature 
of  practical  intelligence.  Knowledge,  of  itself,  is 
merely  the  presentation  of  objects  in  space  and 
time;  the  origination  for  intelligence  of  inde- 
pendent realities  is  due  to  will.  That  there  are 
such  realities  can  only  mean  that  nature  exists 
even  when  it  is  not  perceived  by  me,  not  that  it 
exists  as  a  thing  in  itself.  The  only  objectivity 
which  the  world  can  have  for  the  ind'"vidual  con- 
sists in  its  being  perceived  by  other  individuals. 
The  pre-establicjhed  1  armony  between  the  repre- 
sentations of  different  individuals,  which  we  have 
shown  to  be  im, ''ed  in  the  jonsciousness  of  the 
individual  as  self-determined,  is  therefore  the  only 
condition  under  which  the  world  can  become  ob- 
jective for  the  individual.  "  For  the  individual 
other .  intelligences  arc  as  it  .vere  the  bearers  of 
the  universe,  and  there  are  as  many  indestructible 
mirrors  of  the  objective  world  ns.  there  are  intelli- 
gences."    A    single    individual    alone    by   himself 

would  not  only  not  become  conscious  of  his  own 
11 


! 


102    soiielling's  transcendental  idealism. 


freedom,  but  he  would  not  even  become  conscious 
of  an  objective  world.  Will  or  self-deter mird- 
tion  is  the  necessary  condition  of  our  perception 
of  the  world  of  nature  as  we  know  it. 

It  has  been  shown  that  in  intelligence  as  will 
is  to  be  found  the  explanation  of  intelligence  as 
knowing;  that  the  individual  only  knows  himself 
as  individual  in  relation  to  other  self-conscious 
beings;  and  that  the  independence  or  objectivity 
of  nature,  in  the  only  sense  in  which  it  can  be 
admitted  by  a  consistent  idealism,  consists  in  its 
relations  to  other  intelligences.  What  has  now 
to  be  considered  is  the  exact  nature  of  will  or 
practical  intelligence.  The  first  point  to  which 
Schelling  directs  his  attention  is  the  relation  of 
will  to  the  external  world.  By  a  free  act  of 
self-determination  intelligence  raises  itself  entirely 
above  the  world  of  knowable  or  perceptible  objects. 
This  act  can  become  the  object  of  explicit  conscious- 
ness only  if  it  is  directed  upon  some  definite  object 
of  perception,  which  shall  serve  as  the  visible  expres- 
sion of  it.  Pure  self-determination,  in  other  words, 
is  thinkable  only  in  contrast  to  some  object  pre- 
sented in  perception,  and  only  so  can  it  be  trans- 
lated into  an  actual  volition.  The  act  of  volition, 
however,  cannot  be  absolutely  identical  with  the 
object  of  perception,  for  in  that  case  it  would  be  a 


PRACTICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


103 


scious 

eption 

IS  will 
nee  as 
himself 
nscious 
ectivity 
can  be 
5  in  its 
lias   now 
will  or 
0   which 
Lation  of 
3    act   of 
entirely. 
e  objects, 
jonscious- 
lite  object 
e  cxpres- 
ter  words, 
)ject  pre- 
be  trans- 
f  volition, 
with   the 
rould  he  a 


perception;  the  act  q,nd  the  object  must  remain 
distinct  from  each  other.  As  we  saw  in  consider- 
ing the  reflective  stage  of  knowledge,  an  act  taken 
by  itself  is  a  conception  or  function  of  thought. 
To  say,  therefore,  that  the  function  and  the  object 
are  distinct,  is  to  say  that  the  latter  is  external  to 
the  former;  or,  what  is  virtually  the  same  thing, 
that  an  object  is  external  for  me  just  because  my 
will  is  determined  in  relation  to  it. 

This  peculiarity  of  will,  that  it  is  always  directed 
upon  an  object  external  to  itself,  gives  rise  to  a 
contradiction  which  must  be  solved.  On  the  one 
hand,  I  am  conscious  of  my  freedom  as  pure  self- 
activity  or  infinite,  while  on  the  other  hand  that 
self-activity  can  only  manifest  itself  as  in  relation 
to  a  definite  object,  or  as  finite;  how,  then,  can 
the  infinity  of  will  be  reconciled  with  its  seeming 
finitude?  ,Will  does  not  destroy  the  productive  ac- 
tivity of  perception,  and  hence,  as  having  a  world 
opposed  to  it,  it  cannot  but  seem  to  be  limited; 
the  two  spheres  touch,  but  the  one  is  outside  of 
the  other.  In  willing  I  am  free;  in  the  compulsion 
to  accept  the  world  of  objects  as  it  presents  itself 
in  my  perception  I  am  apparently  necessitated  or 
limited.  It  results  from  this  contradiction  that 
there  must  be  an  activity  which  floats  between  the 
infinite  and  the  finite,  the  object  of  which  must  be 


itl 


1 


164   schelling's  transcendental  jhkauhm. 

in  one  aspect  unlimited,  and  in  another  aspect 
limited.  This  activity,  which  was  by  Kant  called 
reason,  and  by  Schelling  is  n^mod  imagination,  is 
neither  purely  theoretical  nor  purely  practical,  but 
is  the  mediator  between  the  two.  The  products 
of  this  activity  are  ideas,  which  mu«t  be  carefully 
distinguished  from  the  conceptiun^  of  the  under- 
standing. The  understanding  is  an  activity  which 
manifests  itself  only  in  the  dotorinination  of  specific 
objects  of  perception,  and  henue  it  is  a  finite  or 
limited  activity.  Imagination  is  at  once  finite  and 
infinite.  If  therefore  we  assimilate  an  idea  to  a 
conception,  we  destroy  the  infinite  aspect  of  the 
former,  and  the  result,  as  Kant  has  clearly  shown, 
is  a  series  of  contradictions  or  antinomies.  This 
free  self-activity  or  will  is  finiti  when  viewed  in 
relation  to  a  particular  object  which  is  willed,  but 
viewed  as  self-activity,  it  is  infinite  or  capable  of 
transcending  all  finite  objects  of  volition.  The 
source  of  antinomy  is  therefore  where  Kant  placed 
it,  viz.:  ia  the  limitation  of  the  infinite  activity  of 
freedoi-n  to  limited  objects.  When  we  reflect  on 
the  relation  of  an  idea  to  a  definite  object,  we 
may  say  that  it  is  finite;  when  we  reflect  on  the 
activity  itself,  we  see  that  it  is  infinite;  and  this 
just  means  that  the  object  of  an  idea  is  neither 
the  one  nor  the  other,  but  botlj  in  one. 


4M. 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


165 


r  aspect 

\i  called 

lation,  is 

tical,  but 

products 

carefully 

lie  under- 

rity  which 

of  specific 

I  finite  or 

3  finite  and 
idea  to  a 

[)ect  of   the 

,rly  shown, 

jmies.  This 
viewed  in 
willed,  but 

•  capable  of 
ition.  The 
Kant  placed 

^e  activity  of 

e  reflect  on 

object,  we 

leflect  on  the 

Lte;    and  this 

la  is  neither 


Ine. 


In  willing,  a  transition  must  be  made  from  the 
idea  to  a  determinate  object  —  a  transition  i.  e.  in 
thought,  not  in  reality.  Hence  the  idea  of  an 
object  that  is  neither  finite  nor  infinite,  but  is 
simply  the  transition  from  the  one  to  the  other, 
implies  an  ideal,  which  is  a  mediating  element 
bearing  the  same  relation  to  action  as  the  schema 
to  conception.  By  means  of  this  ideal  there  arises 
for  intelligence  an  opposition  between  the  real  or 
external  world  as  given  in  perception,  and  the 
object  which  is  set  up  by  the  idealizing  activity. 
This  opposition  takes  the  form  of  impulse,  which, 
as  a  state  of  feeling,  implies  like  all  feelings  a 
contradiction  that  demands  solution.  This  felt  con^ 
tradiction  is  the  condition  of  that  free  activity 
which  intelligence  without  reflection  seeks  to  tran- 
scend. Thus  will  is  directed  outwardly  by  means 
of  impulse,  and  this  impulse  arises  immediately 
from  the  contradiction  between  the  idealizing  and 
the  perceptive  self,  the  object  aimed  at  being  the 
restoration  of  that  self- identity  which  has  been 
destroyed. 

How,  then,  we  have  to  ask,  does  this  impulse  lead 
to  the  transition  from  the  mere  idea  of  an  object  to 
its  actual  realization  by  will?  How  can  a  free  act 
determine  anything  in  the  real  or  objective  world? 
From  the  explanation  of  the  nature  of  the  idea,  it 


166     SCHKLLINO'S  TRANSCKNDKNTAL  IDKAMSM. 

will  be  readily  understood  that  it  can  never  be  real- 
ized, but  consists  in  the  continual  transcendence  of 
the  limits  in  which  intelligence  in  acting  finds  itself 
placed.  The  ideal,  on  the  other  hand,  as  the  specific 
determination  of  the  idea,  is  continually  being 
realized  at  each  stage  of  action;  it  is  simply  the 
particular  limited  end  set  before  intelligence  by 
itself.  The  realization  of  the  ideal  leaves  the  idea 
unrealized,  and  hence  the  f^onsciousness  of  freedom 
as  the  persistence  of  self-consciousness  is  made  pos- 
sible. In  free  activity  there  is  a  succession  of  per- 
ceptions, but  the  succession  is  related  as  means  and 
end,  not  as  cause  and  effect.  Now  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  to  transcendental  idealism  the  object- 
ive world  is  not  a  thing-in-itself,  but  is  the  system 
of  perceptions  in  which  intelligence  manifests  its 
own  laws.  To  say  that  a  change  takes  place  in  the 
objective  world,  is  simply  to  say  that  a  change  occurs 
in  my  perceptions.  The  demand  that  something 
should  be  determined  in  the  objective  world,  there- 
fore means  that  by  a  free  act  in  me  something  should 
be  determined  in  my  external  perception.  That  my 
free  activity  has  causality  thus  means  that  I  perceive 
it  as  having  causality.  Now  the  distinction  between 
intelligence  and  will  is  a  merely  relative  one,  for 
there  must  be  a  point  of  view  from  which  ilviy  are 
identical.      The    distinction    is   one   made   by   our 


PRACTICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


167 


external  reflection.  In  intelligence  itself  the  I 
which  acts  and  the  I  which  knows  are  one  and  the 
same;  the  distinction  is  merely  that  the  I  as  will  is 
an  object  to  itself,  while  the  I  as  knowing  is  not; 
this  in  fact  is  the  sole  reason  why  we  oppose  the  one 
to  the  other.  The  self  which  perceives  is  the  same 
as  the  self  which  acts,  the  difference  being  that  the 
former  simply  perceives,  while  the  latter  perceives 
itself  as  perceiving.  It  is  in  this  explicit  subject- 
objectivity  that  the  relative  distinction  of  intelli- 
gence and  will  consists;  otherwise,  the  active  self 
would  appear  simply  as  knowing.  Conversely,  the 
self  knows  itself  as  active  in  perception  only  be- 
cause it  not  only  perceives,  but  contemplates  itself 
as  perceiving.  The  question,  therefore,  is  not  how 
the  self  as  acting  comes  into  contact  with  the  self  as 
thinking  the  outer  world.  There  could  be  no  ex- 
ternal perception,  were  there  no  internal  activity  of 
the  self.  My  activity  in  forming  an  object  must  at 
the  same  time  be  a  perception,  and  conversely,  my 
perception  must  be  an  activity.  That  this  is  not  at 
once  apparent  arises  from  the  nature  of  perception, 
which  is  not,  taken  by  itself,  a  perceiving  but  a  per- 
ceived; hence  the  self  which  is  still  at  the  phenom- 
enal point  of  view  is  not  aware  of  the  identity  of  the 
perceiving  and  the  acting  self.  The  change  which  fol- 
lows from  a  free  act  in  the  outer  world  must  be  in 


V>JM'7"'^OJ8W"y 


168     SCIIELLINa'fi  TRANSCEND KKTAL  1DKALI8M. 

conformity  with  the  laws  of  productive  perception, 
and  08  if  freedom  had  no  share  in  it.  Productive 
perception  acts  as  if  it  were  completely  isolated, 
and  produces  in  accordari'  '^  with  its  own  laws  what 
follows  as  a  change.  The  reason  why  perception 
does  not  here  present  itself  as  an  activity,  is  that 
the  ideal  activity,  conception  or  function  is  opposed 
to  the  object  instead  of  being  united  with  it.  But 
that  the  conception  or  activity  precedes  the  object, 
is  a  matter  of  appearance.  And  if  the  conception 
does  not  really  precede  the  object,  the  only  objective 
is  the  self  as  actively  perceiving.  Just,  therefore, 
as  it  might  be  said,  that  when  1  believed  I  was  per- 
ceiving I  was  properly  acting,  so  it  can  now  be  said 
that  when  I  believe  I  am  acting  on  the  outer  world  I 
am  properly  perceiving.  Everything  which  appears 
in  action  as  outside  of  the  perceiving  self  belongs 
only  to  the  appearance  of  the  sole  objective,  the  per- 
ceiving self;  and  conversely,  when  we  abstract 
from  the  active  self  everything  which  belongs  to  the 
appearance,  nothing  remains  but  the  perception.* 

This  may  be  put  in  another  way.  Transcen- 
dental idealism  has  shown  that  there  is  not,  as 
is  commonly  supposed,  any  transition  from  the 
objective  world  of  nature  to  the  subjective  world 

•  What  Schelling  \a  here  attempting  to  show  is  that  in  every  veil, 
tion  proper  there  is  an  element  of  perception  implied.  When  I  will 
to  raise  my  arm  (to  take  a  very  simple  case)  the  volition  is  a  thought, 
the  actual  movement  a  perception. 


PRACTICAL   P1IIL080PIIT. 


169 


)tion, 
ictive 
lated, 
what 
eption 
s  that 
pposed 
But 
object, 
jeption 
ijective 
srefore, 
jas  per- 
be  said 
world  I 
ippears 
elongs 
e  per- 
bstraet 
to  the 
ion." 
nscen- 
inot,  as 
in    the 
world 


Jvery  voll- 
len  I  will 
,  thought. 


of  mind,  but  that  the  objective  world  is  simply 
the  subjective  which  has  become  an  object  to  itself. 
A  similar  difficulty  arises  when  we  endeavor  to 
explain  action.  For  in  action  there  seems  to  be 
a  transition  fr«  the  subjective  to  the  objective 
world;  in  eve  ^t  '  conception  is  freely  drawn, 
which  is  to  pa^  •  into  a  world  of  nature  ap- 

parently independent  ot  us,  and  yet  really  relative 
to  us.  How,  then,  is  the  seeming  transition  to 
be  explained  consistently  with  the  fundamental 
principle  of  idealism?  Only  on  the  supposition 
that  the  world  of  nature  becomes  objective  for  me 
by  means  of  action.  That  we  act  freely  or  inde- 
pendently of  all  external  action  upon  us  of  an 
independent  world  of  nature,  and  that  the  world 
is  in  some  sense  independent  of  us  —  these  two 
propositions  must  be  synthetically  united.  Now, 
if  the  world  is  simply  our  perception,  the  world 
will  become  objective  for  us  when  our  perception 
becomes  objective.  Hence  it  will  be  readily  under- 
stood how  it  can  be  said,  that  "  what  appears  to  us 
as  an  act  on  the  outer  world  is  from  the  idealistic 
point  of  view  simply  a  developed  perception."  Any 
change  which  is  produced  in  the  outer  world  by 
an  act  of  mine  is,  looked  at  in  itself,  a  perception 
like  every  other  perception.  The  perception  is  here 
the  objective;   that  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the 


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23  WEST  MAIN  STREET 

WEBSTER,  N.Y.  U5M 

(716)I72-4S03 


'^ 


RBasHon 


170  sohelling's  tbanscendental  idealism. 


phenomenon,  that  which  in  the  perception  belongs 
to  the  phenomenon,  is  the  act  on  a  sensible  world 
thought  as  independent.  Objectively  or  really  there 
is  no  transition  from  the  subject  to  the  object,  just 
as  little  as  there  is  a  transition  from  the  object  to 
the  subject.  The  point  here  is  simply  that  I  can* 
not  appear  to  myself  as  perceiving  without  perceiv- 
ing a  subjective  as  passing  over  into  an  objective. 
The  only  diiBculty  then  is  to  explain  how  the  change 
of  that  which  objectively  is  perception,  into  an  act 
as  it  presents  itself  phenomenally,  can  be  made. 
This  may  be  explained  by  an  illustration.  Suppose 
thai  by  my  causality  a  change  occurs  in  the  outer 
world.  If  we  reflect  merely  on  the  fact  of  this 
change,  we  must  certainly  say  that  I  produce  the 
change,  since  there  is  for  me  nothing  in  the  outer 
world  at  all  which  is  not  due  to  my  productive 
activity.  This  production  of  a  change,  so  far  as 
it  is  a  perception  —  and  in  reality  it  is  nothing 
else  —  is  not  preceded  by  any  conception  of  change. 
But  if  I  make  the  act  of  producing  the  change  an 
object  of  reflection,  the  conception  of  change  must 
precede  the  change.  The  object  which  here  is  to 
appear  is  the  act  of  production  itself.  In  actual 
production  no  conception  precedes  the  perception: 
the  precedence  is  purely  ideal,  or  exists  only  for 


-PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


171 


the  self  as  perceiving  itself;   in  other  words,  it  is 
only  an  appearance. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  evidently  follows  that 
all  action  roust  take  place  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  nature.  Hence  I  cannot  know  myself  as 
acting  except  by  the  mediation  of  matter,  and  more 
particularly  of  that  part  of  matter  which  I  recog- 
nize as  identical  with  myself,  viz:  my  own  organ- 
ism. And  the  impulse  which  we  have  seen  to  be 
the  cause  of  action  must  also  appear  as  a  natural 
impulse,  acting  irrespectively  of  my  freedom  and 
apparently  compelling  me  to  act  by  the  pain  of 
want.  So  also  the  change  in  the  outer  world,  in 
which  action  consists,  must  appear  as  the  conse- 
quence of  all  the  external  conditions  which  make 
it  possible.  The  inevitable  conclusion  seems  to  be 
that  I  am  not  free  at  all,  but  under  the  compulsion 
of  material  law.  If  freedom  is  to  be  saved  there 
must,  therefore,  be  some  other  conception  of  will 
than  that  of  an  action  upon  the  external  world. 
Will  is  something  more  than  this:  its  distinctive 
characteristic  in  fact  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
determination  of  an  external  object  by  action,  but 
in  pure  self-determination,  or  the  self  as  determin- 
ing itself.  It  is  in  the  ideal  activity,  as  directed 
upon-  the  pure  Ego,  that  the  nature  of  will  becomes 
known.     This  pure  self-determination  constitutes 


I   r 


,'iimiiMftMifJiiiitsumi'- 


172    SCHBLLINO'S  TBANSCBNDBKTAL  IDEALISM. 


■ 


the  common  essence  in  which  all  intelligences  are 
identical.  Self-determination  is  the  primary  con- 
dition of  all  consciousness.  The  activity  by  which 
the  self  becomes  an  explicit  olrject  of  intelligence 
cannot  be  deduced  theoretically,  but  only  by  a 
postulate,  i.e.,  by  a  demand  to  act.  The  self  ought 
to  will  nothing  but  its  own  self-determination. 
This  "categorical  imperative"  is  the  moral  law 
which  commands  us,  in  Kant's  words,  to  "  will 
only  that  which  all  intelligences  are  capable  of 
willing."  As  that  which  all  intelligences  can  will 
is  pure  self-determination  or  autonomy,  it  is  by 
the  moral  law  that  the  self  as  such  becomes  its 
own  object.  That  law  does  not  apply  to  me  as 
a  particular  individual,  but  only  to  me  as  intel- 
ligence in  general  —  to  that  which  is  objective  or 
eternal  in  me.  But  the  moral  law  must  not  re- 
main as  a  pure  idea,  but  must  be  realised  by  the 
individual  in  the  sphere  of  nature;  it  must,  in 
other  words,  be  brought  into  relation  to  natural 
impulse,  which  of  itself  works  blindly  like  pro- 
ductive perception.  The  'ect  of  this  impulse  is 
in  the  widest  sense  hap^iaess.  As  natural  im- 
pulse there  can  be  no  command  to  be  happy,  for 
that  which  takes  place  according  to  a  law  of  na- 
ture needs  not  to  be  commanded. 
The  immediate  activity  whose  object  is  pure  self- 


M. 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


173 


loei  are 
try  con* 
ly  which 
iUigence 
ly  by  a 
If  ought 
ninaiion. 
oral  law 
to  •♦  will 
ipable  of 
can  will 
,  it  is  by 
icomes  iti 
to  me  as 

as  intel- 
ijective  or 
gt  not  re- 
ed by  the 

must,  in 
;o  natural 

like  pro- 
impulse  is 
itural  im- 
bappyi  for 

aw  of  na- 

pure  self- 


determination  can  only  come  into  consciousness  as 
the  opposite  of  that  merely  natural  impulse  which 
is  blindly  directed  on  an  external  object.  But  both 
activities  —  that  which  is  commanded  by  pure  will, 
and  that  which  is  prompted  by  natural  impulse  — 
must  present  themselves  in  consciousness  as  equally 
possible.  This  opposition  is  therefore  the  condition 
under  which  alone  the  absolute  act  of  will  can  be- 
come an  object  to  the  self;  it  is  that  which  makes 
volition  possible,  and  hence  volition  is  not  the 
original  act  of  will  itself,  but  the  manifestation  of 
absolute  will  in  the  act  of  freedom  which  has  be- 
come an  object  for  the  self.  Of  will  as  absolute  we 
cannot  say  that  it  is  either  free  or  not  free,  since  it 
can  only  act  according  to  the  law  of  its  own  nature ; 
but  as  volition,  presenting  itself  as  independent  of 
something  foreign  to  itself,  we  can  say  that  the  self 
as  empirical  may  be  free.  Freedom  thus  consists  in 
independence  on  natural  impulse,  or  identification 
with  the  moral  law  as  a  categorical  imperative. 
Thus,  without  directly  intending  it,  we  have  solved 
the  problem  of  transcendental  freedom.  The  ques- 
tion of  freedom  has  no  bearing  on  the  absolute 
Ego,  which  cannot  but  be  pure  self-determina- 
tion, but  only  upon  the  empirical  Ego ;  and  hence 
it  is  only  as  empirical  that  the  will  can  be  said  to  be 
free.    The  will  in  so  far  as  it  is  absolute  is  lifted 


iSM«^Wt*««»«»«^^.,^, 


174  8Chblli>;g*8  transobndbntal  idealism. 

above  freedom;  it  is  not  sabject  to  law,  bnt  is  itself 
the  source  of  all  law.  Only  as  it  manifests  itself 
does  it  appear  as  volition,  and  this  manifestation  of 
the  absolute  will  is  freedom  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  term.  And  since  the  self  in  its  free  action 
must  contemplate  itself  to  infinity  as  absolute  will, 
and  in  its  innermost  nature  is  nothing  other  than 
this  contemplation  of  absolute  will,  the  manifes- 
tation of  it  is  as  certain  and  undoubted  as  is  the 
reality  of  the  self.  Conversely,  volition  can  only 
be  conceived  as  the  phenomenal  appearance  of  an 
absolute  will  under  the  limits  of  finitude,  and 
hence  it  is  a  perpetual  revelation  of  the  absolute 
will  in  us.  And  as  the  moral  law  and  volition 
are  equally  essential  conditions  of  self-conscious- 
ness, intelligence  in  its  practical  activity  as  will 
has  come  to  have  before  it  a  world  whicl^  it  dis- 
tinguishes from  itself,  and  which  it  yet  contemplates 
as  determined  by  itself. 

To  complete  the  practical  part  of  Transcendental 
Philosophy  it  only  remains  to  show  the  bearing 
of  the  conception  of  freedom  which  has  just  been 
set  forth  upon  the  conception  of  rights,  the  state 
and  history. 

We  have  seen  that  impulse,  the  activity  of  the 
self  as  tending  outward,  and  self-determination  or 
the  action  of  self  upon  itself,  are  contrary  to  each 


PRACTICAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


176 


is  itself 
ts  iUelf 
ation  of 
sense  of 
e  action 
ate  will, 
ber  than 
manifei- 
eks  is  the 
can  only 
ice  of  an 
;ude,  and 
)  absolute 
i  volition 
conscious- 
y  as  will 
icV  it  dis- 
itemplates 

scendental 

le  bearing 

just  been 

the  state 

ity  of  the 
ination  ov 
try  to  each 


other,  and  roast  yet  be  harmonised  in  the  free 
action  of  the  individual  man.  What,  then,  is  the 
exact  relation  of  these  two  contrary  activities?  It 
is  manifest  that  the  pure  will  can  never  become 
an  object  for  the  self  except  in  relation  to  an 
external  object,  which,  however,  has  no  indepen- 
dent  reality,  but  is  simply  the  medium  in  which 
pure  will  expresses  or  realizes  itself.  Happiness, 
when  exactly  analysed,  is  the  identity  or  har- 
mony of  the  pure  will  with  that  which  is  inde- 
pendent  of  it.  In  other  words,  happiness  can 
only  be  truly  realized  when  natural  impulse  and 
the  moral  law  are  coincident.  A  happiness  con- 
sisting in  the  realization  of  mere  natural  impulse 
is  a  dream,  and  not  less  a  happiness  which  is  pure 
self-determination  apart  from  impulse.  A  finite 
being  cannot  make  the  mere  form  of  morality  his 
end,  and  just  as  little  is  the  end  mere  impulse; 
the  true  end  or  highest  good  is  self-realization  in 
the  real  or  objective  world,  or  pure  will  as 
dominant  in  the  realm  of  nature.  The  reciprocal 
action  of  individuals  through  the  outer  world 
must  not  be  a  matter  of  pure  caprice  or  accident, 
but  must  be  controlled  by  inviolable  law,  so  that 
none  may  destroy  the  possibility  of  free  self-real- 
ization in  another.  Such  a  law  cannot  directly 
control  the  freedom  of  the  individual,  nor  can  it 


«'iM«M«li:K0>«#»'jul!i. 


176     BOMKLLINO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


apply  to  pure  will;  it  can  only  be  a  limitation  of 
natural   impulse.     The   outer  world   must  be  so 
organized  as  to  cause  an  impulse  which  transcends 
its  proper  limit  to  act  against    itself;    and  this 
self-adjustment  of  impulse  must  receive  the  sanc- 
tion of  all  rational  beings.    Now,  such  a  law  is 
not  to  be  found  in  the  world  of  nature  as  such, 
which  is  perfectly  indifferent  to  the  actions  of  men, 
but  only  in  the  world  of  rational  beings.    But  f| 
law  which   is  for   human  action  what  the  law  of 
causality  is   for   external   events,  is    the   law  of 
justice,  which  is  as  inexorable  as  the  laws  of  na- 
ture, and  which    therefore,  as    perfectly  distinct 
from   the   law  of  morality,   is   an  object,  not  of 
practical,  but  of  theoretical  philosophy.    The  law 
of  justice  is  a  sort  of  second  nature  set  above  the 
first,  under  which  free  beings  must  be  placed  in 
the   interest  of  the  freedom  of  each.     It  is  the 
natural  mechanism  by  which  they  can  be  thought 
as  in  mutual  action  and  reaction.      The   purely 
mechanical  or  inevitable  character  of  the  law  of 
justice  is  proved  by  experience,  which  shows  that 
any  attempt  to  identify  it  with  morality  leads  to 
despotism  in  its  most  terrible  form.    Now,  if  this 
law  of  right  is  the  necessary  condition  of  the  real- 
ization  of  freedom   in   the  outer  world,  it  is  of 
great  importance  to  determine  how  it  can  be  con- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


177 


on  of 
be  80 
Bcends 
d  ibis 
I  sane- 
law  is 
3  such, 
>f  men, 
Bat  i| 
law  of 
law   of 
\  of  na- 
distinct 
,  not  of 
The  law 
»ove  the 
[laced  in 
is  the 
thought 
purely 
law  of 
)ws  that 
leads  to 
r,  if  this 
Ithe  real- 
it  is  of 
be  con- 


ceived as  originating  independently  of  the  will  of 
the  individual.  Manifestly  men  must  have  been 
driven  to  establish  it,  without  any  clear  conscious- 
ness on  their  part,  by  the  promptings  of  their  im- 
mediate needs  and  as  a  reaction  against  violence; 
and  it  must  be  gradually  modified  in  accordance 
with  the  stage  of  culture  at  which  the  nation  to 
which  they  belong  may  have  arrived.  Hence  the 
perpetual  modification  of  the  law  under  the  stress 
of  circumstances.  To  secure  the  highest  form  of 
consciousness  in  each  individiial  state,  there  ought, 
as  Kant  contended,  to  be  a  subordination  of  all 
states  to  a  common  law  of  justice,  administered 
by  an  areopagus  of  nations. 

The  gradual  realization  of  law  is  the  substance 
of  history.  Here  we  re-enter  the  sphere  of  prac- 
tical philosophy,  since  history  exhibits  the  develop- 
ment of  human  freedom,  as  the  philosophy  of 
nature  is  an  account  of  the  evolution  of  external 
existence.  The  idea  of  history  is  the  special  prob- 
lem of  the  philosophy  of  history.  There  is,  strictly 
speaking,  no  theory  of  history,  for  a  theory  implies 
rigid  conformity  to  a  law,  from  the  comprehension 
of  which  events  can  be  determined  in  advance. 
Such  a  conformity  to  law  as  is  found  in  nature 
does  not  obtain  in  history,  which  is  the  product  of 

freedom.      At  the  same  time  there  could  be  no 
IP 


_ir«Sl*«lb.i.-...^:«^^, 


178     SCMELLING'b  TBANBCENDBNTAL  IPBALIHlf. 

philosophy  of  history,  if  history  were  the  m^re 
expression  of  lawless  caprice,  and  hence  it  must  be 
shown  how  will  and  law  are  in  it  united.  The 
peculiarity  of  historical  development  is  that  its  var- 
ious stages  are  not  fixed  in  a  goal  which  is  attained 
once  for  all,  but  that  it  is  an  eternal  pt  ogress. 
Individuals  and  generations  pass  away,  but  the 
race  of  man  remains;  each  epoch  is  the  condition  of 
a  higher  epoch,  which  includes  and  transcends  Uie 
one  that  has  gone  before.  History  is  thus  a  con- 
tinual  advance  toward  a  pre-determined  goal,  an 
advance  which  is  realized  in  and  through  the  will  of 
individuals  and  yet  in  spite  of  the  free  play  of 
individual  caprice.  That  ideal  goal  is  not  culture 
or  science,  but  a  perfect  state,  of  which  all  men 
shall  be  citizens;  and  to  this  goal  the  race  is  contin- 
ually  approaching.  History  is  thus  the  realization 
of  freedom  through  necessity.  Necessity  and  free- 
dom  are  related  as  unconscious  and  conscious 
action.  Such  necessity  rules  over  our  free  acts,  and 
hence  there  arises  what  we  do  not  consciously  pro- 
pose to  ourselves,  or  even  the  opposite  of  that 
which  we  intended.  This  necessity  is  more  potent 
than  our  humali  freedom,  and  prevails  .in  spite  of 
it.  Not  only  tragic  art,  but  all  high  deeds,  rests 
upon  the  belief  in  something  higher  than  ourselves. 
How  should  we  will  anything  great  or  good,  were 


PRACTICAL   PHILOtiOPHY. 


179 


)  mere 
liust  be 
1.^    The 
its  var- 
attained 

but  the 
idition  of 
cends  the 
us  a  con- 
goal,  an 
the  will  of 
e  play  0^ 
iot  culture 
|b  all  men 
is  contin- 
realixation 
and  free- 
conscious 
)e  acts,  and 
sibusly  pro- 
ite  of   that 
nove  potent 
l\in  spite  of 
deeds,  rests 
n  ourselves, 
good,  were 


we  not  assured  that  it  must  follow,  however  men 
may  strive  against  it?  The  power  of  such  a  belief 
is  rooted  in  the  conviction  of  the  impotence  of  any 
man  or  of  all  men  to  fight  against  the  progress  of 
the  race  toward  its  ideal  goal.  Such  an  order  of 
things  is  not  the  moral  order  of  the  world,  which 
is  dependent  upon  freedom  and  can  be  made  a 
conscious  end,  but  is  something  absolutely  objective, 
moving  the  will  in  its  deepest  depths  and  giving  us 
security  that  the  highest  ends  will  be  realized. 
Such  security  is  a  delusion,  unless  there  is  a  power 
which  serves  as  the  foundation  and  the  goal  of 
all  human  development,  and  which  converts  even 
the  follies  and  crimes  of  men  into  means  for  its 
own  ends.  This  complete  synthesis  of  all  acts  is 
the  absolute.  In  the  absolute  or  unconditioned 
there  is  no  opposition  of  freedom  and  necessity,  of 
conscious  and  unconscious  action,  but  perfect  unity 
or  "  absolute  identity."  This  unity  of  all  the 
phases  of  human  development  as  lying  at  the 
foundation  of  all  consciousness,  is  the  "  eternally 
unconscious,"  which  can  never  be  an  object  of 
knowledge,  but  is  an  object  only  of  belief,  and 
the  eternal  presupposition  of  all  action. 

The  more  man'  progresses  the  more  apparent 
becomes  the  identity  of  freedom  and  law,  and  the 
less  frequent  the  disturbances  and  aberrations  of 


180    SCUKLLINU*I1  TRANKCBNDMNTAL  IDKAU8M. 


individual  caprice.  Hence  the  history  of  the  world 
is  a  continuous  unfolding  of  the  absolute,  "  the  pro- 
gressive proof  of  the  existence  of  God/*  God  is  not 
a  personal  or  purely  objective  being,  but  the  gradual 
revelation  of  the  divine  in  man.  That  revelation 
can  never  be  complete,  for  then  all  development  and 
with  it  the  manifestation  of  freedom  would  come  to 
an  end.  The  world  is  a  divine  poem,  and  history 
a  drama  in  which  individuals  are  not  merely  actors 
but  authors;  but  it  is  one  spirit  which  informs  all 
and  directs  the  confused  play  of  individuality  to  a 
rational  development.  There  are  three  periods  in 
the  evolution  of  the  absolute.  In  the  first  or  tragi- 
cal period,  the  ruling  power  is  fate,  which  destroys 
unconsciously  the  greatest  and  grandest ;  in  the 
second  period,  beginning  with  the  spread  of  the 
Roman  Republic,  the  absolute  appears  as  nature  or 
conformity  to  external  law;  in  the  third  period, 
which  has  not  yet  come  and  the  time  of  whose 
advent  we  cannot  forestall,  it  will  become  evident 
that  even  the  two  former  periods  were  really  the 
imperfect  manifestation  of  Providence  or  God. 


II. 


B  world 
he  pro- 
d  U  not 
gradual 
velation 
kent  and 
come  to 

history 
y  actors 
'orms  all 
lity  to  a 
eriods  in 
or  tragi- 

destroys 
;  in  the 
d  of  the 
nature  or 
d  period, 
of  whose 
e  evident 
really  the 

God. 


'>i 


CHAPTER  VTT. 

TELEOLOGY  AND  ART. 

ri  lO  complete  the  edifice  of  Transcendental  Ideal- 
"*-  ism,  it  only  remains  to  lay  the  cope-iione.  So 
far  Schelling  has  in  his  exposition  done  little  more 
than  connect  together  in  systematic  unity  the 
various  thoughts  which  with  the  powerful  aid  of 
Fichte  he  had  put  into  shape  in  his  earlier  writings. 
And  it  is  significant  that  the  freshest  part  of  his 
treatise  is  the  conclusion  of  the  practical  philoso- 
phy,  in  which  with  rapid  hand  he  sketches  out  the 
plan  of  a  philosophy  of  history  to  be  filled  in  after- 
ward ;  for  it  is  here  that  there  first  emerges  info 
clear  and  definite  outline  the  idea  of  the  flbi»olute 
as  a  synthesis  of  necessity  and  freedom  which  is 
realised  in  the  incarnate  poem  of  human  his- 
tory. Tt  was  but  natural  therefore  that  Rebel- 
ling should  seek  to  show  how  that  unity  of  the 
unconscious  and  conscious,  which  unrolls  itself  be- 
fore the  eyes  of  the  philosopher  in  the  large  move- 
ments of  history,  should  become  a  part  of  the 
actual  self- conscious  life  of  the  individual  intelli- 
gence. It  is  not  enough  that  the  absolute  should 
manifest  itself  to  the  abstract  vision  of  the  philoso- 

181 


182     SCH£LLING^8  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALKIM. 


pher  in  an  objective  way,  but  it  must  repeat  itself 
in  the  concrete  consciousness  of  man.  In  what 
phase  of  mind,  then,  is  self-consciousness  in  its  full- 
est sense  realized?  To  Fichte  a  final  answer 
seemed  to  be  implied  in  the  nature  of  intelligence 
as  realizing  itself  in  action,  and  building  up  around 
it  an  objective  world;  but,  dissatisfied  with  the 
dualism  of  nature  and  action,  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical intelligence,  which  this  explanation  does  not 
perfectly  resolve,  Schelling  seeks  for  a  still  more 
intimate  union.  It  is  usual  to  say  that  the  solu- 
tion he  was  led  to  propose  was  due  to  his  close 
personal  connection  with  the  romanticists.  And 
no  doubt  the  exaggerated  importance  which,  as  we 
shall  immediately  see,  Schelling  attached  to  art, 
was  in  some  measure  due  to  this  cause.  But  here, 
as  in  other  cases,  the  main  source  of  his  inspiration 
came  from  his  intimate  acquaintance  with  the 
writings  of  Kant,  and  more  particularly  with  the 
CHtique  of  Judgment^  the  work  in  which  Kant 
endeavors  to  transcend  the  dualism  from  which  he 
started.  The  connection  between  Schelling  and 
Kant  is  here  peculiarly  close,  for  in  both  the  imma- 
nent teleology  of  organic  life  and  the  conscious 
teleology  of  art  are  brought  into  relation  with  one 
another.  It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that 
Schelling    has    simply    appropriated    the    Kantian 


TKLEOLOOY    AND    ART. 


183 


itself 
what 
s  full- 
,nswei' 
igence 
iround 
th  tlie 
I  prac- 
>es  not 
I  more 
e  solu- 
s  close 
And 
,  as  we 
to  art, 
it  here, 
)iration 
ith   the 
ith  the 
h  Kant 
hich  he 
ng   and 
imraa- 
mscious 
ith  one 
er,  that 
antian 


theory  without  assimilation  or  change:  here  as 
always  he  adapts  it  to  the  new  point  of  view  arising 
from  a  denial  of  the  absolute  limitation  of  intelli* 
gence  by  something  not  itself,  and  from  the  persist- 
ent effort  to  exhibit  intelligence  as  a  living  process 
or  development. 

1.  All  action  must  be  conceived  as  an  original 
union  of  freedom  and  necessity,  consciousness  and 
unconsciousness,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the 
action  at  once  of  the  individual  and  the  race  is 
free  and  yet  must  conform  to  the  laws  of  nature. 
In  our  immediate  consciousness  it  is  we  who  act, 
but  objectively  it  is  rather  something  else  through 
us.  This  something  else  is  the  unconscious, 
which  must  be  shown  to  be  identical  with  the  con- 
scious in  us.  Intelligence  must  not  only  be  the 
identity  of  necessity  and  freedom,  but  it  must  con- 
sciously perceive  that  identity  as  its  own  product; 
or,  in  Schelling's  phraseology,  "  It  has  to  be  ex- 
plained how  the  I  can  itself  become  conscious  of 
the  original  harmony  of  subject  and  object."  And 
as  that  harmony  can  only  consist  in  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  mechanical  or  natural  law  with  the  con- 
ception of  a  first  cause,  the  product  of  necessity 
and  freedom  must  exhibit  the  adaptation  of  means 
to  ends,  or  at  least  the  appearance  of  such  adapta- 
tion.    Is  there  any  object  of  perception  which  com- 


i 


I 


184     8CHELLINO*S  TRANSCBNDKNTAL  IDEALISM. 

bines  those  two  characteristics?  There  is.  Organ- 
isms are  at  once  under  the  invincible  sway  of 
mechanical  law,  and  are  inexplicable  apart  from 
the  idea  of  final  cause.  It  is  true  that  we  have  no 
right  to  say  that  they  have  been  originated  by  an 
intelligence  externally  constructing  them  after  a 
pre-existing  pattern  or  idea,  but  it  is  equally  true 
that  their  characteristic  difference  from  other  ob- 
jects of  perception  is  utterly  inexplicable  on  merely 
mechanical  principles.  Neither  the  explanation  of 
hylicism  nor  of  conscious  teleology  will  bear  ex- 
amination. Both  fail  to  account  for  the  uncon- 
scious development  of  organic  beings.  The  former 
is  driven  to  suppose  that  matter  is  itself  conscious 
intelligence,  the  latter  that  it  is  acted  upon  ex- 
ternally by  an  intelligence  distinct  and  separate 
from  it.  Either  supposition,  it  need  hardly  be 
said,  is  fatal  to  the  explanation  of  organized  ex- 
istence. The  first  leads  to  a  dogmatic  hylicism 
which  is  essentially  absurd  and  self-contradictory, 
the  second  regards  organisms  as  artificial  products 
and  entirely  fails  to  account  for  their  possibility. 
The  only  theory  which  avoids  the  imperfection  of 
both  views  is  that  which,  recognizing  that  matter 
is  no  independent  reality  or  thing-in-itself,  but 
the  unconscious  product  of  intelligence  as  percep- 
tive, accounts   for  the  appearance  of   adaptation 


MM 


TELEOLOGY    AND   ART. 


185 


Jicep- 
tation 


in  organisms  from  the  fact  that  they  are  the  pro- 
duct  of  an  intelligence  which  acts  according  to 
its  own  necessary  laws,  and  therefore  exhibits  in, 
its  unconscious  products  that  finality  which  is  the 
characteristic  of  conscious  or  free .  activity.  Hence 
it  is  that  organisms  are  under  the  dominion  of 
natural  law  —  which  is  really  the  law  given  by  in- 
telligence to  itself — and  yet  appear  to  be  formed 
by  conscious  purpose.  An  organized  being  is  pro- 
duced by  the  natural  law  of  blind  mechanism, 
and  yet  the  product  in  its  structure  and  functions 
displays  the  character  of  adaptation  to  an  end. 
An  organism  cannot  be  explained  by  teleology,  it 
cannot  be  known  without  it;  the  teleological  ex- 
planation is  inadmissible,  the  teleological  percep- 
tion is  necessary.  In  organic  beings,  therefore,  we 
have  objectively  the  fusion  of  consciousness  and 
unconsciousness,  of  freedom  and  necessity.  Hence 
it  is  that,  so  far  as  perception  goes,  intelligence 
finds  in  organized  existence  that  identity  of  the 
unconscious  and  conscious,  mechanism  and  tele- 
ology, of  wnich  it  was  in  search.  In  life  we  have 
outwardly,  or  in  the  product,  that  which  intelli- 
gence is  inwardly,  or  as  productive.  Our  next 
step  must  therefore  be  to  find  in  intelligence  it- 
self the  explicit  consciousness  of  that  unity.  This 
Schelling  finds  in  Art. 


186     SC'llKLLINti's  TRANSCENDBNTAL  WKAUtiM, 


2.  In  the  account  of  the  immanent  teleology 
of  organized  nature  Schelling  differs  from  Knnt 
mainly  in  explaining  the  union  of  mechanism  and 
teleology,  in  accordance  with  the  central  principle 
of  his  philosophy,  as  the  product  of  the  unconsciouH 
operation  of  intelligence  in  the  individual,  while 
Kant  rather  regarded  the  union  as  the  form  in 
which  we,  from  our  limited  human  point  of  view, 
are  compelled  to  represent  to  ourselves  a  form  of 
existence  that  might  after  all  be  explicable  on 
purely  mechanical  principles,  were  our  intelli- 
gence one  that  contemplated  things  as  a  whole 
and  not  merely  in  part.  The  distinction  between 
master  and  pupil  is,  in  short,  that  the  former  \h 
haunted  by  the  shadow  projected  from  the  dualism 
of  human  and  divine  intelligence,  and  hence  \n 
unable  to  say  with  any  certainty  that  the  mode 
in  which  existence  manifests  itself  to  us  is  any- 
thing but  a  sensible  symbol  of  existence  m  it 
truly  is;  while  the  latter  is  firmly  convinced  that 
the  explanation  of  reality  given  by  philosophy  can- 
not be  set  aside  by  any  hypothesis  of  an  intel- 
ligence essentially  different  from  ours,  an  intelli- 
gence which  ex  hypothesi  is  transcendent  or  un- 
real. At  the  same  time  Schelling,  as  we  i^hall 
see  more  fully  hereafter,  does  not  really  lay  the 
spectre  of  dualism,  but  reintroduces  it  in  the  form 


i 


TELEOLOGY    AND   ART. 


187 


"  unconscious  "  is  at 


of   the  unconscious;   for  the 

bottom  that  which  is  past  finding  out,  in  a  very 

literal  sense. 

The  difference  between  Kant  and  Schelling  in 
their  views  of  art  is  similar  to  that  implicit  in 
their  divergent  explanation  of  organic  nature. 
Here  also  Schelling  finds  an  explanation  of  the 
original  production  of  reality,  where  Kant  sees 
nothing  but  such  a  revelation  of  the  divine  as 
is  possible  for  limited  human  intelligence.  Every 
real  work  of  art  is,  according  to  Schelling,  a  prod- 
uct of  free  and  conscious  activity;  and  yet  it 
is  impossible  to  explain  its  characteristic  quality 
without  reference  to  the  necessary  or  uncon- 
scious element  which  it  contains,  and  which  sep- 
arates it  toto  coelo  from  what  Aristotle  distin- 
guishes as  the  productive  arts.  The  artist  does 
indeed  put  forth  a  conscious  activity  in  shaping 
the  materials  at  his  command  into  forms  of  grace 
and  beauty,  but  this  purely  technical  skill  is  widely 
different  from  the  poetic  activity  itself.  Let  the 
creative  power  be  absent,  and  the  product  is  desti- 
tute of  life.  The  "maker"  is  under  the  sway  of 
his  genius,  that  wonderful  faculty  which  is  some- 
times found  in  scientific  activity,  but  which  is 
always  manifest  in  every  genuine  work  of  art. 
(Genius  is   thus  for  aesthetics  what  intelligence  is 


'188     SCHELLING^S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


for  the  philosopher,  the  supreme  reality  which 
never  itself  becomes  an  object'  of  definite  conscious- 
ness, but  is  the  cause  of  all  that  is  objective. 

There  is  a  marked  contrast  between  the  prod* 
nets  of  art  and  the  organized  products  of  nature. 
In  both  there  is  an  immediate  union  of  free- 
dom  and  necessity;  but  in  organisms  the  activity 
of  intelligence  as  productive  is  hidden  or  un- 
conscious, and  hence  the  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends  presents  itself  only  in  the  products,  while 
in  art  it  is  the  productive  activity  which  is  con- 
scious, and  the  product  which  contains  the  ele- 
ment of  unconsciousness.  The  fundamental  char- 
acter of  every  genuine  work  of  art  is  its  uncon- 
scious infinity.  The  artist  builds  better  than  he 
knows,  and  by  a  divine  instinct  expresses  that  which 
is  but  half  revealed  to  himself,  and  which  is  not 
capable  of  being  grasped  by  the  finite  understand- 
ing. This  contradiction  of  the  finite  and  the  in- 
finite is  for  the  artist  an  inexplicable  feeling,  which 
will  not  let  him  rest  until  he  has  found  for  it  an 
external  form,  whereupon  there  supervenes  an  in- 
finite satisfaction,  which  is  the  subjective  expres- 
sion of  perfect  objective  harmony.  This  union  of 
necessity  and  freedom  is  the  source  of  beauty  which, 
as  the  realization  of  the  infinite  in  the  finite,  is 
the  fundamental    character    of   artistic    products. 


TELEOLOGY    AND    ART. 


189 


and  not  for  any  finite  end  wliatever,  such  as  pleas- 
ure, utility,  morality,  or  science. 

In  art  intelligence  for  the  first  time  becomes  self- 
conscious  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term.  Philoso- 
phy does  indeed  show  that  nature  and  history  are 
the  unconscious  products  of  intelligence,  but,  as 
being  merely  an  abstract  picture  of  reality,  it  is 
not  an  actual  unity  of  consciousness  and  unconscious- 
ness. It  is  only  in  art  that  the  activity  of  intelli- 
gence, which  appears  as  a  phenomenon  beyond  con- 
sciousness, comes  explicitly  within  consciousness.  At 
every  point  of  our  enquiry  into  the  nature  of  intel- 
ligence we  have  been  compelled  to  suppose  a  pri- 
mary limitation  of  the  essential  infinity  of  intelli- 
gence, but  only  when  we  reach  the  realm  of  art 
does  intelligence  discern  the  actual  union  of  its 
opposite  activities.  Here,  therefore,  we  have  at 
last  reached  the  goal  toward  which  intelligence 
has  been  slowly  moving  by  successive  steps.  Art 
is  the  true  organon  of  philosophy.  Nature  and 
history  are  no  longer  for  the  artist,  as  are  action 
and  thought  for  the  philosopher,  an  ideal  world 
which  presents  itself  under  continual  limitations, 
but  they  are  forever  reconciled.  Thus  our  system 
is  completed..  The  intellectual  perception  with 
which  we  began,  has  become  an  explicit  object  of 
ffisthetic   perception,  a   perception   which  does  not 


190     SCHEIiLINQ^S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


merely  contemplate  the  world  like  theoretical  in- 
telligence, or  order  it  like  practical  intelligence, 
but  produces  or  creates  it. 


M. 


cal  in- 
igence, 


\ 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  SYSTEM  OF  IDENTITY. 

TT  may  be  hoped  that,  even  in  the  imperfect 
"*-  medium  of  a  summary  restatement,  the  stimu* 
lating  and  suggestive  character  of  Schelling's  Trans- 
eendental  Idealism  has  been  partially  visible  to 
the  reader.  Especially  for  those  who  desire  to  see 
the  transition  from  Kant  to  Hegel  made  before 
their  eyes,  an  acquaintance  with  that  treatise  is 
indispensable.  At  the  same  time,  while  "naught 
should  be  set  down  in  malice,''  so  neither  should 
"  aught  be  extenuated."  To  accept  with  "  child-like 
faith  "  the  dicta  of  the  leaders  of  philosophy  is,  as 
Schelling  himself  frequently  insists,  but  to  prove 
traitor  to  their  spirit;  and  we  shall  best  show  our 
appreciation  of  the  divine  gift  they  have  given  to 
us  by  subjecting  their  philosophy  to  the  severest 
scrutiny. 

The  main  value  of  Schelling's  work,  apart  from 
its  advance  in  special  points,  consists  in  the  em- 
phasis which  it  everywhere  places  on  the  truth, 
that  the  universe  is  not  a  dead,  inanimate  prod- 
uct,  but  a  living    process,   in  which    intelligence 

creates  and  is  conscious  of  itself  in  creating.    All 

m 


102     8CflELLmG*8  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


forms,  modes,  shows  of  things  are  more  or  less 
complete  manifestations  of  the  same  eternal,  infi- 
nite principle.  Self-activity  rules  in  nature  as  in 
man.  There  are  no  dead  products;  matter,  which 
to  the  eye  of  sense  is  an  inert  and  lifeless  mass, 
is  instinct  with  the  crescent  life  of  intelligence; 
and  hence  the  various  phases  which  it  manifests 
on  its  way  to  man,  in  whom  intelligence,  which 
before  was  implicit,  at  last  becomes  explicit.  Simi- 
larly, if  we  start  from  the  side  of  the  subject  as 
knowing,  the  same  continuous  process  of  evolution 
from  lower  to  higher  modes  of  activity  is  mani- 
fest. The  immediate  feeling  of  "  something  not- 
ourselves,'*  which  is  characteristic  of  sensation, 
breaks  into  the  explicit  opposition  of  subject  and 
object  in  perception,  while  in  reflection  the  appre- 
hension of  the  activity  of  the  mind  in  relation  to 
objects  is  raised  into  the  clear  light-  of  conscious- 
ness. Nor  does  the  process  of  ideal  evolution  end 
here;  for  in  the  action  of  man  there  is  revealed 
to  him  that  which  was  vaguely  present  from  the 
first,  and  which  became  ever  more  apparent, 
namely,  the  existence  for  him  as  a  self-conscious 
being  of  a  world  of  self-conscious  beings  like  him- 
self, bound  under  the  same  moral  law,  and  like 
himself  destined  for  a  life  of  freedom  in  a  free 
state,  or   rather  in  that  great  iruktreia,  the  world. 


THE   SYSTEM   OP   IDENTITY. 


103 


And,  last  of  all,  the  explicit  recognition  of  the 
movement  of  a  divine  intelligence  toward  an  end 
but  dimly  seen,  is  revealed  to  us  in  the  activity 
adapted  to  ends  of  living  beings,  and  more  clearly 
still  in  the  intuitions  of  the  poet,  who  working 
consciously,  creates  a  product  that  reveals  more 
than  was  present  to  his  own  mind  in  its  creation. 
In  this  recognition  of  development,  process,  final- 
ity, Schelling,  is  at  one  with  Hegel;  in  fact  the 
purposely  general  terms  in  which  we  have  just 
summarized  his  theory  might  pass  for  a  hurried 
outline  of  Hegers  own  system.  Closer  inspection, 
however,  makes  it  apparent  that  Schelling  is  only 
Hegel  in  germ,  and  Hegel  with  much  that  is  most 
characteristic  and  most  valuable  in  him  left  out. 
It  will,  therefore,  be  advisable  to  make  a  few  crit- 
ical remarks  on  the  Transcendental  Idealism,  with 
the  view  of  bringing  out  in  clear  relief,  so  far  as 
that  can  be  done  here,  some  of  its  excellences  and 
defects. 

Comparatively  short  as  the  Transcendental  Ideal- 
ism is,  it  goes  over  in  a  sense  the  whole  ground  of 
philosophy.  It  is  at  once  a  metaphysic,  a  philosophy 
of  nature,  and  a  philosophy  of  spirit;  or,  more  ex- 
actly, it  sets  forth  the  supreme  conditions  of  know- 
able  reality,  the  grades  of   nature,  the  phases  of 

knowledge,  the  basis  of  ethics,  the  principles  of  art 
18 


M 


194     SCIIELLINQ^B  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


and  the  nature  of  religion.     A  complete  encyclopae- 
dia of  the  philosophical  sciences  like  this,  no  man, 
however  highly  he  may  be  endowed,  can  construct 
all  at  once;  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  it 
is  in  large  measure  vague,  sketchy,  and  unsatisfac- 
tory.     The     value    of    a    philosophy     must    be 
measured,  not  merely  by  the  firmness  with  which  it 
grasps  a  central  principle,  but  by  the  thoroughness 
and  consistency  with  which  the  principle  is  worked 
out    and    applied    to    the    multifarious    phases   of 
human  thought  and  action.     Even  with  the  labors 
of  Kant  from  which  to  start,  and  with  the  brilliant 
light  cast  back  upon  Kant   by   Fichte,   Schelling 
could  not  be  expected  to  do  more  than  develop  to 
some  degree  that  which  he  found  ready  to  his  hand. 
And  perhaps  it  is  not  unfair  to  say  that  no  amount 
of  self-restraint  could  ever  have  enabled  Schelling, 
with  his  quick  imaginative  temperament,  to  build 
up  such  an  edifice  of  philosophy  as  his  great  suc- 
cessor Hegel  has  left  to  us.    With  fiery  impatience 
he  dashes  «off  a  philosophical  treatise  almost  "  in  one 
hot  sitting,'*  and  immediately  upon  the  revelation 
to  him  of  some  logical  consequence,  which  in  his 
haste  he  had  not  at  first  seen,  he  once  more  rushes 
before  the  public  with  a  new  work,  the  preface  to 
which   explains   with   amusing  self-deception    that 
what  he  is  going  to  say  has  been  kept  back  only 


THE   SYSTEM   Or   IDENTITY. 


105 


from  regard  for  the  intellectual  needn  of  hb  readem. 
The  Transcendental  Idealism,  it  must  in  juitice  to 
Schelling  be  said,  is  less  of  a  mere  tract  than  most 
of  his  other  writings;  but  for  the  reasons  MUggested 
it  is  very  unequally  worked  out,  and  it  really  holds 
in  solution  two  opposite  principles  which  are  never 
perfectly  reconciled,  and  fails  to  draw  a  clear  line 
of  demarcation  between  metaphysics,  as  the  philos- 
ophy of  knowable  reality,  and  psychology,  the 
philosophy  of  the  individual  mind.  The  most  de- 
veloped and  perhaps  the  most  perfect  part  of  the 
treatise  is  the  theoretical,  in  which  the  various 
phases  of  knowledge  are  described;  next  in  impor- 
tance is  the  practical  part,  which  is  very  valuable 
as  a  short  and  clear  statement  of  the  basis  of  ethics 
as  conceived  by  Fichte,  and,  besides,  contains  the 
conception  of  historical  development,  which  is  the 
most  purely  original  part  of  the  work,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  idea  of  art  as  the  final  solution  of 
the  identity  of  intelligence  and  nature.  The  Tran- 
scendental  Idealism  as  a  whole  is  not  in  the  strict 
sense  an  original  work;  it  is  not  original  even  as 
Fichte's  Wissenschaftslehre,  which  owed  its  inspira- 
tion to  Kant,  is  original,  and  much  less  in  the 
larger  sense  of  the  three  Critiques  of  Kant.  But  it 
would  be  unfair  to  Schelling  not  to  remember  that 
v'hile,  especially  in  the  theoretical  part,  he  draws 


196     SCHELLINO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


largely  on  Fichte,  his  Transcendental  Idealism  is 
pervaded  by  the  explicit  conception  of  process  or 
development,  by  means  of  which  all  the  elements 
he  has  borrowed  are  fused  into  unity;  and  that 
even  the  theoretical  part  contains  a  most  significant 
and  intrinsically  valuable  attempt  to  connect  the 
categories  of  relation, —  substance,  cause  and  reci- 
procity,—  which  in  Kant  had  remained  in  stiflF  and 
abrupt  contrast,  in  the  true  order  of  their  ideal 
development. 

1.   In  the  introduction  Schelling  draws  a  strong 
contrast   between   the   philosophy  of   nature    and 
the  philosophy  of  knowledge,  which  is  at  once  the 
source  of  the  strength  and  of  the  weakness  of  his 
system.     All  knowledge  consists  in  the  agreement 
of  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  and  the  sum- 
total  of  the  latter  is  nature,  of  the  former  intelli- 
gence.    Hence  it  is  as  necessary,  he  holds,  to  show 
how  nature  rises  through  successive  stages  to  in- 
telligence, as    to    explain   the   successive   steps   by 
which  intelligence  constructs  nature  for  itself.    This 
opposition  of  two  fundamental  sources  or  "  disci- 
plines "  was  to  Fichte,  as  is  well  known,  a  stone  of 
stumbling  and  a  rock  of  oflFence.    How  can  there  be, 
he  not  unnaturally  asked,  any  "object"  that  is  not 
in  relation  to  a  "  subject,"  and  how,  therefore,  can 
we  hold  the  parallelism  of  intelligence  and  nature? 


THE   SYSTEM   OP   IDENTITY. 


197 


And  undoubtedly  the  view  of  Schelling  suffers 
from  grave  defects.  It  is  impossible  to  free  him 
from  the  charge  of  isolating  in  an  illegitimate 
way  things  which  are  indissolubly  bound  together. 
Nature  apart  from  intelligence  at  once  lapses  back 
into  a  mere  thing-in-itself,  and  all  Schelling's  ef- 
forts to  recover  the  ground  he  has  lost  at  the 
start  turn  out  to  be  unavailing.  His  final  attempt 
to  combine  what  he  had  put  asunder  by  means 
of  the  poetic  faculty  as  at  once  creative  and  un- 
conscious is  a  virtual  confession  of  failure,  and 
prepares  the  way  for  the  leap  into  the  dark,  which 
he  soon  felt  himself  compelled  to  make.  It  may 
be  doubted,  however,  how  far  Fichte  had  any  just 
ground  of  complaint  against  his  too  eager  follower. 
As  we  have  seen,  there  is  in  his  own  theory  an 
inexplicit  fusion  of  two  distinct  principles  which 
really  lie  at  the  root  of  Schelling's  opposition  of 
intelligence  and  nature.  The  philosophy  of  Fichte 
was  an  attempt  to  explain  reality  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  there  is  no  intelligence  other  than  the 
sum  of  finite  intelligences,  which  in  Schelling's 
phrase,  are  "  the  bearers  of  the  universe."  But 
Fichte,  almost  in  spite  of  himself,  was  compelled 
to  distinguish  between  the  absolute  Ego  and  the 
finite  Ego,  and  to  regard  the  latter  as  eternally 
striving   toward   a  goal    it    is    forever    incapable 


198     SCHELLING*S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 

of  reaching.  This  "striving"  is  therefore  some- 
thing revealed  in  and  to  the  individual  intelligence, 
something  which  it  is  compelled  to  submit  to  by 
the  very  law  of  its  being.  Thus  there  gradually 
emerges  a  distinction  between  the  individual  and 
the  absolute  Ego,  which  admits  on  Fichte's  prin- 
ciples of  no  further  explanation.  It  is  something 
we-kno\v-not-what,  or  in  other  words,  the  Kantian 
thing-in-itself,  without  the  explanation  by  which 
Kant  attempted  to  determine  it.  The  same  tendency 
is  shown  in  Fichte's  conception  of  knowledge  as  a 
process  by  which  intelligence  at  once  gives  itself 
laws  and  submits  to  them.  And  Fichte  himself 
insists  that  knowledge  and  life  are  distinct;  that 
the  former  is  a  picture,  the  latter  alone  reality. 
Thus  in  Fichte  we  have  implicitly  the  two  ele- 
ments which  afford  a  relative  justification  for  Schel- 
ling's  contrast  of  intelligence  and  nature.  On  the 
one  hand  he  practically  admits  a  "something  not- 
ourselves"  working  in  and  through  us,  and  on 
the  other  hand  he  opposes  knowing  and  being.  It 
can  hardly  be  said,  therefore,  that  Schelling  has 
absolutely  contradicted  Fichte,  however  he  may 
have  seemed  to  do  so,  and  however  he  may  have 
failed  to  work  out  that  side  of  Fichte's  philosophy 
which,  as  we  may  see  in  Hegel,  leads  to  a  higher 
result. 


THE  SY8TBM   OP  IDENTITY. 


199 


on 
It 


To  appreciate  the  true  and  the  false  in  the  oppo* 
sition  of  nature  and  intelligence,  as  it  is  set  forth 
by  Schelling,  we  must  begin  by  drawing  a  clear 
distinction  between  individual  and  absolute  intelli- 
gence. Nature  is  manifestly  independent  of  the 
individual  as  such,  and  may  therefore  be  legiti- 
mately regarded  as  in  some  sense  independent  of 
his  knowledge.  But  when  this  is  said,  it  must  be 
immediately  added,  that  there  is  no  nature  apart 
from  all  relation  to  intelligence.  Nor  indeed  does 
Schelling  really  mean  to  say  that  there  is:  all  that 
he  holds  is  that  the  "objective"  world,  i.e.,  the 
world  of  external  things,  including  organic  beings 
and  even  man  as  an  organism,  are  separable  in 
thought  from  the  self-conscious  intelligence  in  man 
and  exist  prior  in  time  to  it.  The  great  imperfec- 
tion of  Schelling  is  not  in  contrasting  man  and 
nature,  but  in  maintaining  the  complete  parallelism 
of  the  two  distinguishable  realms.  From  the  phe- 
nomenal point  of  view,  in  which  we  are  tracing  the 
various  manifestations  of  nature,  we  must  rather 
hold  that,  just  as  each  lower  phase  of  nature  points 
forward  to  a  higher  phase  in  which  it  is  merged, 
so  nature  as  a  whole  can  only  be  explained  by 
man  as  including  and  transcending  it.  Instead 
of  opposing  nature  and  intelligence  as  two  coordi- 
nate realms,  each  explicable  by  itself,  we  must  hold 


%00    SCHELLING's  TBANSCBNDBKTAL  IDBALI8K. 


that  the  former  is  simply  a  lower  phase  of  the 
latter.  In  this  way  alone  can  we  get  rid  of  the 
dualism  which,  implicit  in  Kant  and  Fichte,  is  made 
explicit  in  Schelling.  For,  when  we  say  that 
nature  and  intelligence  are  like  two  parallel  lines, 
we  virtually  reduce  intelligence  to  nature.  Both 
must  be  explained  as  the  manifestation  of  an 
activity  which  appears  now  as  nature  and  again  as 
intelligence,  and  this  activity  evidently  cannot  be 
defined  as  higher  in  the  one  sphere  than  in  the 
other  without  its  becoming  at  once  apparent  that 
the  one  must  be  regarded  as  the  imperfect  or  in- 
complete form  of  the  other.  The  essence  of  each 
is,  therefore,  assimilated  by  Schelling,  and  accord- 
ingly nature  and  intelligence  are  alike  conceived  by 
him  as  the  manifestation  of  pure  self-activity. 
Now  self-activity  may  undoubtedly  be  explained  as 
identical  with  self-conscious  intelligence;  but  for 
Schelling  such  an  explanation  is  precluded  from  the 
fact  that  he  has  opposed  the  two  worlds  as  parallel. 
Hence  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  "  self"  disappears  and 
all  that  remains  is  the  "  activity."  This  is  evident 
in  his  conception  of  the  "  I  am "  as  the  supreme 
principle  of  philosophy,  in  his  uncritical  assimilation 
of  intelligence  to  two  opposite  forces  as  limiting 
each  other,  in  his  supposed  discovery  of  the  unity  of 
nature  and  intelligence  in  the  unconscious  creations 


THE  SYSTEM   OP   IDENTITY. 


201 


of  poetry,  and  ultimately  in  his  leap  beyond  intelli- 
gence and  nature  into  the  "  night  in  which  all  cows 
are  black."  The  only  wonder,  in  fact,  is  how  Schel- 
ling  did  not  see,  at  the  time  he  wrote  the  Transcen- 
dental Idealism,  that  the  parallelism  of  nature  and 
intelligence  necessarily  carried  with  it  the  implica- 
tion of  a  unity  transcending  both,  a  unity  which 
for  him  could  only  be  that  in  which  they  agreed,  or 
their  "  absolute  indifference." 

It  must  be  said,  then,  that  while  Schelling  is 
justified  in  seeking  to  define  the  objective  world  of 
nature  more  exactly  than  Fichte  had  done,  he  is  not 
justified  in  putting  it  upon  the  same  plane  with 
intelligence.  This  in  fact  is  the  source  and  ratio- 
nale of  his,  as  of  all  other  pantheism.  For,  when 
intelligence  and  nature  are  so  absolutely  opposed, 
even  the  assertion  that  nature  exists  only  for  knowl- 
edge cannot  prevent  intelligence  from  being  con- 
ceived as  a  finite  subject,  standing  opposite  to  which 
is  a  world  of  finite  objects;  and  hence  the  unity  of 
both  must  be  found  in  the  conception  of  a  power 
which  manifests  itself,  now  as  thinking  subject  and 
again  as  thought  object,  neither  the  subject  nor  the 
object  having  any  reality  except  as  a  phase  of  the 
Power  which  is  over  or  behind  both. 

2.  In  his  account  of  the  fundamental  principles 
of  idealism  Schelling  cannot  be  said  to  make  any 


202   schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


advance  beyond  Ficlite.  Both  start  from  the  im- 
mediate perception  of  intelligence  by  itself;  both 
find  in  the  nature  of  intelligence  an  original 
duality  of  opposite  activities;  and  both  connect 
with  the  three  main  principles  the  logical  laws  of 
identity,  opposition  and  ground.  In  Schelling  per- 
haps  the  tendency  to  assume  that  "all  determina- 
tion is  negation"  is  most  conspicuous.  Hence  he 
finds  the  explanation  of  knowledge  in  the  necessity 
under  which  intelligence  labors  to  limit  its  original 
infinity.  The  infinity  of  intelligence,  it  is  cer- 
tainly of  great  importance  to  recognize,  but  it 
must  not  be  conceived,  as  Schelling  has  a  ten- 
dency to  conceive  it,  as  simply  the  negation  of 
all  determinateness.  For  when  the  infinite  is  re- 
garded in  this  way,  the  definite  content  which 
makes  it  to  be  what  it  is,  necessarily  appears  as 
something  accidental  or  extraneous  that  it  must 
seek  to  get  rid  of.  In  itself  intelligence  is  held 
to  be  pure  infinity,  and  only  because  it  is  to  be 
conscious  of  itself  is  it  necessary  to  regard  it  as 
limited  or  determined.  Self-consciousness  thus  be- 
comes an  accidental  determination  of  the  pure 
self,  and  hence,  as  in  the  opposition  of  nature  and 
intelligence,  the  supreme  reality  is  to  be  sought 
in  the  mere  abstraction  of  pure  being.  But  while 
this  tendency  to  strip  intelligence  of  all   its  de- 


II. 


THE   SYSTEM   OP   IHENTITY. 


203 


he  ira- 
f;  both 
)riginal 
connect 
laws  of 
ng  per- 
armina- 
ence  ho 
ecessity 
original 
is  cei'- 
but    it 
a  ten- 
i,tion   of 
e  is  re- 
;  which 
)ears  as 
it  must 
is  held 
is  to  be 
rd  it  as 
thus  be- 
le   pure 
ure  and 
1  sougVit 
at  while 
its  de- 


terminateness,  and  to  set  up  the  residuum  as  the 
absolute  Ego,  is  manifest  in  Schelling,  it  must  be 
added  that  his  system  shows  a  contrary  tendency 
as  well.  The  Ego  is  not  merely  pure  infinity,  but 
it  is  that  which  continually  affirms  itself  in  all 
knowledge  and  action;  it  is  not  an  inert  substance, 
but  a  self-affirming  or  self- perpetuating  activity. 
Prom  this  point  of  view  the  self  is  that  to  which 
all  objects  must  be  referred,  and  in  relation  to 
whicli  only  they  have  any  reality.  The  various 
stages  of  knowledge  and  action  are  but  the  fuller 
and  more  perfect  forms  in  which  intelligence  re- 
veals its  nature,  and  comes  to  an  ever  higher  self- 
consciousness.  In  Schelling  we  everywhere  find 
the  conflict  of  the  opposite  principles  of  abstrac- 
tion and  concretion,  and  it  can  hardly  be  said  that 
either  ever  gains  the  victory.  The  abstract  prin- 
ciple we  saw  before  in  the  opposition  of  nature 
and  intelligence,  and  the  concrete  principle  in  the 
ideal  evolution  of  nature;  and  here  again  we  find 
the  struggle  for  mastery  of  the  same  principles, 
the  abstract  being  represented  in  the  conception 
of  intelligence  as  pure  identity  or  negative  in- 
finity, and  the  concrete  in  its  manifestation  as  an 
eternal  process  or  progressive  self- consciousness. 

3.  The  theoretical  part  of  Schelling's  philosophy 
has  already  been  characterised  generally  as  a  mix- 


S04     BCH£LLIXO*S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM, 


ture  of  metaphysic  and  psychology.  As  a  psychology 
it  contains  a  most  instructive  and,  on  the  whole, 
accurate  characterization  of  the  various  phases  of 
knowledge  as  shown  in  sensation,  perception  and 
reflection.  That  for  the  knowing  subject  sensation 
implies  the  consciousness  of  a  limit,  or  of  something 
not  made  by  himself,  is  manifestly  a  correct  account 
of  its  nature;  and  when  it  is  added  by  Schelling 
that  it  has  no  reality  except  as  a  self-limitation 
of  intelligence,  the  character  of  sensation  as  im- 
plicit thought  or  self-consciousness  is  grasped  in 
a  way  that  at  once  explodes  its  supposed  passivity, 
and  makes  the  view  of  the  empirical  psychologist 
manifest  foolishness.  So  also  the  account  of  per- 
ception as  but  sensation  made  explicit,  together 
with  the  explanation  of  the  rise  of  the  opposition 
of  subject  and  object,  leaves  little  to  be  desired; 
and  when  it  is  further  shown  that  all  perception  — 
from  the  simplest  form  which  it  assumes  in  the 
determination  of  the  object  as  in  space  and  time, 
to  the  fuller  determination  of  it  as  a  congeries  of 
objects  limiting  each  other  by  their  reciprocal  ac- 
tivity—  is  the  manifestation  of  the  activity  of  in- 
telligencf;,  we  have  an  advance  over  Kant  at  least 
in  the  mode  of  statement.  Finally  in  his  account 
of  reflection  as  simply  the  further  determination 
of  intelligence  by  an  analytical  distinction  of  the 


THE  SYSTEM   OF   IDENTITY. 


205 


product  from  the  process  of  thought,  we  get  a 
clear  insight  into  the  nature  of  knowledge,  and 
of  that  transcendence  of  the  abstract  opposition 
of  thought  and  reality,  which  is  the  characteristic 
feature  of  a  genuine  idealism. 

4.  Schelling,  however,  is  unable  to  see  that  the 
account  he  has  given  of  the  evolution  of  knowl- 
edge has  destroyed  the  opposition  of  intelligence 
and  nature  with  which  he  started;  and  hence  he 
goes  on,  in  the  manner  of  Fichte,  to  subordinate 
theoretical  to  practical  intelligence.  Such  a  sub- 
ordination has  no  truth  except  from  the  phenome- 
nal point  of  view.  If  in  all  reality  intelligence 
knows  only  itself,  there  can  be  no  propriety  in 
any  longer  denying  the  essential  correlativity  of 
intelligence  and  nature.  The  reason  given  by 
Schelling  for  holding  that  in  knowledge  the  per- 
fect unity  of  subject  and  object  is  not  obtained, 
namely,  that  only  in  the  explicit  recognition  of 
its  own  activity  does  intelligence  come  to  a  con- 
sciousness of  itself,  gets  its  force  entirely  from  the 
point  of  view  of  common  sense  dualism,  in  which 
nature  is  regarded  as  something  passively  appre- 
hended. In  other  words,  while  Schelling  is  justi- 
fied in  saying  that  even  the  highest  phase  of 
knowledge  leaves  unresolved  the  opposition  of 
subject  and  object,  so   long  as  we  do  not  ascend 


206     SCIIELLINO*S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


to  the  plane  of  idealist  philosophy,  he  is  not  justi- 
fied in  treating  theoretical  intelligence  as  abso- 
lutely subordinated  to  practical  intelligence.  Each 
in  truth  is  a  partial  manifestation  of  the  one  in- 
divisible intelligence,  and  hence  neither  is  higher 
or  lower  than  the  other.  The  faci>  that  in  know- 
ing the  object  is  made  more  prominent,  and  the 
subject  in  acting,  is  no  reason  for  elevating  the 
one  over  the  other.  It  is  only  an  imperfect  lib- 
eration from  the  trammels  of  subjective  idealism 
that  lends  countenance  to  such  a  view.  ^ 

5.  It  is  virtually  confessed  by  Schelling  himself 
that  his  explanation  of  objectivity  as  due  to  the 
practical  activity  of  intelligence  is  not  satisfactory, 
inasmuch  as  he  goes  on  to  seek  in  art  for  a  final 
explanation  of  the  unconscious  element  implied  in 
both  knowledge  and  action.  His  explanation  can 
be  satisfactory  to  no  one  who  asks  seriously  what 
is  meant  by  the  unconsciousness  of  art.  That  the 
products  of  artistic  genius,  like  the  great  deeds 
which  have  left  an  impress  on  the  world's  history, 
contain  in  them  an  element  of  unconsciousness  is 
manifest  enough;  but  it  is  by  no  means  manifest 
that  the  "  unconscious "  is  to  be  straightway  iden- 
tified with  ultimate  reality.  The  element  of  un- 
consciousness is  simply  the  shadow  thrown  by 
human  finitude,  a  shadow  which  can  only  be  dis- 


THE  SYSTEM   OF   IDENTITY. 


207 


placed  by  the  light  of  philosophy.  In  all  knowledge 
and  in  all  action  there  is  a  feeling  of  something 
which  we  do  not  make  for  ourselves.  This  feeling 
is  in  our  ordinary  consciousness  what  the  recogni- 
tion of  human  finitude  or  dependence  is  in  religion 
and  philosophy.  In  other  words,  the  unconscious 
or  unknown  is  that  "thing  in  itself"  which  in 
the  philosophy  of  Kant  finally  emerged  as  God, 
and  which  must  so  emerge  in  any  philosophy  which 
follows  out  the  implications  of  the  activity  of 
human  intelligence.  Schelling,  however,  at  the 
stage  which  he  had  reached  in  the  Transcendental 
Idealism  had  not  freed  himself  from  the  shackles 
of  a  one-sided  idealism,  and  hence  he  labors  to 
show  that  in  artistic  activity  there  is  a  fusion  of 
the  infinite  and  the  finite  which  in  theoretical  and 
practical  intelligence  is  only  the  hidden  goad  im- 
pelling the  mind  forward  to  ever  new  self-mani- 
festations. The  practical  idealism  of  Fichte  he 
found  unsatisfactory,  as  he  could  hardly  help 
doing;  but  he  seemed  to  find  in  the  creative 
activity  of  art  the  unity  of  intelligence  and  nature 
of  which  he  was  in  search.  In  thus  at  last  taking 
refuge  in  the  "  unconscious,"  Schelling  practically 
confesses  his  failure  to  solve  the  problem  of  phi- 
losophy, a  failure  which,  as  we  have  tried  to  show 
above,  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  untena- 


208    8CHELLINO*8  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


ble  opposition  of  intelligence  and  nature  from 
which  he  set  out.  His  next  step  has  already  been 
indicated.  Finding  that  neither  the  process  by 
which  nature  advances  to  intelligence,  nor  the 
process  by  which  intelligence  advances  to  nature, 
yields  that  unity  of  both  which  a  true  instinct, 
not  to  speak  of  his  philosophical  training,  showed 
him  to  be  the  goal  of  philosophy,  he  seeks  for  it 
in  the  abstract  identity  or  indifference  of  subject 
and  object.  To  the  System  of  Identity,  which  is 
almost  explicit  in  the  Tmuscendental  Idealism^  a  \ 
few  words  must  now  be  devoted. 

It  is  somewhat  misleading  to  speak  of  Schelling 
as  "  leaping  in  a  variety  of  directions  according 
to  the  latest  goad."  There  is  no  solution  in  the 
continuity  of  his  philosophical  development.  As 
in  the  Transcendental  Idealism  he  endeavored  to 
combine  the  main  principles  of  Fichte  with  the 
conclusions  he  had  worked  out  for  himself  in 
regard  to  nature,  and  was  inevitably  led  in  that 
endeavor  to  go  beyond  the  point  from  which  he 
had  started;  so  in  the  Statement  of  my  System 
(Darstellung  meines  Systems),  and  the  Lectures 
on  the  Method  of  Academical  Study,  the  two  trea- 
tises which  sum  up  the  philosophy  of  identity, 
he  takes  a  step  which  in  logical  consistency  he 
could  not  avoid  taking.    That  in  the  former  of 


\ 


THE   8YHTKM   OP   IDENTITY. 


200 


those  works  Schelling  adopts  the  mathematical 
mode  of  statement  familiar  to  us  in  Spinoza  arose 
from  that  instinct  iur  literary  form  which  rarely 
failed  him.  How  could  a  system  of  identity  be 
better  set  forth?  To  say  that  he  was  led  to  the 
philosophy  of  identity  externally  by  a  study  of 
8pinoza  is  a  remark  to  which  only  a  superficial 
study  of  Schelling  lends  any  countenance.  In- 
deed, apart  from  any  deeper  objections  to  it,  the 
fact  that  his  familiarity  with  Spino/a  dates  back 
to  the  very  beginning  of  his  philosophical  career 
ought  to  set  the  matter  at  rest. 

In  the  introduction  to  the  first  of  the  works 
named,  Schelling  virtually  confesses  that  the  paral- 
lelism and  independence  of  the  philosophy  of  knowl- 
edge and  the  philosophy  of  nature  is  a  half-truth 
which  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  the  other  half, 
and  that  both  must  be  united  in  the  philosophy  of 
existence  as  a  whole.  This  admission  is  made  in  a 
way  which  reveals  that  craving  for  recognition  as 
an  original  thinker,  which  we  have  seen  to  be  char- 
acteristic of  Schelling,  and  which  brings  into  promi- 
nence a  certain  fragility  of  moral  fibre  that  has  its 
counterpart  in  the  eagerness  he  displays  to  place 
the  public  in  possession  of  his  newest  thought  be- 
fore it  has  had  time  to  lose  its  fi^shness.     The 

complete  system,  he  says,  which  be  had  had  in  his 
14 


310   schellinq's  transcendental  idealism. 


mind  all  along,  and  which  he  had  presented  from 
various  points  of  view,  he  now  finds  himself  com- 
pelled, from  the  prevalent  state  of  opinion  about 
it,  to  give  to  the  public  as  a  whole  earlier  than  he 
had  intended.  This  of  course  is  mere  self-delusion; 
but  Schelling  is  undoubtedly  justified  when  he  goes 
on  to  say  that  in  his  previous  writings  there  ex- 
ists in  germ  that  system  of  identity  which  he  now 
proposes  to  set  forth  in  an  explicit  way.  Phil- 
osophy of  nature  and  transcendental  philosophy 
are  the  opposite  poles  of  his  philosophizing;  the 
philosophy  of  identity  starts  from  the  point  of  in- 
difference, and  goes  on  to  show  how  the  opposite 
poles  may  be  developed  from  it.  The  whole  system 
must  therefore  rest,  not  on  the  reflective  opposi- 
tion of  intelligence  and  nature,  subject  and  object, 
but  on  the  production  of  all  reality  by  and  in  the 
absolute.  If  it  is  correct  to  formulate  the  idealism 
of  Fichte  in  the  proposition,  Ego=All,  his  own 
idealism  may  be  thrown  into  the  form.  All = Ego; 
in  other  words,  whereas  Fichte  starts  from  the  intel- 
ligence  as  having  an  objective  world  opposed  to  it, 
and  therefore  as  finite  or  subjective,  and  seeks  to 
show  that  that  world  exists  only  in  relation  to  the 
finite  subject,  Schelling  begins  with  Reason  as 
above  the  dualism  of  subject  and  object,  and  pro- 
ceeds  to  establish   the  identity  of   the   two.     By 


THE   SYSTEM    OF   IDENTITY. 


211 


reason,  then,  is  meant  not  the  reason  of  any  in- 
dividual intelligence,  but  that  which  is  the  total 
indiiFerence  or  absolute  identity  of  intelligence 
and  nature.  This  idea  is  obtained  by  complete 
abstraction  from  the  ordinary  dualism  of  subject 
and  object,  and  therefore  by  abstraction  from  one- 
self as  thinking  reason.  In  this  way  we  get 
the  true  and  only  reality.  Philosophy  thus  shows 
that  the  only  intelligible  meaning  of  '*things-in- 
themselves"  is  the  knowledge  of  things,  or  rather 
of  the  finite,  as  they  are  in  the  absolute  reason. 
It  is  characteristic  of  philosophy  that  it  rises  above 
all  finite  distinctions,  such  as  those  of  time  and 
space,  and  in  general  of  all  the  differences  to  which 
imagination  gives  an  apparent  independence  and 
reality,  and  puts  itself  at  the  point  of  view  of 
reason.  Beyond  reason  there  cannot  be  any  reality, 
for  the  finite  as  such  is  not  real;  the  finite  subject 
exists  only  in  opposition  to  the  finite  object,  the 
finite  object  only  in  contrast  to  the  finite  subject; 
the  unity  of  both  lies  in  that  which  is  both  because 
it  is  neither.  It  is  evident  that  reason  is  one  in 
the  most  absolute  sense,  since  outside  of  it  there 
is  nothing  that  could  possibly  limit  it,  and  within 
it  there  is  no  phenomenal  distinction  such  as  that 
of  subject  and  object.  The  supreme  law  of  reason, 
and  therefore  of  all  reality,  is  the  law  of  identity. 


31S     SCHELLIXO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


A=A  —  a  law  which,  as  independent  of  time  or 
eternal,  is  absolutely  true.  Again,  reason  is  the 
same  as  the  absolute  identity;  it  is  infinite,  and 
its  identity  can  never  be  destroyed.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  reason  there  is  therefore  no  finite 
existence,  and  hence  it  is  absurd  to  attempt,  as 
all  philosophers  except  Spinoza  have  attempted,  to 
explain  how  the  infinite  identity  proceeds  out  of 
itself;  the  true  view  is  that  all  reality  is  infinite,^ 
while  the  finite  is  merely  apparent  reality.  The 
knowledge  of  the  absolute,  which  as  unconditioned 
does  not  admit  of  proof,  but  follows  immediately 
from  the  law  of  identity,  is  not  separable  from  the 
absolute  in  so  far  as  it  is  real,  but  is  involved  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  absolute.  This  form  is 
given  in  and  with  the  reality  of  the  absolute,  and 
hence  there  is  no  sequence  in  time  of  the  absolute 
and  its  form,  but  both  are  eternally  united.  The 
distinction  of  subject  and  predicate,  in  the  formula 
A=A,  does  not  alBfect  the  inner  nature  of  the.  ab- 
solute, but  is  a  mere  formal  or  relative  distinction; 
in  other  words,  the  absolute  is  only  under  the  form 
of  the  perfect  identity.  The  absolute  cannot  know 
itself  as  absolute  identity  or  infinite,  without  know- 
itself  as  subject  and  object;  but  this  distinction 
affects  only  its  form,  not  its  inner  nature  or  essence. 
There  can  be  no  qualitative  difference  of  subject 


THE   SYSTEM    OP   IDENTITY. 


213 


and  object,  for  that  would  imply  an  opposition  in 
the  inner  nature  of  the  absolute;  all  distinction 
of  reality  is  therefore  purely  quantitative,  or  im- 
plies the  preponderance  of  subject  or  object,  knowl- 
edge or  being;  and  only  because  of  this  distinction 
in  quantity  is  the  form  of  subject-objectivity  actual. 
The  distinction  of  finite  things  is  not  a  distinction 
in  the  nature  or  essence  of  the  absolute,  but  merely 
a  formal  distinction  due  to  reflection-  In  relation 
to  the  absolute  totality,  there  is  not  even  quan- 
titative difference,  but  the  perfect  equilibrium  of 
subject  and  object;  mind  and  matter  are  manifesta- 
tions of  the  same  power,  the  distinction  being, 
that  in  the  one  the  real  and  in  the  other  the  ideal, 
preponderates.  The  separation  of  subject  and 
object  has  no  justification  from  the  point  of  view 
of  reason,  and  is  the  source  of  all  error  in  phi- 
losophy. Each  individual  thing  has  reality  in 
and  through  the  absolute,  and  its  finite  differ- 
ence is  simply  the  form  in  which  the  reality  of 
the  absolute  appears  as  a  determinate  quantitative 
difference.  As  a  particular  expression  or  mani- 
festation of  the  absolute,  each  individual  thing  may 
be  regarded  as  relative  totality,  or  as  in  a  sense 
infinite.  The  absolute  as  manifesting  in  its  form 
the  quantitative  difference  which  distinguishes  mind 
and  matter,  subject  and  object,  may  be  represented 


214   scuellinq's  transcendental  idealism. 


by  the  formula  A=A,  the  point  of  indifference, 
while  the  contrast  of  subject  and  object,  which 
may  be  likened  to  the  opposite  poles  of  a  magnet, 
may  be  represented  respectively  by  the  formulue 
+A=B  and  A=B+.  The  system  thus  indicated 
cannot  be  called  either  idealism  or  realism,  but, 
as  uniting  both,  it  is  properly  distinguished  &H  a 
system  of  absolute  identity.  This  general  state- 
ment of  his  main  principles  Schelling  evidently 
intended  to  be  followed  by  an  account  of  the  \ 
various  phenomenal  stages  in  which  the  absolute 
manifests  itself  on  the  one  hand  as  nature  and  on 
the  other  hand  as  mind,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact 
he  exhibited  only  the  phases  of  matter.  As  the 
statement  of  these  does  not  differ  substantially 
from  other  statements  of  his  philosophy  of  nature 
it  need  not  be  given  here.  A  more  complete  for- 
mulation of  his  philosophy  is  given  in  the  Lectures 
on  the  Method  0/  Academical  Study,  but  the  main 
outlines  of  the  system,  apart  from  occasional  antici- 
pations of  a  later  mysticism,  are  the  same.  1 

In  the  phase  of  speculation  now  under  considera- 
tion, we  see  in  a  very  clear  way  that  conflict  of 
two  opposite  principles  for  the  mastery,  which  we 
have  seen  to  run  through  the  whole  of  the  Trau* 
scendental  Idealism  and  to  vitiate  its  absolute 
value.    ,  Oh  the  one  hand,  the  absolute  or  reason  is 


THE   SYSTEM    OF    IDENTITY. 


:il5 


completely  separated  from  its  manifestations,  and 
thus  lapses  into  a  cold,  dead  identity,  admitting  of 
no  movement  or  life;  while  on  the  other  hand,  as 
manifesting  itself  in  intelligence  and  nature,  the 
concreteness  which  is  at  first  denied  is  restored  to 
it.  Taken  literally  the  opening  sections  of  the 
Statement  of  My  System,  are  open  to  the  criti 
cism  which  Fichte  has  directed  against  them  with 
terrible  effect.  A  reason,  as  he  says,  which  is  the 
"complete  indifference  of,  subject  and  object"  is  "at 
once  completely  determined  and  in  itself  ended  or 
dead;"  there  is  no  possible  way  of  "getting  out  of 
the  first  proposition  in  any  honest  and  logical  way 
a  second  proposition;"  and  hence  the  determinations 
applied  to  it  of  nothingness,  totality,  unity,  self- 
equality,  etc.,  are  perfectly  gratuitous.  Instead  of 
saying  that  "outside  of  reason  is  nothing  and  in 
reason  is  all,"  Schelling  ought  to  have  said,  that 
"in  reason  and  for  reason  there  is  nothing  what- 
ever," since  there  can  be  nothing  for  reason  unless 
it  is  subject  or  object  or  both,  whereas  it  is  ex- 
plicitly held  to  be  merely  the  indifference  of  the 
two.  So,  also,  it  is  utterly  illogical  to  say  that 
"  reason  is  absolutely  one  and  absolutely  self-equal;" 
the  true  inference  from  the  preceding  sections  being, 
that  it  is  "  neither  one  nor  self-equal,  as  for  reason 
there  is,  as  has  been  shown,  nothing  at  all,"     But 


21G     SCHELLINO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


while  Fichte  shows  very  clearly  the  weakness  of  the 
philosophy  of  identity  as  it  is  stated  by  Schellinj^, 
he  does  not  detect  so  well  the  source  of  that  weak- 
ness, and  hence  he  is  unable  to  do  justice  to  the  rela* 
tive  truth  it  contains.  The  indifference  of  subject 
and  object -is  the  result  of  the  immediate  negation 
of  subject  and  object,  which  is  the  first  step  beyond 
the  individualistic  idealism  of  Fichte.  There  is 
something  higher  than  intelligence  and  nature, 
conceived  of  as  the  opposition  of  the  finite  subject 
and  the  finite  object;  and  this  "something,"  as  the 
immediate  negation  of  the  opposition,  is  naturally 
conceived  as  that  which  is  free  from  all  distinction, 
Schelling's  mistake  is  to  rest  satisfied  with  this  first 
step,  Nvithout  advancing  to  the  next  step,  in  the  .res- 
toration of  the  distinction  of  subject  and  object  in 
the  higher  form  of  a  concrete  unity.  "The  finite 
as  such  has  no  independent  reality"  —  this  is  the 
truth  in  his  view;  "the  infinite  is  the  negation  of 
the  finite" — in  this  lies  its  falsity.  The  infinite 
must  be  conceived  as  manifesting  itself  in  the 
finite  or  it  necessarily  remains  dead.  Why  Schel- 
ling  separates  the  two  terms  of  an  inseparable 
unity  in  duality  we  have  already  seen.  Having 
coordinated  nature  and  intelligence,  he  was  unable 
to  get  rid  of  the  dualism  to  which  he  had  thus  com- 
mitted himself.     But  when  it  is  seen  that  nature  in 


THE   SYSTEM   OP   IDENTITY. 


217 


its  various  phases  has  no  reality  apart  from  intel- 
ligence, or,  in  other  words,  that  the  distinctions 
made  in  characterizing  the  world  of  nature  and 
of  intelligence  are  not  absolute  but  relative,  the 
unity  of  the  infinite  and  the  finite  is  seen  to  be  one 
which  must  not  be  sought  in  the  pure  blank  of  a 
perfectly  indeterminate  absolute,  but  in  the  whole 
universe  as  its  manifescation.  Nature  is  thus 
merged  in  intelligence  and  both  receive  their  due. 
The  one  is  no  mere  thing-in-itself,  the  other  is  not 
an  abstract  I-in-itself.  The  absolute  reveals  itself 
to  us  at  the  end  of  the  ideal  process  of  evolution, 
not  at  the  beginning:  it  is  not  selfless  identity,  but 
self-conscious  spirit.  But,  while  in  words  Schelling 
puts  the  absolute  away  in  an  inaccessible  realm,  he 
yet  seeks  at  least  to  restore  it  by  bringing  it  into 
relation  with  its  manifestations  in  nature  and  in 
man ;  and,  while  we  condemn  the  imperfect  idealism 
which  leads  him  to  seek  for  the  absolute  afar  off, 
when  it  really  was  "  tumbling  out  at  his  feet,"  we 
must  not  omit  to  credit  him  with  an  insight  into 
the  problem  which  demanded  solution,  and  with 
taking  the  first  step  toward  its  solution. 


m 


CHAPTER  IX. 


SCHELLING'S  LATER  PHILOSOPHY. 

rriHE  thread  of  speculation  was  taken  up  by 
Hegel  at  the  point  reached  by  Schelling  in  the 
Nystem  of  identity,  but  Schelling's  own  development 
took  an  independent  course,  some  account  of  which 
it  seems  advisable  to  give  to  prevent  misunderstand- 
ing. The  later  or  mystical  phase  of  his  philosophy 
18  expressed  mainly  in  Philosophy  and  Religion 
(1804),  Philosophical  Enquiries  into  the  Nature  of 
Human  Freedom,  (1809),  with  its  supplements,  the 
reply  to  Jacob!  and  the  letter  to  Eschenmeyer 
(1812),  and  in  the  introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of 
Mythology  and  the  Philosophy  of  Revelation,  made 
public  only  after  Schelling's  death. 

In  these  writings  the  criticism  of  the  system  of 
identity,  set  down  at  the  end  of  Chapter  VIII,  is  vir- 
tually endorsed  by  Schelling  himself ;  and  the 
attempt  is  made  to  show  that  for  the  indeterminate 
absolute  must  be  substituted  a  personal  God,  and 
for  the  coordination  of  man  and  nature,  the  subor- 
dination of  nature  to  a  system  of  free  beings.  The 
transition  is  made  in  Philosophy  and  Religion, 
which  in  one  aspect  is  the  completion  of  the  system 

818 


\ 


8CUELLINU  8   LATER   PHILOSOPHY. 


;J19 


lade 


iThe 
em 


of  Identity,  and  in  another  a*  Tct  a  mystical  tran- 
scendence of  it.  The  absolute  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
completely  separated  from  the  world  of  finite  exist- 
ence as  it  appears  in  nature  and  in  history,  and  on 
.  the  other  hand,  the  finite  world  is  the  result  of  a 
primal  break  or  fall  from  the  absolute.  The  inner 
dialectic  by  which  Schelling  was  driven  from  the 
abstract  opposition  of  subject  and  object  to  the  affir- 
mation of  an  utter  void  between  the  finite  and  the 
infinite  is  here  visibly  at  work;  but  not  less  the 
burden  laid  upon  reason  to  fill  up  the  void,  if  not  by 
the  steady  persevering  work  of  reason  then  by  the 
nebulous  forms  of  imagination  under  the  unseen 
impulse  of  reason.  Starting  from  the  idealist  solu- 
tion of  the  reality  of  the  known  world  of  finite  exist- 
ence, Schelling  could  not  well  be  satisfied  with  a 
theory  which  virtually  undid  all  the  work  of  con- 
struction in  the  region  of  knowledge,  which  he  had 
achieved:  the  world  of  nature  he  at  least  never 
intended  to  attenuate  to  a  ghostly  thing-in-itself 
existing  independently  of  intelligence,  and  it  was 
inevitable  that  he  should  seek  to  restore  the  life 
and  movement  which  by  his  doctrine  of  the  abstract 
absolute  he  had  at  least  in  appearance  destroyed. 
Moreover,  as  Schelling  at  a  later  period  expressly 
avers,  the  pantheistic  absorption  of  all  things  in  the 
absolute  is  a  necessary  stage  towards  a  genuine 


220     SCHBLL1N0*8  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


monotheism.  The  denial,  in  other  words,  of  the 
finite  as  such  is  the  condition  of  the  apprehension 
of  the  infinite,  but  it  is  folly  to  remain  forever 
in  this  purely  negative  attitude.  The  supersensible 
nature  of  the  universe  is  first  apprehended  as  a 
withdrawal  into  its  inner  essence;  but  this  essence 
ought  not  to  be  conceived  as  a  dead  identity,  but  as 
the  spirit  which  enfolds  the  finite  within  itself  and 
yet  realizes  itself  in  the  finite.  This  is  in  brief  the 
intuition  which  gives  to  Schelling's  mysticism  its 
speculative  value.  That  he  can  give  no  other  than 
a  mystical  solution  results  partly  from  the  limita- 
tions of  his  philosophical  genius,  and  partly  from 
the  false  course  on  which  he  embarked  when  he 
coordinated  nature  and  spirit,  instead  of  subordi- 
nating the  one  to  the  other. 

The  treatise  on  human  freedom  begins  with  some 
general  remarks  on  pantheism,  by  no  means  the 
least  valuable  part  of  the  work,  which  areJntended 
to  prepare  the  way  for  the  monotheistic  solution 
that  follows.  It  is  usually  held  that  pantheism  is 
destructive  at  once  of  all  individuality  and  of  all 
freedom;  the  former  because  it  absolutely  identifies 
the  finite  with  the  infinite,  the  latter  because  it 
refers  the  volitions  of  men  to  God  as  their  cause. 
But  if  by  pantheism  is  meant  the  immanence  of  all 
things  in  God,  neither  of  these  charges  can  be  sub- 


SCIIELLINU  8    LATKR  rillLOSOrilY. 


221 


stantiated.  The  individuality  of  things  is  not 
denied  in  any  but  a  true  sense,  when  things  are 
referred  to  God  as  the  ground  of  their  existence; 
to  say  that  the  finite  is  nothing  apart  from  God  is 
very  different  from  saying  that  the  finite  has  no 
reality  at  all.  Nor  is  the  doctrine  of  immanence 
incompatible  with  freedom.  The  supposition  ^hat 
it  is,  arises  from  the  base  mechanical  view,  which 
regards  God  and  man  as  two  separate  things  among 
other  things.  The  real  truth  is  that  man  could  not 
be  free  were  he  not  dependent  upon  God;  for  only 
the  free  can  be  in  God,  while  that  which  is  not  free 
is  necessarily  outside  of  God.  Only  in  freely  act- 
ing beings  mn  God  reveal  himself,  and  they  are 
just  as  truly  as  He  is.  Not  the  pantheism  of 
Spinoza,  who  is  the  typical  instance  of  this  mode  of 
thought,  but  his  one-sided  realism  or  determinism, 
is  responsible  for  the  denial  of  human  freedom. 
The  source  of  all  his  mistakes  is  the  assumption 
of  the  independent  reality  of  things,  an  assumption 
which  leads  him  to  conceive  even  of  God  and  the 
will  as  things  outside  of  other  things,  and  to  regard 
each  volition  as  the  mechanical  effect  of  a  precedent 
cause,  which  again  has  a  prior  cause  and  so  on  to 
infinity.  His  system  with  its  dead  mechanical 
explanations  may  be  compared  to  the  statue  of 
Pygmalion  before  it  was  quickened  into  life  by  the 


22^     MCIIBLLINUV  TRAxNSCBNDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


breath  of  love.  This  dead  and  motionless  panthe- 
ism of  Spinoza,  spiritualized  by  idealism,  is  the  true 
philosophy  of  nature;  which,  however,  must  be 
carried  up  into  a  philosophy  of  spirit  resting  upon 
the  supremacy  of  free  will.  For  it  is  not  enough 
to  say  wi  h  Fichte  that  "  activity,  life  and  freedom 
is  the  only  true  reality;*'  but  we  must  show  that 
this  is  true  of  nature  no  less  than  of  man,  and  we 
must  advance  beyond  the  purely  formal  notion  of 
freedom  as  self-activity  to  freedom  as  the  faculty  of 
willing  good  and  evil.  Here  the  philosophy  which 
admits  the  immanence  of  all  things  in  God  first 
enters  upon  its  life-and-death  struggle,  for  here  it  is 
confronted  by  the  dilemma,  that  if  evil  is  in  God  his 
perfection  seems  to  be  destroyed,  while  on  the  other 
hand,  if  there  is  no  evil,  as  little  can  there  be  any 
freedom.  No  half-solutions  are  here  of  any  avail, 
such  as,  that  God  permits  evil,  or  the  Manichaean 
opposition  of  two  independent  powers  of  good  and 
evil,  or  the  doctrine  of  the  origin  of  evil  by  succes- 
sive emanations  which  seem  to  make  it  real  and  yet 
independent  of  God. 

After  this  striking  introduction,  which  is  still 
more  striking  in  the  extended  form  in  which  Schel- 
ling  presents  it,  the  special  problem  of  the  work 
is  entered  upon  in  a  new  mystical  theodicy,  the 
outlines  of  which  are  largely  due  to  the  deep  in- 


Ht'HBLLlNO^H   LATER   IMIILOHOI'IIY. 


^'23 


tuitions  of  Jacob  BOhmen.  The  divine  Hubntance, 
according  to  Btihmfen,  is  primarily  a  formlesH  inH* 
nite,  which,  in  the  feeling  of  its  own  vague  infin* 
ity,  shrinks  into  finitude  in  the  ground  of  nature, 
whence,  gradually  raised  into  the  light  of  spirit, 
it  lives  and  moves  as  God  in  an  eternal  realm  of 
bliss.  In  agreement  with  this  threefold  ideal  move- 
ment, Schelling,  starting  from  the  absolute  in 
the  shape  of  pure  indifference  or  primal  baselesfs- 
ness,  as  it  had  been  reached  in  the  system  of 
identity,  goes  on  to  maintain  that  God  first  aptiears 
as  the  diremption  of  existence  and  ground,  in  order 
that  he  may  finally  transform  his  original  indiffer- 
ence into  identity,  and  thus  become  a  self-conscious 
person  or  will. 

First  of  all,  the  possibility  of  evil  must  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  personality  of  God.  The  first  phase 
or  potency  of  the  divine  life  in  that  of  pure  indiffer- 
ence, the  original,  undifferentiated  "ground"  of 
existence,  which  is  prior  to  all  duality  or  disruption. 
Out  of  this  indifference  break  forth  two  equally  eter- 
nal beginnings,  in  order  that  ground  and  existence 
may  become  one  in  love.  The  division  takes  place 
that  by  it  the  divine  may  become  spirit  or  person- 
ality. Since  before  or  beyond  God  there  is  nothing, 
the  ground  or  foundation  of  his  existence  must 
be  within   himself,  but  it  must  not  be   identified 


224    schelling's  transcendental  idealism. 


with  God  considered  absolutely,  or  in  his  real  ex- 
istence; it  is  nature  in  God,  and  as  such  inseparable 
but  distinct  from  him.     Nature  is  not  to  be  thought 
as  posterior  either   in  time  or  in  essence  to  the 
absolute;    it  no  doubt    precedes  his  concrete  ex- 
istence, but  on  the  other  hand  God  is  the  prius  of 
nature,  and  the  condition  of  its  existence.     In  na- 
ture, as  distinguishable  and  yet  inseparable  from 
God,  the  eternal  One  feels  the  yearning  to  beget 
himself,  the  yearning  after  understanding  or  self-^ 
revelation;  and,  the  ground  moving  like  a  heaving 
sea  in  obedience  to  some  dark  and  indefinite  law, 
there  arises  in  God  himself  an  inner  reflexive  idea, 
in   which   God   contemplates   himself   in  his  own 
image.     This  idea  is  God  born  in  God  himself,  the 
eternal  word  in  God,  which  gives  light  or  under- 
standing.     The    understanding    united    with    the 
ground  becomes  freely  creative  and  almighty  will. 
The  work  of  this  enlightened  will  is  the  reduction 
of  nature  as  a  perfectly  lawless  ground  to  law, 
order,  form;    and  from  this  transformation  of  the 
real  by  the  ideal  comes  the  creation  of  the  world. 
In  the  evolution  of  the  world,  the  first  stage  is 
the  birth  of  light,  or  the  gradual  development  from 
nature  to  man;   the  second  and  higher  stage,  the 
birth  of  spirit,  or  man's  development  in  history. 
Nature  parts  into  two  opposing  forces,  the  inner- 


SCHELLING^S   LATER   PHILOSOPHY. 


225 


most  bond  of  which  only  gradually  unfolds  itself; 
and  it  is  the  task  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  to 
exhibit  the  process  by  which  the  separation  is  grad- 
ually made  until  at  last  the  innermost  center  or 
essence  of  nature  is  disclosed.  Every  natural  ex- 
istence has  a  double  principle  within  itself.  That 
which  separates  it  from  God  originates  from  the 
ground,  and  constitutes  its  self-will,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  universal  will.  In  merely  na- 
tural beings  these  two  principles  never  come 
together  in  unity,  but  the  particular  will  is  mere 
rage  and  greed  in  them,  whilst  the  universal  will 
acts  independently  as  controlling  instinct.  Only 
in  man  are  the  two  principles  united  as  they  are 
in  the  absolute,  and  in  the  illumination  of  self- 
will  by  the  universal  will  consists  the  spirituality 
of  man.  In  God,  however,  the  two  principles  are 
inseparable,  while  in  man  they  are  not  only  separ- 
able, but  opposed,  and  on  this  opposition  depends 
the  possibility  of  good  and  evil.  As  spirit  or  will 
man  is  no  unconscious  instrument  of  the  universal 
will,  but  stands  above  and  beyond  both  of  the  op- 
posing principles.  Good  is  the  voluntary  identifi- 
cation of  the  particular  with  the  universal  will, 
evil  the  voluntary  separation  of  the  one  from  the 

other.    Evil  is  therefore  not  a  mere  negation  or 
16 


3«e    SCIBLUNO'S  TiUNs«K„^,,.^, 

*««t.  but  a  positive  inversion  of  th.  * 

Of  particular  a„a  universal  !)i,T         '"'"'  '^'^"""^ 

-•»'eUt::i'::jfv'-".'>»ntsaetn., 

f-»  tl.e  necessit^Tt;  •  "^  "'^'"'""^  ""■- 
'«  -•  Did  the  two  „':':.  """"-  »^  '•'-elf 
'"•J'-^oluble  unity  in  „T     «  """">'«»  e™e  i„ 

""««  could   be  „o   re  ;r;  "'        '  "'"''  '»  ^'^' 

'»-.  f-  We  is  r  vea  loT  "''  ''""'  "'""-  - 

"""3'  onl,  as  the  oppos  J    :  '1  ""'""'  '"  """'• 

'o^'  and  the  „ii,  of  t,  "''■    ^''«  *'"  ot 

"'^  -«>  .et  insepa  a   ;.  ^  ^  ^'-^"^a- 

"«'  independently,   in   oral,,         """'  *■='•  "n" 

""     ^^e  .round"  a^  I       ^m'  'T'  "''^ 

"o«.  that  spirit   as  win   !,  *'"'  "PP"*'" 

'•'^«'f  «  striving  agaill   the'  ""    """'    ""'"""'" 

'•«»•»»  Of  nature  se^ ,  "^      '"  '"«  '»>-• 

"•-'ity  or  disorder   an      '"""'^  ''''^''  ^  "-- 

"■""ai  in  the  for™  'ofl  T  ""'°""'^"^  '"  "■« 

""'^  in  the  reaI„rLvr   ''"''''""      "'" 

"-'o'Hed  and  il  '2:,.  r  ;t?  ^''''- 
««n   is  a  record  of  the  IT;       ^'  '"^""•^  »"■ 

■"■ivemi  «.ii,,  ,„d  thet  °'  ^^''•'""  and 

«'c'  constitute  the  g  t  :  '"^  "•""  "'  ""^  -»- 
After  the  ,.riod  of'  ril  ^  "'  """*'■  "^^'»'T. 
'»'•'•<'  -hen  nature  wartr  „     T""'"^  """«  '"« 

""  time  when  the  elrth  1     '         •"  '''^'-    «"' 

e  «arth  was  sunk  in  ^i,,, 


I 


'"^  J"^'  the  time  when  the   ^-  ■ 

spirit  *a.  born  i„  ci^-Ll         '"'  ''«'"  "^  'he 

, « Christ,  that  «a„ :  tr  ";•  ^^^  "^'^^ »«« 

'-'  P-iod  of  the  wo  "dt  th        ■;   '"  ''•"'•      T"" 
«   which  self-win   and  '"'''"  °^  ""^  *P''». 

«»^  »a,  hecce  al,  in  ^7  "'  """"•'«^-   *"«' 

^^vti"ra:':i:^^-pji»edi3h^ 

^"^  ordinary  e,p  JJ:;:;;  '"'■  ^o^  o.  evii. 

f-edo«  :.,,«„„„_  :,'.7''^^--."  Which  ,nakes 
^'«>y«  freedom  alt^gethj    ,f' "•'»''''^'».  -"ieh  de- 
'^  fiance,  the  othef  to  ll        °"'  ^'"^'^  "«  «ver 
f  "-«->-   the  same  th  nV™??"''^  '^'""•'  ^ 
''■-  -'»tio«,   When   he  iJ"'/"'''"*'"^   '<■« 
'"'^^iWe   cha..aete,.   man'^tt;;;    ""f  '"■"■"^ 
«'""»  of   mechanical   cansatil         T    """  "^   "■« 
«™e.      To  act  freelv  "t        "  *"'    '"'"^^"^  '"'»»« 
•'"t  the  necessity  of  „„r  „    "     '''"'"   *"•  "'"'^^iiy 

"ho'ce  falls  outside  of  tL       !  ^"'    ""■' 

-•"•    ">«.  first   creatlr  'r ."'^^<'^'"»  ''^  --,       . 
^'-.  hut  his  empiricaT'nat      '"'""    """   '«  •"" 
"■■^  »-   ftee  act  a  It       :.  "  "'«  '-^-'  of 
"■"«  are  predestinated    bit        T      ""  "'=''    '" 

-^-  ^'-'■^--aasiir:::^^^^^^^ 

"wr  any  other  crea- 


228     SCHELLINQ^S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDKALWM. 


ture  could  prevent  him  from  betraying  Ohrist, 
and  yet  lie  was  not  compelled  to  betray  him,  but 
did  so  voluntarily,  and  with  perfect  freedom. 
Hence  the  radical  evil  of  human  nature,  which  is 
merely  raised  into  consciousness  by  the  entrance 
of  opposition.  This,  however,  does  not  mean  that 
moral  progress  is  impossible,  but  only  that  such 
progress  is  the  consequence  of  the  timeless  act  by 
which  man's  nature  and  life  in  time  are  deter- 
mined.* 

The  first  and  second  waves  are  past,  but  a  third 
and  bigger  wave  is  upon  us.  Is  God's  revelation  of 
himself  a  blind  or  a  conscious  act?  And  if  by  his 
own  free  act  evil  has  originated,  how  shall  his  stain- 
less perfection  and  holiness  be  preserved?  Schel- 
ling's  solution  of  this  old  problem  is  not  altogether 
satisfactory.  We  must  distinguish,  he  says,  be- 
tween God  as  the  ground  and  God  in  his  perfection, 
and  we  must  observe  that  even  as  ground  God  h 
not  the  author  of  evil  as  such,  but  merely  solicits 
the  self-will  of  man,  as  a  means  of  awakening  him 
to  the  distinction  of  good  and  evil.  The  ground 
but  calls  forth  the  particular  will  of  the  individual, 
that  love  may  have  a  material  whereon  to  realize 

*For  an  acute  criticism  of  this  part  of  Schelling^H  doctrine,  lee 
Schnrman'a  Kantian  Ethics  and  the  Ethics  of  Evolution,  p,  6  if,  It 
must  of  course  be  understood  that  full  justice  canncH  be  doni  to 
Schulling*8  argument  in  an  epitome. 


schklling's  later  philosophy. 


229 


itself,  and  hence  it  is  indirectly  the  condition  of 
good.  Evil,  in  short,  is  a  necessary  stage  in  the 
process  towards  the  complete  realization  of  good. 
If  it  is  objected  that  this  is  a  Manichscan  dualism, 
Schelling  answers,  in  his  reply  to  Jacobi,  that  the 
perfection  of  God  is  not  incompatible  with  this 
gradual  manifestation  of  himself.  Imperfection  is 
perfection  itself  in  the  process  of  becoming. 
Unless  there  be  a  dark  ground  or  negative  principle 
in  God,  there  can  be  no  talk  of  his  personality.  It 
is  impossible  to  think  of  God  as  self-conscious 
unless  we  think  of  him  as  limiting  himself  by  a 
negative  power  within  himself.  In  God,  as  in  man, 
true  personality  arises  only  by  the  realization  of 
feeling  through  understanding;  the  abstract  unity 
of  reason,  beautiful  as  it  is,  must  be  broken  up  by 
the  separative  and  organizing  understanding  before 
there  can  be  self-conscious  personality. 

The  main  interest  of  Schelling's  Philosophy  qf 
Mythology  and  Philosophy  of  Revelation^  apart  from 
their  suggestiveness,  lies  in  the  application  of  the 
idea  of  the  self- revelation  of  God  as  realized  in  the 
gradual  development  of  the  religious  consciousness. 
The  introductory  part  in  which  are  set  forth  the 
doctrine  of  "potencies"  and  the  various  stages  by 
which  nature  rises  to  self-consciousness  in  man,  is 
in  substantial  agreement  with  the  theosophic  specu- 


230    SCllELLINO^S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


lations  of  the  Enquiries  into  Human  Freedom  and 
its  pendants.  All  that  need  be  said  of  this  section 
is,  that  the  various  stages  of  the  human  spirit  on 
its  way  to  a  comprehension  of  the  idea  of  God  are, 
as  in  the  earlier  treatises,  declared  to  be,  first,  it^ 
theoretical  relation  to  nature,  secondly  its  practical 
relation  to  the  moral  law,  and,  lastly,  the  freedom 
of  artistic  contemplation,  which  consists  in  what  \n 
characterized  by  Aristotle  as  thinking  on  thought, 
and  the  object  of  which  is  God,  as  the  first  principle 
of  the  world.  The  end  of  this  process,  however,  U 
not  union  with  God,  but  merely  the  abstract  com- 
prehension of  the  idea  of  God.  Only  when  religion 
becomes  its  object,  does  philosophy  advance  from  its 
negative  to  its  positive  phase.  For  religion  rests 
upon  the  actual  realization  of  will,  and  hence  phi- 
losophy, to  come  in  real  contact  with  God,  must 
follow  up  the  actual  realization  of  the  religious 
consciousness  from  its  beginnings  in  mythology  to 
its  completion  in  religion  as  the  perfect  revelation 
of  God.  Even  the  pre-Christian  religions  are  to  be 
regarded  as  phases  in  God's  revelation  of  himself. 
The  forces  by  which  the  religious  consciousness  is 
developed  are  at  the  same  time  the  potencies 
tbi^ough  which  God  realizes  himself  in  the  process 
of  the  world.  Mythology  is  the  history  of  God  in 
consciousness.     From  the  very  beginning  man  had 


IM 


SCHELLINCj's   LATER   PHILOSOPHY. 


^31 


a  consciousness  of  God,  although  God  was  not  an 
object  of  definite  knowledge.  From  this  stage  of 
relative  monotheism  the  religious  cfonsciousness  was 
carried  away  from  God  and  assumed  the  form  of 
polytheism,  which  was  a  necessary  stage  in  the  tran< 
sition  to  a  frer  ac  'leism.  The  firs'  *'"rm  of 
religfion  was  Sabeism,  tue  worship  of  God  as  mani- 
fested in  the  stars;  which  was  followed  by  th^ 
Egyptian  worship  of  the  gods  as  individualized  in 
the  form  of  animals;  and  this  again  gave  way  to 
the.  religion  of  Greece,  in  which  the  worship  of 
beautiful  personalities  in  human  form  prevailed. 
Finally,  the  Greek  mysteries  prepared  the  way  for 
a  more  spiritual  faith  in  the  religion  of  revelation, 
the  absolute  monotheism  in  which  all  antitheses  are 
reconciled.  The  main  object  of  the  philosophy  of 
revelation  is  to  explain  the  personality  of  Clirlst; 
and  hence  Schelling  considers  his  existence  prior  to 
his  incarnation,  the  incarnation  itself  and  the 
mediation  of  man  and  God  accomplished  by  it. 
The  completion  of  Christ's  work  allows  of  the 
period  of  the  spirit,  through  the  action  of  which 
the  church  exists.  The  two  first  periods  of  the 
church,  Catholicism  and  Protestantism,  are  past, 
and  the  third,  the  Christianity  of  John,  is  at  hand. 
The  philosophy  of  Schelling  thus  closes  with  a 
vision  xif  the  new  Jerusalem  coming  down  from 
heaven. 


282     SCHELLINO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


The  main  value  of  Schelling^s  later  philosophy, 
as  it  seems  to  me,  lies  in  its  vivid  presentation 
of  problems  for  solution,  and  in  its  prophecy  of 
a  reconciliation  of  contradictions  which  it  does  not 
itself  reconcile.  Starting  from  the  denial  of  any 
Ood  other  than  the  moral  order  of  the  world,  and 
compelled  by  the  coordination  of  subject  and  ob- 
ject to  take  refuge  in  a  pantheistic  absorption  of 
all  things  in  an  indeterminate  absolute,  Schelling 
was  at  last  led  to  see  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
the  personality  of  God,  and  of  seeking  for  a  recon- 
ciliation of  that  personality  with  the  freedom  of 
man.  The  conception  of  God,  as  by  his  very  nature 
compelled  to  reveal  himself  in  the  world,  un- 
doubtedly contains  a  truth  of  pre-eminent  impor- 
tance; but  it  is  not  arrived  at  by  any  rational 
and  well-ordered  method,  but  is  simply  accepted 
on  the  guarantee  of  a  flash  of  poetic  insight.  The 
mysticism  which  views  all  things  as  bathed  in 
the  omnipresent  light  of  the  divine  nature,  and 
dips  the  sharp  contradictions  of  the  analytic  un- 
derstanding in  the  medium  of  a  rational  phantasy, 
has  for  most  minds  a  peculiar  glamour  and  fas- 
cination. But  it  is  not  a  frame  of  mind  which 
can  be  cultivated  with  impunity.  It  is  almost  in- 
evitably followed  by  a  process  of  enervation,  which 
is  fatal  to  vigorous   and   sustained    philosophical 


SCHELLINM*S   LATER   PHILOSOPHY. 


fm 


thought.  Too  many  draughts  of  the  divine  elixir 
are  intoxicating.  The  spoils  of  philosophy  cannot 
be  won  by  day-dreaming,  but  must  be  conquered 
by  energetic,  persistent  and  long-continued  toil. 
Apart  from  this  general  objection  to  Schelling's 
later  method  of  speculation,  it  must  be  said  that 
he  has  not  solved  the  problems  that  he  set  himself 
to  solve.  To  talk  of  God  as  necessarily  opposing 
a  ground  to  himself,  by  which  he  may  come  to  a 
consciousness  of  himself,  is  merely  to  say  that,  some- 
how or  other,  nature  is  dependent  upon  God.  Nor 
can  it  be  said  that  Schelling  has  made  any  decided 
advance  beyond  his  earlier  position  in  his  solution 
of  the  problem  of  human  freedom.  One  cannot 
indeed  be  too  thankful  ."or  the  true  insight,  that 
freedom  is  neither  unmotived  volition  nor  mechani- 
cal necessitation,  but  the  realization  of  one's  own 
inner  nature.  But  to  explain  the  freedom  to  will 
evil  or  good  as  due  to  a  timeless  act  really  explains 
nothing;  it  is  further  away,  indeed,  from  a  true 
explanation  than  the  view  of  Kant,  which  it  affects 
to  improve  but  really  distorts.  Kant  held  that 
man  as  a  rational  will  is  independent  of  the  me- 
chanical law  of  causation,  but  he  did  not  make 
the  extravagant  attempt  to  show  that  man  wills 
his  own  empirical  character  before  he  enters  the 
realm  of  consciousness  at  all.     No  doubt  the  view 


234     SCHELUNO*8  TRANSCENDRNTAL  IDEAMSM. 


of  Schelling  may  be  made  more  consonant  w^th 
ihe  soberness  of  unintoxicated  reason  by  regarding 
it  as  merely  a  poetical  rendering  of  the  truth, 
that  autonomy,  or  self-determination  by  the  pure 
idea  of  duty,  is  the  condition  of  morality;  but, 
thus  interpreted,  it  lapses  back  into  the  uncolored 
prose  of  Kant's  "  categorical  imperative."  Schel- 
ling is  not  more  successful  in  reconciling  the  fact 
of  evil  with  the  goodness  of  God.  All  that  he 
has  to  say  is,  at  bottom,  that  God  does  not  directly 
will  evil,  and  that  evil  is  a  necessary  stage  towards 
good.  '  These  may  be  accepted  as  vague  intuitions 
of  the  truth,  but  in  the  form  into  which  they  are 
thrown  they  do  not  help  us  much.  The  truth  is, 
that  there  is  absurdity  in  the  very  attempt  to 
answer  the  quid  sit  in  place  of  the  quod  sit,  as 
Schelling  expressly  tells  us  his  aim  was.  Such  an 
attempt  to  construct  the  world  before  it  exists,  is 
really  an  attempt  to  derive  the  rational  and  con- 
scious out  of  the  irrational  and  unconscious.  We 
do  not  see  things  any  more  clearly  by  seeking  for 
them  behind  the  mirror.  The  explanation  of  the 
"what  is"  is  all  that  is  possible,  and  indeed  all 
that  is  required.  Schelling's  complaint  that  the 
philosophy  of  Hegel  was  mere  logic,  only  shows 
that,  he  was  himself  attempting  the  impossible 
feat  of  .explaining  reality  by  that  vyhich  was   not 


RCilELL1NG*A   LATER   PHILOSOPHY. 


S85 


reality;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  on  the  dark 
background  of  the  night  he  saw  but  the  brilliant 
shapes  thrown  out  by  his  own  too  fervid  imagina*, 
tion.  The  truth  was  no  doubt  symbolized  in  these 
creatures  of  a  rationalizing  phantasy,  but  only 
because  Schelling  did  not  really  turn  his  back  on 
the  actual,  but  only  supposed  that  he  had  done  so. 
In  making  these  remarks  I  do  not  wish  to  be 
understood  as  seeking  to  underrate  the  suggestive- 
ness  of  Sehelling's  speculations,  or  to  throw  any 
discredit  on  their  value  as  an  important  stage  in 
the  history  of  human  thought.  Nor,  ^  hope,  am 
I  insensible  to  the  great  value  of  his  lectures  on 
Mythology  and  Revelation  as  contributions  to  the 
philosophy  of  religion,  and  as  a  powerful  and,  on 
the  whole,  beneficent  incentive  to  the  study  of 
religion  in  its  history.  But  I  cannot  refrain  from 
saying  that,  with  all  his  brilliancy,  fertility  and 
poetic  insight,  Schelling  in  his  later  days  committed 
himself  to  a  mode  of  philosophizing,  the  form 
of  which  is  radically  unsound,  valuable  as  its  sub- 
stance in  many  respects  is;  and  that  whatever  is 
best  in  his  system  has  been  absorbed  and  super- 
seded by  a  greater  than  he.  The  higher  problems 
of  philosophy,  as  they  were  thrown  down  before 
the  world  by  Kant,  were  taken  up  by  Hegel,  after 
Schelling  had  done  his  best  to  solve  them  and  had 


!^36 


RCHBLLINO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  If)EALI8M. 


in  large  measure  failed,  and  were  attacked  anew 
with  a  vigor,  pertinacity  and  originality  that  have 
never  been  excelled  in  any  age.  If  in  Hegel  the 
pure  light  of  philosophy  does  not  shine,  it  may 
safely  be  said  that  it  has  not  yet  shone  upon  the 
earth. 


b-e-—^ 


CHAPTER  X. 


CONCLUDING   RFMAWKS. 

TN  previous  chapters  an  attempt  has  been  made 
-^  to  exhibit  the  phases  of  Scbelling's  philosophi- 
cal development  as  they  are  registered  in  the 
various  treatises  which  form  their  vehicle.  All 
the  elements  for  an  independent  judgment  have 
been  supplied  to  the  reader,  together  with  some 
hints  of  the  weak  parts  of  the  system,  but  it  ma;- 
be  of  some  little  use  to  students  of  Schelling  to  sf  y 
a  word  or  two  on  the  relation  of  his  philosophy 
as  a  whole  to  that  of  Kant,  anfl  to  suggest  one 
or  two  points  of  analogy  with  the  thought  of  our 
own  day. 

There  is  a  sort  of  dramatic  interest  in  follow- 
ing the  course  of  Schelling*s  speculations  that  does 
not  attach  in  quite  the  same  way  to  ^h?  study  of 
the  fully  articulated  system  of  Hegel.  The  start- 
ing point  and  the  goal  of  Schelling  seem,  and  in 
some  sense  are,  the  exact  opposite  of  each  other; 
his  development  is  not  so  much  evolution  as  revo- 
lution. In  the  one  we  have  the  unqualified  denial 
of  God  as  other  than  the  ideal  of  moral  perfec- 
tion; in  the  other,  we  have  the  unflinching  affir- 

8S7 


238     SCIIELLIN0*8  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


mation  of  the  reality  of  God  as  a  being  who  is 
the  sole  ground  of  explanation  of  all  finite  exist- 
ence. To  Schelling,  in  the  first  stage  of  his 
speculation,  man  is  all  in  all;  and  not  only  so, 
but  it  is  man  as  a  practically  active  or  moral 
being  who  is  regarded  as  the  centre  and  ground 
of  explanation  of  all  things.  At  the  end  of  his 
career,  man  has  ceased  for  Schelling  to  be  more 
than  the  medium  through  which  the  Divine  Being 
manifests  his  infinite  perfection,  although  without 
interfering  with  human  freedom.  The  process  by 
which  these  two  extremes  are  united  constitutes 
the  main  value  of  Schelling^s  philosophy,  and  the 
contemplation  of  the  manner  in  which  the  transi- 
tion is  effected  has  all  the  interest  attaching  to 
an  exhibition  of  the  links,  by  which  the  three 
great  spheres  of  reality  —  Man,  the  World  and 
God  — are  bound  together  in  unity.  Whatever 
may  be  said  of  Schelling's  solutions,  he  has  at 
least  traced  for  us  the  path  by  which  a  philoso- 
phy that  makes  any  effort  to  explain  all  the  facts 
of  life  must  proceed. 

In  looking  back  over  the  course  of  Schelling's 
development,  it  cannot  fail  to  suggest  itself  that 
the  point  from  which  his  philosophy  begins  is  the 
point  to  which  the  empirical  philosophy,  until 
lately  preeminent  in  England  and  elsewhere,  in- 


CONCLUDING   KEMARKS. 


;2dO 


evitably  tends.  Many  of  the  leaders  of  thought 
in  England  seem  to  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  only  "supersensible"  reality,  if  it  may  so 
be  designated,  is  the  reality  of  moral  law,  and 
that  the  only  solution  of  the  "  riddle  of  the  pain- 
ful earth,"  is  to  strive  manfully  to  do  one's  duty. 
This  is  in  large  measure  the  gospel  which  the 
followers  of  Comte,  Carlyle,  Arnold,  and  many 
Others  have  to  deliver;  and  the  burden  of  it  all 
is:  "Cease  to  seek  for  the  solution  of  the  insolu- 
ble problems  of  metaphysic,  and  concentrate  your 
energies  on  the  actual  which  is  here  and  now." 
That  this  should  be  regarded  as  the  last  word  of 
speculation  is  a  presumption  at  least  against  the 
truth  of  the  method  of  speculation  which  leads  to 
it.  For  the  advice  "  Don't  speculate  "  is  one  that 
cannot  be  taken.  Agnosticism  is  at  best  a  tem- 
porary phase  of  thought,  and  must  be  replaced  by 
something  more  positive.  And  it  throws  fresh 
light  on  the  weakness  of  empiricism  when  we  see 
that  the  source  of  the  agnosticism,  which  charac- 
terizes the  beginning  of  Schelling's  speculations,  is 
to  be  found  in  that  negative  attitude  towards  the 
supersensible,  which  is  maintained  by  Kant  in  the 
Critique  of.  Pure  Reason,  mainly  because  Kant 
was  determined  to  allow  full  rights  to  the  purely 
secular    consciousness.      Caprice  and   arbitrariness 


240     fiCHELLING^S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


must  be  banished  from  the  realm  of  our  every-daj 
life  and  experience,  and  hence  no  interference 
with  the  inviolable  laws  of  nature  can  be  allowed. 
It  is  this  determination  to  recognize  law  and  order 
in  that  which  is  around  us,  which  led  Kant,  as  it 
has  led  others,  to  deny  to  the  theoretical  faculty 
any  power  of  knowing  that  which  is  above  sensi- 
ble experience.  In  one  way  this  tendency  deserves 
hearty  commendation.  It  is  the  beginning  of  the 
speculative  reformation  in  the  realm  of  fact  and 
human  life,  corresponding  to  the  religious  refor- 
mation inaugurated  by  Luther.  Nothing  is  to  be 
accepted  that  is  not  certified  in  actual  sensible  ex- 
perience. But  that  only  the  lower  side  of  things 
is  in  this  way  taken  note  of,  is  also  taught  us  by 
Schelling,  not  less  than  by  Kant.  A  supersensible 
that  is  inconsistent  with  the  absoluteness  of  natural 
law  must  be  cast  aside,  but  not  a  supersensible 
which  ennobles  and  transfigures  the  sensible. 
While  the  result  of  Schelling's  speculation  in  its 
first  form  is  identical  with  that  of  empiricism,  its 
tendency  is  widely  different,  and  it  is  because  of 
this  different  tendency  that  it  gradually  developed, 
or  at  least  tended  to  develop,  into  something 
higher  and  better.  The  empiricist's  denial  of  the 
supersensible  is  but  the  obverse  of  his  assumption 
that  all   real  existence  is  independent  of  intelli- 


CONCLUDING    REMARKS. 


241 


gence;  and  hence  that  man,  both  as  intellectual 
and  as  moral,  is  governed  by  the  same  law  as 
applies  to  external  nature.  The  Absolute  cannot 
be  confined  within  the  frames  which  fit  the  par- 
ticular and  finite;  it  is  not  a  sensible  thing  to  be 
determined  as  substance,  as  cause,  or  as  in  recip- 
rocal activity  with  other  things.  The  recognition 
of  this  truth  constitutes  one  of  the  valid  claims 
on  our  gratitude  of  Kant  and  his  idealist  follow- 
ers. It  is  one  thing  to  say  that  the  Absolute  is 
unknowable  because  all  that  is  knowable  is  condi- 
tioned or  sensible;  another  and  a  very  different 
thing  to  say  that  the  Absolute  is  unknowable  as 
conditioned  or  sensible.  The  former  is  the  empir- 
ical formula,  the  latter  the  formula  of  a  true 
idealism.  For  one  who  takes  up  the  first  attitude, 
there  is  no  advance  to  the  supersensible,  so  long 
as  he  persists  in  it,  and  shuts  his  eyes  to  the  pos- 
sibility that  the  limitation  is  in  his  own  formula, 
rather  than  in  real  existence  as  a  whole.  If  th«3 
physical  categories  of  substance,  cause  and  reci- 
procity are  the  only  modes  in  which  rea-lity  can 
be  thought  by  us,  there  can  be  no  knowledge  of 
God,  and  therefore  for  us  no  God.  But  if  we 
only  say  with  Kant  that  these  categories  are  not 
applicable    to    the  Absolute,   on   supposition    that 

there  is  an  Absolute,  the  outlook  is  of  a  different 
16 


^42     SCHELLING's  transcendental  IDEALIiM. 

and  more  hopeful  kind.  The  denial  of  the  finitude 
or  conditioned  character  of  the  Absolute  is  an  indi- 
rect tribute  to  its  perfection.  Should  it  be  possible 
to  show  subsequently  that,  while  the  categories 
which  are  adequate  to  existence  as  conceived  in  its 
parts  are  inadequate  to  the  Absolute  as  the  Totality 
or  Ground  of  existence,  there  yet  are  categories 
which  are  adequate  to  it,  our  first  or  negative 
attitude  will  be  but  the  germ  and  prophecy  of  the 
positive.  Now  this,  as  we  have  seen  (Ghap.  I), 
is  the  position  taken  up  by  Kant  in  respect  to 
the  supersensible.  With  the  calmness  and  caution 
charac^'^ristic  of  all  his  speculations,  Kant  points 
out  that  the  Absolute,  as  the  unconditioned  totality 
of  all  conditions,  cannot  be  brought  under  the 
rubric  which  is  appropriate  to  the  conditioned  or 
relative.  The  imperfection  of  Kant  here  was 
that,  identifying  knowledge  as  a  whole  with 
knowledge  of  the  conditioned,  he  was  driven  to 
the  conclusion  that  reason  in  the  form  of  knowl- 
edge cannot  attain  to  the  comprehension  of  the 
Absolute,  but  can  only  indicate  what  its  nature 
is  not.  Hence  his  attempt  to  make  reason  as 
practical  bear  up  the  whole  weight  of  the  Abso- 
lute. The  inevitable  result  was  that  God  becomes 
for  Kant  a  "  moral  belief,"  not  an  object  of 
knowledge  —  as  if  belief  and  knowledge  could  thus 


f. 


CONCLUDING   REMARKS. 


243 


Initude 
n  indi- 
)0%nih\e 
egories 
I  in  its 
'otalifcy 
;egorie8 
egative 
of  the 
imp.  I), 
peci  to 
caution 
points 
totality 
ier  the 
oned  or 
re   was 
I    with 
iven  to 
knowl- 
of  the 
nature 
lason  as 
16  Abso* 
becomes 
bject   of 
uld  thus 


be  sundered  without  suspicion  being  cast  upon  the 
very  possibility  of  God's  existence.  There  was, 
therefore,  a  certain  justification  for  the  negative 
attitude  assumed  by  Schelling  towards  an  "ob- 
jective" God;  a  justification  (1)  in  the  fact  that 
the  God  whose  reality  he  denied  was,  as  the  tran- 
scendent God  of  deism,  really  finite,  and  (2)  in  the 
self-contradiction  of  the  Kantian  theory  from 
which  he  started.  However  little  we  can  at- 
tribute to  Kant  Schelling's  interpretation  of  the 
term  "postulate" — the  interpretation  that,  like 
the  postulates  of  geometry,  it  means  something 
to  be  done,  not  something  to  be  believed  in  as 
objective  —  it  must  be  admitted  that  it  is  a  fair 
deduction  from  the  letter  of  Kant's  theory.  For 
if  God  is  made  merely  an  object  of  "  belief,"  he  is 
as  existing  thrust  out  beyond  our  consciousness, 
and  so  becomes  a  transcendent  Being,  who,  as  out 
of  all  real  relation  to  our  reason,  is  for  us  "as 
good  as  nothing."  On  the  other  hand,  an  inter- 
pretation of  Kant,  based  on  the  spirit  rather  than 
on  the  letter  of  his  doctrine,  leads  to  a  different 
result.  God  may  be  beyond  knowledge  in  the 
sense  of  being  unconditioned  or  non-finite,  and 
may  yet  be  an  object  of  reason.  This  is  what 
Kant  strove  to  say,  however  he  may  have  failed 
to  say  it  in  an   unambiguous  and  self-consistent 


244     SCHELLING^S  TRAXSCBNDBNTAL  IDEALISM. 


way;  and  hence  we  can  understand  how  Schelling, 
starting  from  the  critical  position  that  nothing 
exists  which  is  out  of  relation  to  intelligence, 
should  first  deny  the  reality  of  a  transcendent 
God,  and  should  next,  hy  the  inner  dialectic  which 
led  to  that  denial,  be  compelled  ultimately  to 
affirm  his  reality. 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  pcilod  of  Schelling's 
speculative  activity,  as  represented  by  his  philoso- 
phy of  nature,  his  transcendental  philosophy,  and 
the  unity  of  both  in  the  system  of  identity.  The 
ethical  idealism  of  Schelling's  first  phase  of 
thought — an  idealism  without  God — could  not 
be  permanently  satisfactory  to  one  who  had  drunk 
deep  of  the  spring  of  critical  idealism.  "  Conduct," 
as  Mr.  Matthew  Arnold  is  so  fond  of  saying,  may 
be  "  three-fourths  of  life,"  but  conduct  cannot  rest 
on  the  bosom  of  nothing.  When  a  contrast  is 
drawn,  as  it  so  commonly  is  drawn,  between  "con- 
duct "  and  "  thinking,"  it  seems  to  be  forgotten  that 
the  conduct  of  a  man  is  determined  by  the  quality 
of  his  thinking.  No  doubt  men  may  have  good 
thoughts  while  their  conduct  is  bad;  but,  there  is 
not,  conversely,  any  good  conduct  that  is  not  set  in 
motion  and  controlled  by  good  thinking.  The  sup- 
position that  there  is  arises  from  confusing  explicit 
or  reflective  thinking  with  thinking  in  general.    It 


CONCLUDING    RBMARKS. 


245 


elUng, 
othing 
igence, 
endent 
which 
ely   to 

slling'i! 
>hilo80- 
ly,  and 
'.    The 
ase    of 
Id    not 
drunk 
nduot," 
ig,  may 
lot  rest 
trast  is 


I 


t(, 


con- 
en  that 
quality 
re  good 
there  is 
t  set  in 
'he  sup- 
explicit 
iral.    It 


is  one  thing  to  be  dominated  by  a  true  thought,  and 
another  thing  to  be  able  to  give  a  formal  and 
precise  statement  of  what  that  thought  is,  and  the 
ultimate  grounds  of  it.  But  the  task  of  philosophy 
just  is,  to  state  in  the  explicit  form  of  reflection 
that  which  is  implicit  in  the  life  and  action  of  good 
men.  Hence  it  is  that  no  philosophy,  which  knows 
what  it  is  about,  can  decline  the  task  of  bringing 
the  scientific  view  of  the  real  world  into  harmony 
with  its  view  of  morality.  The  attempt  to  put 
asunder  two  things  so  indissolubly  joined  together 
inevitably  revenges  itself,  as  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy has  shown,  in  agnosticism  or  mysticism.  In  a 
philosophy  which  makes  morality  all  in  all,  and 
knowledge  nothing,  the  reality  of  the  supersensible 
is  naturally  denied  on  the  ground  that  a  knowledge 
of  it  is  unnecessary  to  conduct;  or  at  best  it  is 
bodied  forth  as  a  mysterious  and  inaccessible  region. 
Schelling  was  therefore  right  when  he  refused  to 
acquiesce  in  the  ethical  idealism  of  Fichte,  and, 
under  the  guidance  of  Kant,  "broke  through  to 
nature."  But  even  in  the  very  phrase  of  a  "  breach 
to  nature,"  by  which  he  designated  his  diflference 
from  Fichte,  Schelling  proclaims  at  once  the  weak- 
ness and  the  strength  of  his  peculiar  position  in  the 
march  of  an  idealist  philosophy.  The  strength  of 
the  new  attitude  is  that  a  knowledge  of  nature  is 


*H6     SCHELLINO'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM. 


regarded  as  essential  to  a  complete  solution  of  the 
problem  of  philosophy:  its  weakness  is  that  it  still' 
opposes  thinking  and  being  as  if  they  were  two 
separate  realities  of  equal  worth.  Pass  along  the 
line  of  thought,  and  you  do  indeed  find  that  there  is 
no  thought  that  has  not  being  as  its  object;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  this  being  is  conceived  as  in  some 
sense  merely  the  representation  or  picture  of 
reality,  not  reality  itself.  Follow  out  the  evolution 
of  being,  and  you  at  last  come  to  thinking,  but 
this  thinking  is  somehow  a  product  of  being.  Evi- 
dently Schelling  has  not  got  rid  of  dualism,  refined 
as  the  dualism  is  to  which  he  has  committed  him- 
self. Hence  he  feels  himself  compelled  to  seek  for 
a  uniting  principle,  which  shall  bind  together  what 
he  has  illicitly  separated.  This  principle  or  abso- 
lute thus  becomes  a  sort  of  "pre-established  har- 
mony," accounting  for  the  corres;  ^.dence  of  the 
"subjective  subject-object"  and  the  "objective  sub- 
ject-object." Now  the  idea  of  a  pre-established 
harmony  is  merely  an  enunciation  of  the  problem, 
not  a  solution  of  it.  Two  relatives  are  illegiti- 
mately separated  and  then  artificially  united.  The 
source  of  Schelling's  mistake  lies,  as  I  have  tried  to 
show  above  (Chap.  VIII),  in  his  failure  to  subordi- 
nate nature  to  spirit,  and  in  the  consequent  elimi- 
nation of  self-consciousness  from  the  universe.    The 


CONCLUDING    REMARKS. 


247 


of  the 
it  still' 
e  two 
ng  the 
here  is 

)Ut,  Oil 

1  some 

ire    of 

olution 

ig,  but 

Evi- 

refined 

id  him- 

leek  for 

er  what 

►r  abso- 

ed  har- 

of  the 

ive  sub- 

Eiblished 

)roblein, 

illegiti- 

i.     The 

tried  to 

subordi- 

it  elinii- 

se.    The 


proof  of  this  need  not  be  repeated,  but  it  may  be  of 
advantage  to  show  the  relation  of  this  second  phase 
of  Schelling's  speculation  to  the  philosophy  of 
Kant. 

At  the  point  reached  by  Kant  in  the  second  part 
of  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  the  phenomenal 
world  is  shown  to  lead  necessarily  to  the  idea  of  the 
noumenal  world,  the  conditioned  to  the  uncondi- 
tioned, the  relative  to  the  absolute,  the  part  to  the 
whole.  The  absolute,  however,  is  presented  in  a 
purely  negative  way  as  that  which  is  not  condi- 
tioned, relative  or  partial.  Hence  it  tends  to 
assume  the  form  of  a  pure  blank  identity,  in  which 
the  differences  of  things  as  yet  are  not.  Now  if  we 
take  up  the  philosophy  of  Kant  at  this  point,  and 
treat  it  as  final,  we  are  inevitably  driven  to  the 
pantheistic  absorption  of  all  things  in  the  absolute. 
Hence,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  those  who  like  Schopen- 
hauer, assume  that  Kant  has  here  said  the  last  true 
word,  are  led  to  regard  man  and  nature  as  manifes- 
tations of  an  unconscious  will,  which  is  in  reality 
simply  a  blind  force.  Schelling,  in  the  second 
phase  of  his  speculation,  to  a  certain  extent  does 
JEissume  the  finality  of  this  stage  in  the  Kantian 
.  philosophy:  with  the  result  as  we  have  seen,  of 
unspiritualising  nature  because  he  has  denatural- 
ized spirit.     Here  in  fact  we  find  Schelling,  vrith 


MOH 


248   schbllino'b  transcendental  idealism. 


disastrous  consequences  to  his  philosophy,  branching 
off  from  Fichte  in  a  wrong  direction.  In  the  idea 
of  a  unit>  combining  both  mind  and  nature  he  is 
perfectly  right,  and  to  that  extent  he  is  entirely  at 
one  with  Hegel ;  but  in  virtually  making  that  unity 
abstract  instead  of  concrete  he  has  let  go  of  the 
principle  of  a  self-consistent  idealism.  For  if 
nature  is  nothing  apart  from  its  relations  to  intelli- 
gence, as  Schelling  in  agreement  with  Kant  meant 
to  affirm,  it  is  evident  that  the  absolute  must  be 
sought  not  in  the  abstract  residuum  which  arises 
from  the  elimination  of  the  differences  of  spirit 
and  nature,  but  in  the  concrete  unity  embracing 
both  and  therefore  lifting  nature  into  the  pure 
ether  of  spirit.  It  would  be  unjust  however  to 
Schelling,  as  it  is  to  Kant,  to  hold  him  tightly  to 
the  bare  letter  of  his  system.  His  philosophy  is 
not  a  mere  repetition  of  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza; 
for  by  Spinoza  thought  and  extension  are  conceived 
simply  as  the  attributes  of  substance,  mind  and 
nature  as  things  in  reciprocal  relation  to  each 
other;  whereas  Schelling  never  surrenders  the 
belief  in  the  self-conscious  activity  of  mind,  but 
rather  seeks  to  show  that  both  nature  and  mind  are 
manifestations  of  a  single  self-conscious  activity. 
Hence,  while  the  final  result  of  the  philosophy  of 
Spinoza  is  the  denial  of  freedom  and  the  degrada- 


CONCLUDING   REMARKS. 


249 


lion  of  human  actions  to  mere  links  in  the  chain  of 
a  blind  causality,  Schelling,  with  a  noble  inconsist- 
ency, holds  fast  by  the  unconditioned  freedom  of 
man  and  his  elevation  above  the  ceaseless  flow  of 
mechanical  succession.  In  the  second  phase  of  his 
philosophic  development,  as  in  the  first,  we  see  at 
work  two  rival  claimants  for  powei  neither  of 
which  can  gain  the  mastery  over  the  other. 

In  the  last  phase  of  his  speculation  Schelling 
labors,  with  sinking  spirits  and  only  under  the 
guidance  of  stray  flashes  of  light,  to  establish  the 
self-conscious  personality  of  God.  Judged  by  his 
actual  achievements,  this  flnal  stage  of  his  develop- 
ment is  very  unsatisfactory.  The  belief  in  the 
universe  as  the  abode  of  spirit  Schelling  cannot 
give  up,  feeling  it  to  be  the  truth  of  truths;  but 
that  belief  he  does  not  see  his  way  to  justify  by 
an  ascent  of  the  hard  path  of  pure  speculation, 
and  so  he  gives  us  not  philosophy  but  poetry.  The 
fatal  mistake  which  he  made  in  co('>rdinating  na- 
ture and  spirit,  when  he  swerved  from  the  narrow 
path  of  ethical  idealism,  he  was  seemingly  unable 
to  retrieve,  and  he  can  but  fall  back  on  uncritical 
intuition.  Here  also  his  relation  to  Kant  is  of 
the  closest  kind.  The  critical  philosophy  had  found 
in  the  idea  of  the  world  as  a  manifestation  of  that 
which  we  are  compelled  to  figure  to  ourselves  ae 


250     BCII£LLINO*8  TBAM8CBNDENTAL  IDEALIHM. 


purpose,  the  fulcrum  by  which  the  negations  of 
empiricism  were  to  be  overthrown  and  ^he  existence 
of  a  supreme  reason  established.  But  Kant  could 
not  persuade  himself  that  the  universe  is  actually 
a  teleological  system;  the  furthest  he  was  pre- 
pared to  go  was  that  we  cannot  otherwise  present 
it  to  ourselves.  Thus  to  the  end  the  shadow  thrown 
by  the  empirical  conception  of  the  world  comes 
between  Kant  and  Him  who  is  "not  far  from  every 
one  of  us.'*  For  Kant*s  denial  of  teleology  as  an 
absolute  truth  is  mainly  due  to  his  assumption 
that  knowledge  can  only  be  of  the  finite,  phenom- 
enal or  relative;  or,  what  is  at  bottom  the  same 
thing,  that  the  only  constitutive  categories  are 
those  which  he  has  shown  to  be  true  of  finite 
things.  Schelling  therefore  erred  by  taking  Kant 
too  literally,  and  neglecting  the  spirit  of  his  phi- 
losophy. For  that  spirit,  carried  out  to  its  fine 
issues,  assuredly  leads  to  the  reasoned  conviction 
that  the  world  as  a  whole  is  the  self-revelation  of 
spirit,  and  therefore  the  manifestation  of  purpose. 
Hegel  in  relieving  the  critical  philosophy  of  the 
beggarly  elements  clinging  to  it  and  allowing  it 
to  rise  up  to  the  higher  zones  of  spirit,  is  the 
true  follower  of  Kant.  Discarding  with  Fichte 
the  gratuitous  fiction  of  a  thing-in-itself  beyond 
knowledge,   he    agrees  with  Schelling   in  holding 


i 


CONCLUDING   KKMAKKH. 


251 


I 


that   nature  is  nothing  apart  from    intelligence; 
but,  instead  of  degrading  intelligence  by  assimila- 
ting it  to  nature,  he  raises  nature  up  to  intelli- 
gence.     Nor  will  he  allow  of  any  leaps  from  the 
lowest  to  the  highest  categories,  but  seeks  to  put 
every  category  in  its  place,  and  to  connect  all  by 
the  bond  of  an  organic  movement.     Hence  the  im- 
portance he  attaches  to  the  separate  consideration 
of  the   variouif  functions  by   which   the  world   is 
thought,  and  by  which  at  last  it  is  seen  to  be  a 
fully  rounded  system.     In  the  same  way  the  con- 
crete world  is  followed  up  from   its  lowest  ideal 
beginnings  in  space  and  time  until  it  issues  in  a 
universe  radiant  in  the  light  and  love  of  a  personal 
God.    The  best  fruit  of  the  study  of  Schelling  is 
the  hold  it  enables  us  to  have  over  the  infinitely 
richer   and  fuller  system   of  his  successor  Hegel. 
Fichte  and  Schelling   may   perhaps    be    neglected 
without  serious  loss,  although  the  study  of  their 
writings  is  not  to  be  despised,  but  to  neglect  Kant 
and  Hegel  is  to  lose  the  highest  philosophical  edu- 
cation   which    the    flow    of    human    thought    has 
brought  down  and  laid  at  our  feet. 


